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Abstract 
Information economics 1s used to develop a model of technological 
innovation which is applied to the case of computer program copyright. 
A critical outline of the neo-classical economic perspective of innovation 
and Arrow's concerns regarding appropriability of information is 
provided. This perspective justifies intellectual property institutions as a 
correction of market failure and as a "reward for invention". The same 
literature marginalises countervailing arguments including monopoly 
distortions, alternative sources of innovator reward and the potential for 
anti-competitive strategies. 
Information economics provides a distinct and preferred perspective in 
the analysis of technological development and in the role of intellectual 
property in the promotion of innovat~on. The conception of information 
as a resource, rather than as a commodity, implies that information is part 
of a shared technological capital, whose indivisibilities should be 
exploited for social benefit. The information perspective conceives 
innovation as a messy, evolutionary and interactive process involving 
many participants, and a cycle of innovation characterised by incremental 
improvements, imitation and learning strategies, and technological 
trajectories influenced by bounded rationality. These environments will 
also generate powerful network externalities. 
A model of innovation based on these assumptions is developed which 
incorporates two major distinctions. One is between tacit and codified 
knowledge; the other is between technology and technological artefacts. 
This knowledge-artefact distinction is defined in the innovation model by 
the concept of an information technology artefact, characterised as a 
physical product whose underlying means of creation is not 
communicated by mere possession of that product. This innovation 
model is reconciled to the intellectual property regimes of confidential 
iv 
information, patent and copyright, demonstrating the use of legal 
doctrines to encourage the diffusion of tacit knowledge through society. 
Applying the innovation model to the question of computer programs, it 
is argued that programs in their executable of machine code forms 
correspond to the concept of an IT artefact, in that possession of machine 
code does not imply access to the underlying source code. The process of 
software development and the utility of decompilation are discussed in 
this context, particularly the lack of isomorphic correspondence between 
machine code and third or higher generation source code languages. The 
close analogy between the software development model and the scenario 
of confidential information suggests a limited role for copyright of 
computer programs beyond a prohibition of literal copying or piracy. 
Arguments favouring broader protection of non-literal elements of 
computer programs are critically reviewed and prescriptions for 
proprietary protocols, user interfaces and standards in the literature are 
rejected as inconsistent with the realisation of network externalities by the 
software industry. An information economics perspective instead 
recommends the encouragement of reverse engineering and imitative 
competition provided that developers implement their own source code 
solutions to invest in the diffusion of tacit programming knowledge. 
Decompilation should be permitted to provide a limited degree of access 
to internal interfaces and communications protocols. Elements of a user 
interface should not be protected. Copyright regimes in the United States, 
Europe and Australia are assessed against the policy prescriptions 
generated by the application of the innovation model to computer 
programs. The influence of political actors and international pressures 
such as TRIPS are noted. It is hoped that the infusion of an information 
economics approach might trigger the switch in perspective needed in 
policy debates to preserve the integrity of the intellectual commons. 
v 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Economic activity is increasingly dominated by the production, 
distribution and consumption of information. Developments in the 
literature herald a new age of rapidly expanding "knowledge industries" 
and "information economies") Computer programs are increasingly 
important facilitators of the use of technology, in applications as diverse 
as word processing, robot-based manufacturing and medical science. 
A key issue in this information economy is the role of intellectual 
property in promoting technological innovation. A tension exists 
between offering a reward of a "limited monopoly" as an incentive to 
innovators, and preventing that limited monopoly from both exacting 
excessive profits and discouraging or impeding the production of 
information by limiting later author's access to the public domain. The 
policy question is where to strike the proper balance between these 
objectives in the interests of innovation and technological advancement. 
This thesis uses an information economics perspective to develop a 
1 Machlup, F. (1962) The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United 
States (Princeton University Press: Princeton); Porat, M. (1977) The Information 
Economy (US Department of Commerce: Washington); Jonscher, C. (1983) "Information 
Resources and Economic Productivity" Information Economics and Policy Vol. 1 pp. 13-
35; OECD Documents, Employment and Growth in the Knowledge Based Economy 
(OECD, Paris 1996). 
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model of technological innovation which is the applied to the case of 
computer program copyright to suggest where this balance should be 
found. 
1.2 Motivation and scope 
Much of the legal literature in the area of copyright and computer 
programs is concerned with the extent to which the law does or does not 
apply to program code, to its "structure, sequence and organisation", and 
to other "non-literal" elements such as user interfaces. Few articles have 
engaged in a normative evaluation of desirable characteristics for an 
intellectual property regime for computer programs.2 This thesis seeks to 
provide such a contribution through the development of a model of 
innovation grounded in information economics. Statements by 
legislators, the judiciary and commentators in respect of contentious 
issues of the practical interpretation of software copyright legislation 
demonstrate an attachment to neo-classical economic theory and faith in 
the application of legal semantics such as the idea-expression dichotomy. 
This thesis challenges both these approaches. 
Legal systems derived from English jurisprudence have traditionally been 
seen as reluctant to extend property protection to the products of 
2 A notable exception is Samuelson, P., Davis, R., Kapor, M.D. and Reichman, J.H. 
(1994) /1 A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" Columbia 
Law Review, Vol. 94, p. 2308. 
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"ingenuity, knowledge, skill or labour".3 The granting of intellectual 
property rights has rested largely on the economic argument that they 
provide stimulation to innovation, thereby promoting national economic 
advancement and consumer and social welfare.4 Economics is, therefore, 
used as a benchmark against which the policy recommendations 
developed in this thesis, and those submitted by others in the literature, 
can be assessed. Like Machlup5, the thesis assumes that: 
While economic analysis does not yet provide a basis for choosing 
between "all or nothing", it does provide a sufficiently firm basis 
for decisions about "a little more or a little less" of various 
ingredients [of intellectual property]. 
More particularly, however, an information economics approach is 
adopted. Information economics is the area of economics which analyses 
the "processes by which information and knowledge is produced, 
diffused, stored and used".6 The information perspective assumes that 
information capacities of economic actors are imperfect due to 
information asymmetries, arising from literacy, geographical location and 
technical proficiency, as well as degrees of cognition, based on language, 
innate intellectual ability and education. The analysis presented within 
3 
4 
5 
6 
e.g. Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co. Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479 
at p.509 per Dixon J. 
Ricketson, S., The Law of Intellectual Property (1984) pp. 425-426. 
Sub-Committee on Patents, Trade-marks and Copyrights of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, United States Senate (1958) An Economic Review of the Patent System 
(USGPO: Washington) p. 80. . 
Lamberton, D.M. (ed.) (1971) Economics of Information and Knowledge (Penguin: 
Hammondsworth) p. 7. 
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this thesis falls within the fourth strand of Machlup's list of areas 
comprising information economics? 
... analysing the creation and utilisation of new technology, and 
the incentives for research, development, invention, innovation 
and diffusion of knowledge. 
Computer programs are themselves special forms of technology and it has 
been characteristics such as ease of replication which has driven 
legislative action to include computer programs as "literary works" 
within copyright laws internationally. Some assertions within the 
literature, however, of easy access to the knowledge underlying a 
computer program require reappraisal. Close attention to the nature of 
computer programs and the software development process is, therefore, 
essential to challenge these assumptions. 
Likewise, it is empty to argue about the economic value of an intellectual 
property system without specifying and evaluating that system's criteria.8 
Legal analysis is, therefore, required of the copyright regimes in place 
internationally to assess whether the current state of the law is consistent 
with the policy recommendations developed from the innovation model. 
The scope of the thesis includes three major foci for discussion: an 
economic analysis and development of the model of innovation; the 
7 
8 
Machlup, F. (1984) Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution and Economic Signif icance, 
Vol. III: The Economics of Information and Human Capi ta l (Princeton University 
Press: Princeton) p . 6. 
Cheung, S.N.S. (1986) "Property Rights and Invention" Research in Law and 
Economics, Vol. 8, p. 5 at p. 9. 
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application of this model to software through a consideration of computer 
program qualities; and finally an assessment of the state of copyright law 
internationally. 
1.3 Structure 
Chapter Two notes that the foundation on which arguments for broader 
protection of intellectual property and computer programs copyright in 
particular, are based within a "reward for invention" argument. This 
argument has its origins in work by Arrow and concerns about the 
appropriability of information. Limiting access to information through 
the imposition of intellectual property rights seeks to mimic the 
excludable and tradeable qualities of physical goods. The chapter also 
demonstrates that later literature has extrapolated this argument to the 
point where the "balance" issue - public domain access to information -
is marginalised. Most particularly this is seen in downplaying the 
potential distortions from monopoly rights, the avenues for rewarding 
innovators other than through royalties, and the potential use of 
intellectual property for anti-competitive strategies. 
Chapter Three provides a counterpoint to the neo-classical "commodity" 
view of information in outlining the preferable view that information is 
instead a "resource", or an element of a shared technological capital. The 
characteristics of information and the innovation process are contrasted 
between the neo-classical and information economic perspectives. The 
neo-classical view is progress through "invention", an isolated process 
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typically involving a single firm. The information economics view 1s 
that progress is an evolutionary and interactive learning process 
involving many participants. This process suggests a cumulative and 
incremental cycle of innovation driven by bounded rationality and 
displaying powerful network externalities. Such an environment implies 
significant lead times providing rewards to innovation. 
Chapter Four uses an information economics perspective to develop a 
model of innovation. In this model, information does not possess strong 
"public good" characteristics, but its flows are limited by its embodiment 
in modes of human understanding and within its application to 
production. Two key concepts are drawn from existing literature and 
combined in this model. One is a distinction between "tacit" and 
"codified" knowledge, while the other is a distinction between knowledge 
in abstract and knowledge embodied in a physical product, defined as an 
"information technology artefact" or "IT artefact" for the purposes of this 
thesis. A significant assumption in this IT artefact model of innovation is 
that possession of the artefact (the physical product) does not 
communicate the underlying knowledge or means for its creation (the 
tacit and codified knowledge). This model is applied (and adapted where 
appropriate) to the intellectual property regimes of confidential 
information, patent and copyright. It is argued that the intellectual 
property laws promote innovation by the encouragement of flows of tacit 
knowledge through society. 
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Chapter Five applies the IT artefact model of innovation to computer 
programs. This involves a demonstration of the central quality of an IT 
artefact (program in executable form) - lack of access to underlying 
knowledge (source code and materials) - thereby1 a rejection of a widely 
held assumption within the legal literature. This is based on an 
examination of the nature of computer programs and the development 
process, supplemented by the Appendices. In particular the chapter 
argues that third and higher generation languages bear no isomorphic 
identity with their compiled machine code and that decompilation (more 
accurately disassembly) is of limited use in understanding the source code 
of a program of any size or sophistication. It is argued that a closer 
analogy exists between the IT artefact model of computer program 
innovation and the regime of confidential information than to the 
regime of copyright, which assumes a high degree of access to codified 
knowledge from possession of the product. This implies that progress is 
by imitative competition and reverse engineering, with a limited role for 
copyright in prohibiting replication or "piracy" of machine code 
programs. 
Chapter Six critically reviews the legal and economic literature favouring 
broader protection of computer programs than the limited role suggested 
by the innovation model. In particular the issue is whether copyright 
should extend to the more abstract, creative and stylistic elements of 
software, so called "non-literal" copying. Economic arguments are found 
to be based on a neo-classical perspective and assume maximisation to 
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returns to innovators and protection of investment as the overriding 
objective. Creativity arguments misconceive the nature of the computer 
programming as akin to a literary or artistic endeavour. The realisation 
of network externalities (and avoidance of their anti-competitive 
exploitation) dictates that interfaces, including user interfacesi and 
standard programming techniques should not be the subject of 
proprietary claims in copyright. Policy recommendations are summarised 
at the conclusion of this chapter. 
Chapter Seven examines the United States, Europe and Australia to assess 
the state of the legislative and judicial interpretations of copyright over 
computer programs against the policy prescriptions suggested by the 
information perspective. The focus of discussion is whether the idea-
expression distinction and the doctrine of fair use (or "fair dealing") are 
effective mechanisms in drawing the line between protected and 
unprotected elements of programs, and in providing a "bright-line" test 
for infringement. Extensions of the concept of "expression" to include 
"non-literal" aspects of programs - at odds with these prescriptions - can 
be reconciled as a confusion between evidentiary and doctrinal issues. In 
particular, the approach of the United States Second Circuit in Altai9, 
involving a complex factual determination, reflects a methodology based 
on circumstantial evidence of copying of source code. The preferred 
approach whe.re there is no evidence of misappropriation in access to 
9 Computer Associates International Inc. v Altai Inc. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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source code or related materials is articulated in the appeal judgments in 
Borland1D (United States, First Circuit) and Powerflex11 (Australia, Full 
Federal Court). This approach is based on whether the non-literal 
element is itself protectable under copyright. The state of the law will, 
however, remain uncertain until the US Supreme Court is able to rule on 
a new appeal12 and the Australian High Court hears the pending appeal 
in Powerflex. The political considerations surrounding intellectual 
property policy are also discussed, with particular emphasis on coalitions 
of vested interests, international mechanisms such as the Berne 
Convention and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), and unilateral trade actions by the United States Government in 
driving change in the direction of broader and longer protection. 
Chapter Eight provides a overview of the discussion and its major 
findings, outlines the contributions made by this thesis, and concludes 
with a reflection related future issues. 
10 Lotus Development Corporation v Borland International Inc. 49 F. 3d 807 (1st Cir. 
1995). 
11 Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation [1997] FCA 490. 
12 The Borland appeal was tied 4-4 so the decision of the First Circuit stood. 
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Chapter Two 
Information as a Commodity 
2.1 Introduction 
The major objective of this thesis is to examine innovation from an 
information economics perspective and to examine computer program 
copyright in that context. This chapter provides a review of the orthodox 
economics literature against which such an information economics 
perspective can be juxtaposed. Many policy arguments in respect of 
copyright, and protection of computer programs in particular, rely on the 
economic orthodoxy critically examined in this chapter. The review 
begins with the seminal work of Arrow and demonstrates its extension to 
more general propositions about intellectual property policy. The central 
feature of the orthodox economic argument is the maximisation of 
reward to the inventor. A the same time other opportunities for reward, 
the distorting effects of monopoly, and avenues for market power have 
been marginalised within the literature. 
The policy objective of intellectual property is, in broad terms, the 
encouragement of technological progress.13 Conventional economic 
analyses suggest that imposition of "commodity" characteristics upon 
information will overcome a perceived lack of appropriability of the 
13 Besen, S.M. & Raskind, L.J. (1991) " An Introduction to the Law and Economics of 
Intellectual Property", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, p. 3; and Ricketson, S. 
(1984) The Law of Intellectual Property pp. 425-426. 
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information thereby securing to the creator the chance of a return which 
encourages investment. The traditionally accepted model of invention 
within the economics literature has been one where information is seen 
as the result of a process analogous to industrial output. Nonexcludable 
and nonrivalrous characteristics of this "invention-product" are said to 
justify enforcement of property rights on the basis of "market failure". 
The key propositions, elaborated below, of the conventional model are as 
follows: 
• without regulation, information has "public good" characteristics; 
• lack of appropriability associated with public goods leads to market 
failure and underinvestment in inventive activity; 
• through artificial scarcity imposed by intellectual property laws, the 
value of information in the hands of users becomes appropriable; 
• investment in the creation of information is directly related to the 
degree to which this value can be appropriated by the 
investor I owner. 
The above propositions form the basis for much of the economic 
literature concerned with intellectual property policy. As later discussion 
demonstrates14 such economic arguments are widespread within the 
computer program copyright debate. From an information perspective, 
however, such arguments may justify inappropriate public policy choices. 
14 See particularly Chapter Six. 
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The role of this chapter is to provide a critical overview of the 
foundations of this literature against which the information perspective 
is a counterpoint. 
2.2 Arrow's model of information 
The pedigree of most of the neo-classical economic literature on 
intellectual property can be traced from Arrow's 1962 paper15 on the 
allocation of resources for invention. At this point it is appropriate to 
distinguish two terms used in this thesis. The term "invention" is used 
in this chapter since it is found in most the economic literature. The 
remainder of this thesis uses the term "innovation" to describe the 
process of technological progress in abstract.16 The concept of invention as 
a "product" and connotations of intra-firm technological development 
are consistent with the orthodox literature presented in this chapter. The 
term "innovation" is based on an information perspective which 
emphasises the incremental nature of the process and is chosen 
deliberately in contrast to the term "invention" which suggests an 
isolated event of inspiration. While the connotations differ, the 
denotation of both "invention" and "innovation" is technological 
progress in general. The terms appear to be used interchangeably within 
15 Arrow, K.J. (1962) "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention" 
in National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive 
Activity: Economic and Social Factors (Princeton University Press: Princeton) pp. 609 -
625. 
16 Analogous to Mandeville's concept of "innovative process": Mandeville, T. D. (1996) 
Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, and the Patent System 
(Ablex: New Jersey). 
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the legal literature. 
Arrow discussed information problems in respect of agents within a 
market. The three key propositions that neo-classical economic theory 
has borrowed from Arrow are that: 
• uncertainty leads to underinvestment in risky activities (such as 
invention); 
• information is nonexcludable, which leads to market failurei and 
• information is indivisible: the cost of producing information is 
unrelated to its value to users. 
Arrow found that uncertainty creates risk and that devices for shifting 
risks are limited and imperfect (including, but not limited to, moral 
hazard effects).17 According to his analysis, there is an expectation of 
underinvestment in risky activities relative to a Pareto optimal allocation 
of resources to such projects. Arrow argued that, within a context of 
market uncertainty, information itself "becomes a commodity" since it is 
valuable to economic agents in overcoming uncertainty.IS Arrow 
characterised invention as the production of this information-
commodity. Inherent uncertainties in production also suggest an 
underinvestment in inventive activities. 
He identified a "fundamental paradox" of demand for information: that 
17 Ibidem pp. 610-614. 
18 Id p. 614. 
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the value to the purchaser is not known until the content is revealed, at 
which point the potential purchaser has acquired the information to 
some degree. Information is said to be "nonexcludable". Sale on an open 
market, therefore, may result in a purchaser reproducing the information 
at little or no cost. This is the origin of the frequently cited 
"appropriability" problem; the second important factor leading to an 
underinvestment in invention and research. This has also been described 
as the "public good" problem. A product is said to be a public good if 
those who consume . the good might not pay for it (nonexcludability) and 
its benefit in consumption by one person does not unequivocally reduce 
its benefit in consumption by another (nonrivalrous competition).19 
Arrow's third element was "indivisibility": that the cost of producing 
information is unrelated to the extent of its use and value in the hands of 
others. He noted that the cost involved in transmitting information is 
frequently very low. An efficient (Pareto optimal) market outcome would 
imply distribution of the information at marginal cost, which may be 
zero. Social welfare would, therefore, be maximised by diffusion of 
information throughout society at little cost. Pareto optimality is typically 
used as a benchmark for maximisation of economic welfare. It is the 
point at which no individual can be made better off without making 
another individual worse off. Arrow's analysis suggests that free 
19 For the classic exposition of public goods theory, see Samuelson, P.A. (1954) "The Pure 
Theory of Public Expenditure" Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 36 p. 387; 
Baurnol, W.J. & Ordover, J.A. (1988) "Antitrust Policy for High Technology 
Industries" Proceedings 7th International Telecommunications Society Conference. 
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diffusion of information and knowledge throughout society promotes 
economic welfare. 
A graphical representation of the Arrow model is provided in Figure 2-1. 
The purpose of the representation is to act as a prelude to the model 
implied by the conventional analysis (Figure 2-2) and the contrasting 
informational model of innovation (presented in Chapter Four). In the 
Arrow model the capital provider invests in a process of invention. 
Invention is a process which produces information (an intangible 
commodity). Information is valuable to users in managing risk, yet its 
full value is not appropriable to the capital provider since information 
may be (almost) costlessly transmitted to other users who do not provide 
a return ("free riders"). In evaluating the cost of investment to the 
benefits of returns, Arrow's model implies that there will be 
underinvestment relative to a measure of Pareto optimal efficiency. This 
proposition is the major focus of subsequent literature. The other 
proposition relating to indivisibilities, however, suggested that the value 
of the benefits of information production are unrelated to the val.ue of 
investment. That is, some types of information may be produced at little 
cost that are of enormous benefit to society. The intellectual property 
literature has instead assumed a significant level of investment in 
research and development and limited avenues for extracting a return. 
This theme is developed in the following section. 
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2.3 Reward for Invention 
It is axiomatic within the orthodox literature that, once an information-
good has passed beyond the inventor and any immediate contracting 
parties, it is difficult or impossible to recover from third parties a share of 
the benefits which flow to them from use of the information-good. The 
argument follows that, in the private market, there will be 
underproduction, relative to a "socially optimal" quantity and quality of 
information-goods, unless there is some government intervention to 
create an incentive to invest. 
From this simple proposition comes the principal justification for 
intellectual property rights - the hypothesis that both risk and 
appropriability can be addressed (imperfectly according to Arrow) by 
creating "legally imposed property rights".20 Demsetz21, in commenting 
directly on Arrow's paper, argued: 
The degree to .which knowledge is privately appropriable can be 
increased by raising the penalties for patent violations and by 
increasing resources for policing patent violations . .. Given the 
appropriate legal apparatus and schedule of penalties it may be no 
more difficult to police property rights in many kinds of knowledge 
than it is to prevent the theft of automobiles and cash. 
This argument by Demsetz was central to much of the policy literature 
and political arguments surrounding intellectual property. His assertion 
20 Arrow, K.J. (1962) "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention" 
in National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive 
Activity (Princeton University Press) pp. 609-626 at p. 615. 
21 Demsetz, H. (1970) "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint" Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 1-22. 
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was that maximisation of private appropriability through intervention of 
legal institutions (such as copyright) would facilitate market mechanisms 
and provide social benefit. 
Much subsequent literature from this tradition - particularly that 
originating from the Chicago school22 - has accepted the "reward for 
invention" argument as flowing naturally from Arrow's paper. Private 
property rights are said to provide an incentive for the production of 
intellectual property because, if successfully marketed, there is a chance of 
obtaining a return in the form of income which creators can obtain 
through royalties and licensing.23 The role of intellectual property laws, 
therefore, can be seen as to ensure the appropriability of the value of the 
works when in the hands of users. Failure to provide for appropriability 
in this fashion leads to a less than socially optimal amount of investment 
in invention.24 
The "reward for invention" thesis assumes that market failure is 
corrected only if intangibles are forced, through legal institutions, to 
exhibit the same economic characteristics as tangibles. The conception of 
information creation as a production chain is a necessary incident of the 
22 e.g. Dam, KW. (1994) "The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law" Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 23, pp. 247-271. 
23 Arrow, K., (1962) "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention" in 
National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: 
Economic and Social Factors p.619. 
24 Taylor, C.T. and Silberston, Z.A. (1973) The Economic Impact of the Patent System 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge) at p. 25. 
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conception of information as a commodity.25 The consequences of this 
commodity approach are portrayed in Figure 2-2. The purpose of this 
figure, prepared by the author, is to show the conceptual extension from 
Arrow's model which the orthodox literature reflects. In particular a 
commodity model of information is analogous to the standard economic 
model of the market, with the process of "manufacture" replaced by 
"invention". The product is not a physical good but an intangible, 
"information", which is made artificially scarce due to the applications of 
intellectual property laws. Importantly, the perception is that invention 
is a single, isolated process which takes place within the "black box" of the 
firm.26 Due to legal sanctions and policing, the information can be 
marketed and its value in the hands of users appropriated through 
normal market mechanisms. The incentive to invent in such a model is 
directly related to the size of the potential return on investment. 
Arguments which base their assumptions upon the concept of 
information as a commodity have typically made an implicit assumption 
of a direct relationship between the scope of the property right, the returns 
to inventors and the level of investment in research and development. 
This direct relationship drives the conclusion that the objectives of 
intellectual property can be promoted by maximisation of potential 
25 Braman, S. (1989) "Defining Information: An Approach for Policymakers" 
Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 13, pp. 233-242 at p. 237. 
26 Mandeville, T. D. (1996) Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, 
and the Patent System (Ablex: New Jersey) p. 42, citing Nordhaus, W.D. (1969) 
Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change 
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Figure 2-2 - The Commodity Model 
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returns to inventors. It follows that activities such as price discrimination 
through licensing between individual and "site" software licences; 
hardback and paperback books; and individual and library subscription 
rates for journals, will serve to assure returns to investors by increasing 
the market power inherent in the property right.27 
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that broadening the scope of 
monopoly rights granted by intellectual property laws is always desirable, 
as is the limitation or abolition of measures such as compulsory licensing; 
reinforcing government policing and imposing higher penalties for 
infringement. 
As an example, consider how the optimal life of an intellectual property 
right should be determined. The classic economic test in the area of 
determining a property right length was stated by Nordhaus:28 
As the life is increased, two opposite forces affect the level of 
economic welfare. First, a longer life increases invention and thus 
gives on balance a larger amount of output for a given level of 
inputs. This is a positive effect. Second, a longer life means that 
the monopoly on information lasts longer and thus there are more 
losses from inefficiencies associated with the monopoly. The 
optimal life of the patent is that point at which the two forces 
balance at the margin. 
Many papers, however, appear to focus on Nordhaus's positive effect and 
(MIT Press; Cambridge). 
27 Besen, S.M. and Raskind, L.J. (1991), "An Introduction to the Law and Economics of 
Intellectual Property" journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, p. 3 at p. 5. 
28 Nordhaus, W. (1969) Invention, Growth and Welfare (MIT Press: Cambridge) p. 76 
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marginalise the negative effect. Kitch29 rhetorically noted that, viewed in 
isolation, the reward function of intellectual property suggested a 
perpetual term for patents: 
If the purpose is to reward the inventor for his invention, then 
why shouldn't he be awarded all of the present value of his 
invention? 
Kitch also conceded, however, that the "simplicity" of the argument 
breaks down once the view is taken that the inventor 's contribution is 
not the invention itself, which eventually would have been made by 
someone else, but the time of the invention: 30 
The patent should reward not for the whole value of the 
invention, but for the value of being first. 
2.4 Monopoly effects 
The focus on the "reward for invention" argument within the debate on 
duration is illustrative of the wider copyright literature w hich emphasises 
the incentive to invest yet downplays the potential market distortions 
associated with exclusive rights. This section examines the narrow 
approach taken to questions of monopoly within the intellectual property 
context. 
There is a perception within the literature that there is small chance of 
intellectual property having undesirable economic effects. This relies to 
29 Kitch, E.W. (1977) "The Nature and Function of the Patent System" Journal of Law 
and Economics Vol. 20 p. 265 at p. 285. 
30 Ibidem p. 290. 
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some degree on the "paradox" of intellectual property protection: that the 
imposition of a monopoly privilege over the use or reproduction of an 
invention or work is alleged to correct market failure.31 Under the 
paradox, reconciling competition policy and protection of intellectual 
property appears to rest on a trade-off between short-run static inefficiency 
and long-term dynamic efficiency. Dynamic efficiency includes the 
invention and commercial introduction of new products and processes 
which enhance welfare both by increasing the utility of goods and by 
promoting growth through increased productive efficiency.32 
At one level, the negative impact of intellectual property can be collapsed 
into an investigation of whether the creation of a right has led to effects 
which would be noticeable as "monopoly" effects. Actions such as directly 
restricting supply and raising prices are the usual considerations for 
determining the presence of monopolies, consistent with Nordhaus's 
concept of "losses from inefficiencies"33. This can be observed in 
comments by Easterbrook34 who appears to rely on domination of the 
production market when he. argues that patents do not necessarily create 
31 Braunstein, Y.M., Baumol, W.J. and Mansfield, E. (1980) "The Economics of R&D" in 
Dean, B.V. and Goldhar, J.C. (eds), Management of Research and Innovation (North-
Holland: Amsterdam) pp. 19-32 at p. 28. 
32 Ordover, J.A. (1984) "Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting 
Industrial and Intellectual Property" Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 53, p. 503 at p. 505; 
Scherer, F.M. (1984) Innovation and Growth pp. 257-263. 
33 Nordhaus, W. (1969) Invention, Growth and Welfare (MIT Press: Cambridge) p. 76; 
quoted above. 
34 Easterbrook, F.H. (1990) "Intellectual Property Is Still Property" Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy, Vol. 13, p. 108 at p. 109. 
page 21 
Chapter Two - Information as a Commodity 
any monopoly: 
A patent may create a monopoly - just as an auto manufacturer 
may own all of the auto production facilities - but property and 
monopoly usually differ. 
Such an approach is narrowly conceived and fails to address wider 
questions of market power associated with an intellectual property right. 
Kitch35 relies on this narrow approach in arguing that as competitive 
pressures are exerted on patent holders, any suggestion of monopoly in its 
strict sense is false. The argument follows that competition exists in the 
form of close substitutes. Also, obsolete technology would still be 
competitive as substantial investments are committed to existing 
technology and additional investments were required in many cases to 
shift to new technologies. Hence, near the end of the life of the right, the 
potential for entry of additional firms would force the patent holder to set 
prices to a competitive level to discourage entry. Kitch cited Xerox as an 
example of behaviour where patents did not result in monopoly power, 
based on evidence that after the introduction of xerography, other forms 
of document reproduction continued to share the marketplace. This 
example was criticised by Scherer,36 who noted that the allegation of 
competition was incorrect when the facts were closely examined. Xerox 
had in fact been engaging in price discrimination in its exercise of market 
35 Kitch, E.W. (1986) "Patents : Monopolies or Property Rights" Research in Law and 
Economics, Vol. 8, p. 31. 
36 Scherer, F.M. (1986) "Comment on Edmund Kitch" Research in Law and Economics, 
Vol. 8, p. 51 at p. 52. 
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power.37 
Confusion exists in the literature as to whether "monopoly" should be 
taken to mean the market-distorting effects intended to cure the market 
failure or in its strict economic sense. Rather than recognising the 
semantic nature of the argument, authors, particularly those adopting a 
conventional economics view, suggest that the existence of competitors 
precludes a finding a monopoly. Chicago writers such as Dam38 have 
noted that unlike monopolies "economic rents" represent an advantage 
relative to competitors which results in a higher return on investment. 
Economic rents can be justified in a policy sense as an element of the 
incentive for invention, and the efficiency question, so far as neo-classical 
economics is concerned, is whether the existence of rents leads to socially 
wasteful "rent seeking".39 The difficulty is that arguments such as Dam's, 
in placing such a heavy emphasis on efficiency often marginalise the 
issue of rents as a problem of equity or allocation. This marginalises the 
negative impacts of intellectual property rights by assuming that the 
37 In terms of machine and supplies cost, clerical labour costs and quality, operating a 
new Xerox machine easily dominated over existing diffusion transfer or Thermofax 
copiers. The only serious competitor was Electrofax coated paper processes, but for any 
monthly volume of 1852 copies or above, Xerox was superior. So, Xerox charged 5 cents 
per copy in the 2000 copies per month range, and 3.5 cents per copy in higher volumes 
allowing it to dominate the market at the lower prices. Scherer, F.M. (1986) 
"Comment on Edmund Kitch" Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 8, p. 51 at pp. 53 -
54. 
38 Dam, K.W. (1994) "The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law" Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 23, pp. 247-271 at pp. 250-251. 
39 Drawing m another strand of economic literature: Boss, H.H. (1990) Theories of 
Surplus and Transfer: Parasites and Producers in Economic Thought (Unwin Hyman: 
London). 
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absence of a monopoly, strictu sensu, and equating the existence of 
competitors with "competition", implies an absence of other undesirable 
effects. Inevitably the question of "monopoly" effects as against "rents" or 
"distortions" is essentially one of definitional semantics and rejecting the 
existence of undesirable economic effects by relying on nee-classical 
assumptions and definitions detracts significantly from forming a true 
understanding of the problem. The real issue is not one of a technical 
monopoly, but rather one of market power. 
Scherer's observations above indicate the potential for welfare problems 
from monopoly which are not captured within a simple demand and 
supply analysis. Typical welfare losses that can arise are: 
• losses due to underutilisation; 
• losses due to wasteful/ duplicative research; and 
• losses due to restriction on invention by acquiring and not using 
rights. 
Underutilisation of the new technology is where consumers willing to 
purchase the good at its marginal cost of production do not purchase the 
good, due to the price being raised above that level. The problem is not 
limited to patent: such a cost has been hypothesised where copyright 
protection is imposed or increased in scope.40 For example, Novos and 
Waldman model copyright protection without price discrimination as to 
40 Hirschleifer, J. and Riley, J.G. (1979) "The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information -
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quality on the basis that consumers do not vary in their valuations on the 
quality of the good. In an analytical model this leads them to conclude 
that copyright protection does result in an underutilisation social welfare 
loss.41 Where intellectual property rights are stronger, there can be a 
stimulus to socially wasteful research and development spending to 
develop technology which is inferior to that protected yet superior to 
current processes.42 
2.5 Under-reward and over-reward 
As well as downplaying the significance of monopoly and its direct effects, 
the "reward for invention" literature appears to marginalise two further 
issues. One is that the literature assumes an extreme form of competition 
with costless information flows. This highly competitive market under-
rewards invention since competitors will too quickly have imitating 
products to market at little cost. It has been suggested, however, that 
natural imitation lags do exist and are sufficient to provide a reward to 
stimulate invention. Competition itself can be seen as an impetus for 
invention. The other issue is that intellectual property rights can over-
reward invention since it the legal privilege provides the opportunity for 
anti-competitive behaviour. These issues are discussed below. 
an Expository Survey" Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 17, p. 1375. 
41 Novos, I.E. and Waldman, M. (1984) "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: 
An Analytic Approach" Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 92, p. 236 at p. 240. 
42 Nelson, R.R. (1981) "Assessing Private Enterprise: An Exegesis of Tangled Doctrine" 
Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 93-111. 
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Neo-classical economics assesses underinvestment against the benchmark 
of Pareto optimality. Although Pareto optimality can be a useful tool for 
the identification of potential problems, it is not useful, at least in terms 
of intellectual property, for determining their solutions . The 
underinvestment model relies on an assumption of perfect competition 
in the market, of numerous buyers and sellers, of homogeneous products, 
easy entry and perfect knowledge. The assumptions can be explained as 
arguing that: 
• all information is interchangeable; 
• all information is communicable; 
• all agents are competent in the reception and understanding of 
information; 
• information transfer is costless; 
• information transfer is simultaneous (market lead-time provides 
no advantage); 
• no one requires other resources with which the given piece of 
information must be combined; and 
• if there is a requirement of combining pieces of information, the 
sources of complementarity and potential gain are known. 
These assumptions all relate to the process and transmission of 
information in the context of the nature of invention. They drive the 
conclusion that, in the absence of intellectual property protection, barriers 
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to entry into the market are so weak that they offer little assistance to aid 
appropriability. Sometimes despite the restrictions placed upon it by 
intellectual property protection, the market is still perceived to fail. 
Where market power is perceived to be threatened by some exacerbation 
of the appropriability problem - such as fears of widespread "piracy" 
across the internet - there follows a perceived need for broadening the 
scope of the property rights or otherwise strengthening the legal 
institutions. 
This theme within the literature is of under-reward for invention, yet 
much of this underinvestment literature assumes that within current 
market institutions little incentive exists to invent except by returns 
through the exercise of market power contained in intellectual property 
rights. Indeed, very little is said of benefits otherwise than by royalties. 
The following statement by Nelson43 is axiomatic to this literature: 
Innovation takes R&D resources and involves risks. To motivate 
the effort under priva te enterprise requires that the innovator (or 
those who finance him) can make a profit. Under the ground rules 
of private enterprise, the only way that this can be done is by 
having at least a temporary period where the innovating firm and 
not its competitors can produce the new product or use the new 
process, or receive compensation from other firms that do. 
It has been suggested both conceptually and empirically, however, that 
competition is one of the most influential factors stimulating research 
43 Nelson, R.R. (1981) "Assessing Private Enterprise: An Exegesis of Tangled Doctrine" 
Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 93-111 at p. 106; emphasis added. 
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investment.44 Indeed, several authors have noted that technological 
improvements might be just as likely to occur if many manufacturers are 
competing in the marketplace45 and that competition may operate as a 
more effective stimulant to invention than the prospect of monopolistic 
reward.46 Scherer47, for example, argued that the presence of oligopolistic 
industry structures, natural imitation lags and the advantages of 
competitive product leadership, characteristics widespread in the 
information economy suggest that investment in research and 
development is wholly rational in the absence of intellectual property 
protection. This theme has been echoed by Braunstein, Baumol and 
Mansfield.48 
Intellectual property may also serve to over-reward invention (and 
impede later inventors) as it is a means to engage in anti-competitive 
practices. Examples would include: 
• acquisition of related patents so as to control a particular industry or 
industrial process; 
44 Firestone, O.J. (1971) Economic Implications of Patents (University of Ottawa Press: 
Ottawa) p. 169. 
45 Emerson, J.M. (1984) "Computer Software: Detailed Inquiry Needed Before 
Legislation" Law Institute Journal p. 514; also note Copyright Law Review Committee 
(1990) lssites Paper: Computer Software Protection (AGPS; Canberra) p. 14. 
46 Macdonald, S. (1989) "Human Qualities Necessary for Invention: Independent 
Inventors and the Stimulus of Adversity" Prometheus, Vol. 7, p. 333. 
47 Scherer, F.M. (1980) lndustrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (2nd 
Edition) (Rand McNally: Chicago) pp. 444 - 447. 
48 Braunstein, Y.M., Baumol, W.J. and Mansfield, E. (1980) "The Economics of R&D" in 
Dean, B.V. and Goldhar, J.C. (eds), Management of Research and Innovation (North-
Holland: Amsterdam) pp. 19-32. 
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• applying financial pressure to smaller firms through litigation; 
• accumulation of patents through time so as to perpetuate 
exclusivity after the expiry of original patents49; and 
• application of restrictive licensing conditions50. 
These factors are of concern given there is a growing dominance of 
corporate ownership of intellectual properties and anti-competitive 
behaviour through exploitation of the rights vested in the ownership of 
intellectual property.51 The economic literature explains this behaviour 
in terms of cost raising strategies, switching costs, and product 
differentiation. 
Strategies designed to raise rivals' costs have a number of advantages in 
enhancing market power. Rival's costs may be raised through several 
means, by: 
• raising input prices; 
• imposing switching costs; 
• increasing expenditure on research and development; 
• increasing advertising or promotional expenses; 
49 Silberston, A. (1967) "The Patent System" Lloyds Bank Review, Vol. 84, pp. 32-44 at 
pp. 41-42. 
50 Mandeville, T.D, Lamberton, D.M. and Bishop, E.J. (1982) Economic Effects of the 
Australian Patent System (Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra) at 
p.213 
51 Silberston, A. (1967) "The Patent System" Lloyds Bank Review, Vol. 84, pp. 32-44 at 
p. 37. 
page 29 
Chapter Two - Information as a Commodity 
• imposing a "regulatory parameter" - such as intellectual property 
protection or de facto or de jure standards 
Salop and Scheffman52 found that cost-raising strategies may result in a 
decrease in price if the firm seeking to raise rival's costs has market power 
in the output market. This result runs counter to those who insist that 
market power is only reflected in extraction of rents through increase of 
prices. They found that if the price falls as a result of the action of the 
dominant firm, the output of the fringe firm falls. Further to this, Salop 
and Scheffman found that vertical integration can be anti-competitive 
even where the integration does not monopolise the relevant factor 
market. A cost-raising strategy linked to product differentiation is that of 
imposition of switching costs through risk-averse consumption. Time 
and effort are consumed in learning how to use products. A consumer 
will usually, therefore, demand that the features of any new product be 
similar to those features in which the consumer's learning effort has been 
expended. For example, features dealing with the interface between the 
user and a computer program will be valued not only on actual and 
perceived need, but also on associated costs of obtaining the necessary 
knowledge to operate the program. These associated costs are switching 
costs. 
Switching costs place fringe firms and new entrants at a cost disadvantage, 
since to compete they would need to supply additional functionality or 
52 Salop, S.C. & Scheffman, D.T. (1987) "Cost-Raising Strategies" Journal of Industrial 
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usability to overcome the heavy weight given by the users to interface 
factors. Switching costs are particularly effective barriers to entry w here 
the extent of vertical integration is asymmetric to the rest of the industry. 
Established firms with little need to adapt technology from others have a 
clear cost-incentive to broaden the scope of protection. The 
implementation of standards, both de facto and de jure, therefore, are a 
key cost-raising strategy. 
Allied to switching costs is the concept of product differentiation. One 
common method for product differentiation is to direct attention towards 
the features of the artefact. An equally powerful method is to cultivate a 
favourable brand image among customers and distributors. The resulting 
brand loyalty can create a dominant position by raising entry costs for 
rivals who will have to overcome such loyalty to compete. Brand loyalty 
may be increased through forward integration (such as buying into the 
distribution networks), post-sales service, and training of purchasing 
agents. Incentives exist against ensuring perfection in a product where 
imperfections allow for a demonstration of support services and a 
deepening of the personal relationship with the consumer - potentially 
increasing brand loyalty. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has critically outlined the conventional view of the 
economic justifications for intellectual property protection. The policy 
Economics, Vol. 36, p. 19. 
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recommendation - an imposition of a commodity form to information 
through intellectual property protection - is open to criticism. The 
dominant perspective is that of a production chain model of invention 
which generates information as its output.53 Intellectual property aims to 
promote investment in invention through restrictions on the use of the 
information by others. 
Conventional economic analysis assumes that a direct relationship exists 
between the scope of the monopoly privilege afforded, returns to 
investors and the level of investment in research and development. 
Intellectual property is seen as an appropriate intervention to address a 
market failure which arises from lack of appropriability of information in 
the hands of users. It is important to note that the perceived 
appropriability problem is derived from the work of Arrow in dealing 
with information in a pure sense. Market failure is (allegedly) solved by 
affording a monopoly privilege: a right to extract rents over the use of 
information. The argument surrounding the scope of the right is centred 
on the pursuit of "socially optimal output" in terms of "efficiency". 
A narrow conception of "monopoly" marginalises the effect of welfare 
losses resulting from underutilisation and wasteful research. The focus 
on the intellectual property right as the source of return on invention 
also marginalises other forms of reward and the potential for over-reward 
through anti-competitive exploitation of intellectual property rights. 
53 Chapter Four develops an alternative model of innovation (invention) where 
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The following chapter will outline an alternative and, in the author's 
opinion, preferable perspective, based in information economics. The 
alternative perspective is that information, in the context of intellectual 
property regulation, is better conceived as a resource. This information 
perspective is drawn ·upon to develop the model of invention 
(technological innovation) presented in Chapter Four, based on the 
assumption that the information or knowledge underlying the creation of 
a product is not readily appropriable. Such an approach has profound 
consequences for the process of innovation and role of intellectual 
property. 
information is not readily appropriable but is embodied in a pltysical product. 33 page 
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Chapter Three 
Information as a Resource 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the conventional view of the economics 
of technological development, which was based on the notion of 
information as a commodity. This chapter explores the alternative 
assessment of information - as a resource. Viewing information as a 
resource facilitates viewing the process of "innovation"54 as cumulative 
and dynamic. The main distinction between the resource and commodity 
views is that a resource has value in use, whilst a commodity has a value 
in exchange.55 Information as a resource is better suited than information 
as a commodity to an analysis of intellectual property regulation, as the 
aim of intellectual property is to ensure that information is disseminated 
throughout society. When information is viewed as a commodity, the 
issue of dissemination of information becomes secondary to a concept of 
information being traded. This means that considerations of information 
as an input are effectively disregarded. When viewed as a resource, the 
role of information in facilitating technological progress is a principal 
consideration. 
54 As stated in Chapter Two, the term "innovation" is used to· describe the process of 
technological progress in abstract. The term is also used to emphasise the incremental 
nature of the process, particularly drawing upon existing resources, in contrast to the 
concept of "invention" which suggests an isolated event of inspiration. 
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In Chapter Two, intellectual property was justified in terms of providing 
"inventors" with financial incentives to invest in the creation of 
information products. This incentive to "invent", however, is not the 
pivotal focus of affording intellectual property rights within English-
derived legal systems. Intellectual property protection's primary aim has 
been to maximise the welfare of the community by ensuring "the end" of 
diffusion of information through "the means" of providing incentives 
for innovation.56 A vast quantity of legislative and juridical comment, 
as well as other literature - by far the majority, has commented that the 
means through which this aim is to be achieved is by weighing the 
advantages gained by the granting of incentives against the disadvantages 
flowing to the public from the recognition of property rights.57. 
This chapter adopts an information economic perspective to examine the 
nature of information as a resource for technological innovation. Neo-
classical economists have been criticised for failing to account for the role 
of technology in the economy, and in the dynamics of technological 
change.58 Recent literature suggests that technology is best viewed as 
55 Monk, P. (1989) Technological Change in the Information Economy (Pinter Publishers) 
pp. 87 -92. 
56 Kreiss, R.A. (1995) "Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory" 
U.C.L.A. Law Review, Vol. 43, p. l. 
57 Baxter, W.F., (1966) "Legal Restrictions en Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An 
Economic Analysis" Yale Law Journal, Vol. 76, p. 267 at p.271. 
58 Jewkes, J. Swayers, D. and Stillerman, J. (1956) The Sources of Invention (Macmillan: 
London). 
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information as it is composed of information resources of various types.59 
One purpose of this chapter is to outline the properties of information6() 
from the perspective of information economics, in contrast to the 
orthodox economics presented in the previous chapter. Another is to 
discuss the implications for the market of an information perspective, 
with particular focus on network externalities. Both provide a framework 
for the development of a model of technological innovation in Chapter 
Four, and its application to computer programs in Chapter Five. 
3.2 Information properties 
This section discusses some of the properties of information from an 
information perspective. This provides a useful contrast with the 
assumed properties of information from an orthodox perspective, as 
outlined in Chapter Two. Under the orthodox perspective, information 
was treated as a form of output from a process of "invention", and that 
lack of appropriability suggests that information should be made 
exclusive by imposition of property rights. The process of information 
creation was itself seen as an isolated act of inspiration, research and/ or 
development. Under the information perspective, information is seen as 
a capital resource. Indivisibilities suggest that information should be 
59 Monk, P. (1992) "Innovation in the Information Economy" in Antonelli, C. (ed.) The 
Economics of Infonnation Networks (Elsevier Science Publishers: New York) pp. 35-50 
at p. 38. 
60 It is not possible, however, to define information in a precise manner due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of the literature, much of which is be based in sociology, 
technical science and psychology: Braman, S. (1989) "Defining Information: An 
Approach for Policymakers" Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 13, pp. 233-242. 
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shared to maximise social benefits. The process of information creation is 
"innovation" which suggests a process which is interactive between firms 
and based on imitative competition. 
3.2.1 Information is capital 
A better conception of information is as a capital resource, since it is used 
to facilitate production. An assumption of information economics is the 
rejection of the concept of information as a static commodity (an output) 
and instead adopting the concept of information as dynamic resource (an 
input). One observation made by Arrow, and largely ignored by later neo-
classical authors was that information is not only the product of 
innovative activity, it is also an input to innovation and prior 
information is required for the creation of subsequent information.61 
Information may be said to be synthesised and innovated rather than 
created, building on sources already in the public domain.62 
Technological progress, therefore, must necessarily build on a foundation 
provided by earlier inventors.63 Ricketson64 noted that future creative 
activity depends upon the public domain and that "copying, 
61 Arrow, K.J. (1962) "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention" 
in National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive 
Activity (Princeton University Press) pp. 609-626 at p. 618. This theme is not pursued, 
however, and Arrow disposes of it as simply compounding the appropriability 
problem. 
62 Pendleton, M., (1985) "Intellectual Property, Information-based Society and a New 
International Economic Order - the Policy Options?" European Intellectual Property 
Review, Vol. 2, p. 31. 
63 Scotchmer, S. (1991) "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and 
the Patent Law" Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, p. 29. 
64 Ricketson, S. (1992) New Wine into Old Bottles: Technological Change and 
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reinterpretation and redefinition" of other works is integral to 
maintaining a healthy public domain. 
3.2.2 Information is shared 
The orthodox perspective assumed that information needed to be 
privately appropriable and thereby made excludable. The information 
perspective assumes that by its very nature, information's value to society 
accrued by common access. The cost of information is independent of the 
scale on which it is used. In an information intensive economy, 
information creates pervasive economies of scale.65 From this 
proposition Arrow66 has argued that individuals have clear incentives to 
organise for effective acquisition and communication of information: 
Specialisation in information gathering is one instance, in my view 
the most important instance, of the economic benefits of 
organisation. The basic gain in all such cases is that a group 
working together can produce more in total than the sum of their 
products working individually ... Of all the forms of division of 
labor, the division of information gathering is perhaps the most 
fundamental. 
The theme of the benefits of division of labour is recurring in the context 
of information.67 This can be tied into network externality effects 
generated by the phenomenon of information. Knowledge can be 
Intellectual Property Rights", Prometheus, Vol. 10, p. 53. 
65 Lamberton, O.M. (1992) "Information Economics: Introductory Remarks" in Antonelli, 
C. (ed), The Economics of Information Networks (Elsevier Science Publishers: New 
York) pp. 29-34 at pp. 30-31. 
66 Arrow, K.J. (1979) "The Economics of Information" in Dertouzos, M.L. and Moses, J. 
(eds) The Computer Age: A Twenty-Year View (MIT Press: Cambridge) pp. 306 - 317 at 
P· 7. 
67 See also Leijonhufvud, A. (1989) "Information Costs and the Division of Labour" 
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internally generated through processes of research, development, design 
and engineering. It can also be obtained through learning by doing, the 
acquisition of organisation routines, or from the environment. 
As an example of observed sharing behaviour, Rosegger68 noted an 
apparent contradiction in behaviour when examining acquisition of 
knowledge from other firms. Neo-classical theory suggested that both 
firms and individuals derive returns from proprietary knowledge, hence 
they should have little incentive to share such knowledge, particularly 
competitors. Instead, what Rosegger observed was a rapid growth of 
bilateral, cooperative arrangements and the generation of 
institutionalised informational exchange on a widening range of topics. 
A major element of the incentive to co-operate within information 
transfer is the need to bring complementary knowledge to bear on the 
solution of common problems. This model explains why co-operation 
can be a beneficial strategy for the solution of problems and the 
development of new technologies. For example, d' Aspremont and 
Jacquemin69 suggested that appropriability problems can be mitigated 
where firms are able to internalise the research and development 
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 120 ,pp. 165-176. 
68 Rosegger, G. (1991) "Advances in Information Technology and the Innovation 
Strategies of Firms" Prometheus, Vol. 9, pp. 5-20 at pp. 9-10; see also Rosegger, G. 
(1989) "Co-operative Research in the Automobile Industry: a Multinational 
Perspective" in Link, A.N. and Tassey, G. (eds) Co-operative Research and 
Development: The Industry-University-Government Relationship (Kluwer: Boston) 
pp. 167-186 .. 
69 D' Aspremont, C. and Jacquemin, A. (1988) "Cooperative and Noncooperative R & D in 
Duopoly with Spillovers" American Economic Review pp. 1133-37. 
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spillovers from other firms. Expenditure on research and development is 
necessary to appropriate the spillovers from other firms and to keep 
informed about the technological advances of competitors. 
The attitude of some policy makers, however, is that valuable 
information, like valuable physical commodities, should be "protected", 
thereby to facilitate its trade. Such thinking is flawed as it fails to 
appreciate the role of information exchange within the economy. 
Intellectual property legislation manifests the concern with restricting, 
privatising and trading information rather than sharing information. 
Short term commercial incentives to appropriate intellectual property 
rights of the results of co-operation conflicts with its goals. Short term 
self-interest at the commercial level can destroy the intended, longer-term 
co-operation.70 Macdonald and Mandeville71 found that firms in high 
technology industries engage in extensive second sourcing and cross-
licensing as a means to pervert the patent system and that if the patent 
system were to work as intended, such firms would face significant 
retardation of information exchange with disastrous effects for 
innovation and competitiveness. 
3.2.3 Innovation is imitation 
An important perception within the conventional model is that 
70 Oakley, B. and Owen, K. (1989) Alvey: Britain's Strategic Computing Initiative (MIT 
Press: Cambridge) p. 28. 
71 Macdonald, S. and Mandeville, T. (1987) "Innovation Protection Viewed from an 
Information Perspective" in Kingston, W. (ed.) Direct Protection of Innovation 
(Kluwer Academic: Dordrecht) pp. 157-170. 
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innovation is a single, isolated process which takes place within the 
"black box" of the firm.72 Competing firms are seen as attempting to 
"copy" or ·"imitate" the original innovation. The policy implication is 
that the first innovator should be rewarded while its competitors are 
punished for "appropriating" the former's investment. Within an 
information economics perspective, however, information grows 
synergistically and exponentially m an environment of shared 
intellectual capital.73 
Recently Scotchmer74 and colleagues have pursued a theme which is 
relevant to the conception of knowledge as a resource for innovation. 
This is the adoption of a perspective which emphasises the cumulative 
nature of product research development. 75 A premise in Scotchmer's 
work is that firms other than the first innovator produce more creative 
and diverse second generation products. Without such a premise, the 
natural solution would be to protect the original innovator so broadly 
that licensing is required from all second generation innovators. 
72 Mandeville, T. D. (1996) Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, 
and the Patent System (Ablex: New Jersey) p. 42, citing Nordhaus, W.D. (1969) 
Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change 
(MIT Press; Cambridge). 
73 Masuda, Y. (1980) The Information Society as Post-Industrial Society (Institute for 
the Information Society: Tokyo). 
74 Scotchmer, S. (1991) "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and 
the Patent Law" Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, p. 29. 
75 Green, J.R. and Scotchmer, S. (1995) "On the Division of Profit in Sequential 
Innovation" RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, p. 20. 
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Scotchmer argues against such an approach.76 A second innovator who 
cannot market the next generation product without a license has a very 
weak bargaining position. Outside firms will either be inefficiently 
excluded from producing the particular products, or by licensing will be 
overrewarding the original innovator. According to Scotchmer, when 
both first and second generation products are developed, the division of 
profit between the two innovators depends on the breadth of protection. 
Narrowing the scope of protection is one solution to reward second 
generation inventors. The challenge is to reward early innovators fully 
for the technological foundation they provide to later innovators, but to 
reward later innovators adequately for their improvements and new 
products as well. 
Mandeville77 argued that within an information-theoretic perspective, 
any sharp distinction between innovation and imitation - pervasive 
within the conventional economics of innovation literature - fades away. 
He rejected a model of one way diffusion of information from an 
innovating firm to other firms: 
The conventional perspective basically seems to assume that 
technological information is completely embodied in the hardware 
that emerges from the self-contained, innovating firm. Users and 
adopters contribute nothing and thus are not innovating. The 
innovation process stops at the factory gate. 
76 Scotchmer, S. (1991) "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and 
the Patent Law" Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, p. 29 at p. 32. 
77 Mandeville, T. D. (1996) Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, 
and the Patent System (Ablex: New Jersey) p. 46. 
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Instead, technological progress is evolutionary, social and interactive, a 
"messy" process involving many participants.78 This agrees with 
Schumpeter,79 who argued that an evolutionary process of technological 
advance involved a combination of innovation and imitation. 
3.3 Information and markets 
This section examines the nature of the market in the context of rich 
information flows. Under an information economic perspective, the 
market can be characterised by assumptions of bounded rationality and 
interdependence among economic agents which support stron~ 
externalities.80 One theme in the orthodox literature discussed in the 
previous chapter was the lack of opportunity to generate returns 
commensurate to the benefits obtained by users from innovation. This 
was based on an assumption that information (the product of 
"invention") was highly appropriable and that a competitive market 
would drive returns on innovation to zero. The assumptions of the 
commodity model, based in perfect competition in the market: of 
numerous buyers and sellers, homogeneous products, easy entry and 
perfect knowledge, all drive a perception that the market affords poor 
78 Ibidem p. 55 (Figure 4.3). 
79 Schumpeter, J. (1950) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (3rd Ed) (Harper: New 
York). Similar sentiments were stated by Machlup, F. (1984) The Economics of 
Information and Human Capital, Volume III: Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution 
and Economic Significance (Princeton University Press: Princeton) p. 166. 
80 Antonelli, C. (1992) "The Economic Theory of Information Networks" in Antonelli, C. 
(ed), The Economics of Infonnation Networks (Elsevier Science Publishers: New York) 
p. 5 at p. 7. 
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protection to innovators. Information economics provides a different 
perspective and implications for the market. From an information 
per.spective homo economicus is not endowed with perfect knowledge 
nor necessarily equipped with the means to receive information and 
correctly process and act upon it. Part of this relies on the nature of tacit 
and codified knowledge discussed in the following chapter. Information 
is no longer a simple and objective concept (like a commodity) but adopts 
qualities contingent on individual and organisation capabilities (like a 
resource). The assumed non-rivalrous and non-excludable qualities 
attributable to information are not appropriate in this context. The 
implications for a market rich in information flows will include: 
• lead time; 
• bounded rationality; and 
• network externalities; 
each of which is discussed below. 
3.3.1 Lead time 
Market lead time is perceived to be a greater advantage under an 
information economic perspective than under a commodity-based 
perspective. The reason for this added advantage comes from some of 
Arrow's later work. Arrow81 noted that transmission of information 
forms only part of communication information. 
81 Arrow, K.J. "Economic Development: The Present State of the Art" Honolulu, East-
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Information exchange is costly not so much because it is hard to 
transmit but because it is difficult to receive. 
So, despite the creation and adoption of information technology to 
expedite transmission of information, it does not necessarily follow that 
the costs of communication are decreasing. The ability to interpret and 
make use of the information must be considered in any depiction of the 
market for information technology products. 
A significant barrier to entry emanates from lead times in production and 
distribution. 82 First mover advantage results from lags between release 
of the artefact and the entry of competitors. Such lags can originate from 
the time which must be taken to: 
• recognise market success in an product; 
• gain the requisite tacit knowledge83 and/ or reverse engineer the 
product; 
• procure the use of effective marketing and distribution channels; 
• secure the availability of complementary information and 
complementary goods; and 
• secure suppliers of raw materials and capital equipment. 
Based on these factors, a product will have a greater market lead time 
advantage the greater the degree of knowledge contained within that 
West Center 1975 p.18 
82 Cadot, 0. and Lippman, S.A. (1995) "Barriers to Imitation and the Incentive to 
Innovate" (Working Paper: UCLA, November 1995) at p. 4. 
page 45 
Chapter Three - Information as a Resource 
product and the greater the amount of knowledge required to make use of 
that product.84 For this reason, in many areas of intellectual endeavour, 
market lead time advantage can be consciously exploited. 
3.3.2 Bounded rationality 
The more "tacit" the knowledge, the more difficult it is to articulate and 
communicate.85 Difficulties in communicating knowledge give rise to 
informational asymmetries.86 Information asymmetries, in turn, mean 
that rather than people being rational actors making decisions based on 
perfect information, people try to act with only consideration of the 
pertinent knowledge at hand available at reasonable cost.87 Industrial and 
institutional economists, among others, refer to this as "bounded 
rationality".88 As information must suffer from asymmetries, objectives 
will pertain to satisficing rather than maximising. Under such a view, 
economic change occurs under forces of variation, selection and 
retention.89 Within this framework, variation places emphasis upon 
83 See Chapter Four 
84 This basis for lead time is essential in the model of innovation developed in Chapter 
Four. 
85 Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 
(Harvard University Press: Cambridge) pp. 76-77. 
86 Freeman, C. (1982) The Economics of Industrial Innovation (Pinter: London) 
87 Machlup, F (1982) "Optimum Utilization of Knowledge" Knowledge, Information and 
Decisions: Society, Vol. 20, p.10 
88 Simon, H.A. (1955) "A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice" Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 69, pp. 99-118; and Simon, H.A. (1959) "Theories of Decision Making 
in Economics" American Economic Review, Vol. 49, pp. 253-283. 
89 Duysters, G. (1996) The Dynamics of Technical 
Cheltenham) pp. 10-15. 
Innovation (Edward Elgar: 
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information and competency asymmetries between firms:90 this is in 
contrasts with neo-classical assumptions of agent competence given all 
relevant information. Variation examines matter such as Heiner's91 
"Competence-Difficulty" gap: that there is a division between any 
problem and an agent's competence. For example, limited learning will 
impair decision making where unexpected yet relevant information 
becomes available as agents will tend instead to adopt rigid and simplified 
decision rules thereby relying on circumscribed information. Firms 
survive by repetition or imitation of successful routines. 92 In most cases 
existing routines are slow to adapt and where firms are unable to change 
quickly enough to meet the challenges of their environment, selection 
occurs. This process of selection implies that there is a persistent state of 
disequilibrium within any given industry. 
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, the growth of an installed 
base of technology provides a signal to the market. This signal, in turn, 
acts to influence search activities and the costs necessary to gather 
information related to the performance of products. In addition to the 
search activities, such growth should induce further adoption 
externalities in respect of costs of retraining, maintenance, and 
90 Dosi, G. (1988) "Sources, Procedures and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation" Journal 
of Economic Literature, Vol. 26, pp. 1120-1171. 
91 
92 
Heiner, R. (1983) "The Origin of Predictable Behaviour" American Economic Review, 
Vol. 73, pp. 560-595. 
Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 
(Harvard University Press: Cambridge). 
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complementary inputs. Compatibility with the existing installed base of 
technology and complementarity with other innovations being 
introduced will often influence adoption choice. This then gives rise to 
network externalities which can become instrumental in strengthening 
the irreversibility of the installed base.93 A critical mass of consensus will 
define the trajectory of technological development. The outcome of the 
competition of rivalrous technologies is influenced by size of the existing 
stock of each of the technology products competing on the market place.94 
Such phenomena also includes what have been described as 
"bandwagon" effects.95 This implies that signalling and leadership are 
important mechanisms for the promotion of, and development within 
information rich and rapidly changing industries. All these factors are 
examples of network externalities, discussed below. 
3.3.3 Network externalities 
External effects are seen as important in may recent studies of 
technological change, and in the processes of innovation, and diffusion. 
An "externality" arises where the action of an individual affects other 
individuals, so that the social costs and benefits do not agree with the 
individual costs and benefits. Negative externalities such as pollution 
93 Antonelli, C. (1992) "The Economic Theory of Information Networks" in Antonelli, C. 
(ed), The Economics of Information Networks (Elsevier Science Publishers: New York) 
p. 5 at p. 19. 
94 Antonelli, C. (1991) The Diffusion of Advanced Telecommunications in Developing 
Countries (OECD, Paris). 
95 Leibenstein, H. (1950) "Bandwagon, Snob And Veblen Effects in the Theory of 
Consumer's Demand" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 64, p. 12. 
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arise since individuals do not bear the direct costs of pollution and 
therefore have adverse incentives to pollute if it derives economic gains 
to them personally. Direct externalities, whether positive (beneficial) or 
negative (harmful) "lead the Invisible Hand astray".96 At the most 
elementary level, it is clear that telecommunications networks provide 
positive strategic externalities beyond initially quantifiable costs and 
benefits. Gombani97 describes information networks as being at the 
forefront of the transition process from the age of machines to the age of 
information. Pervasity of information networks is a significant feature of 
what he states is the "discontinuity" period society is currently 
experiencing, marked by continuous technological advances. Network 
economics is an attempt to characterise the:98 
• static and dynamic features of a system of interaction among agents 
where a variety of signals, besides prices, matter and where 
hysteresis plays a major role; 
• pervasive role of technical, pecuniary, adoption and consumption 
externalities in the introduction of technological change; 
• strategic attitude of firms to internalise external factors through 
measures to reduce uncertainty and increasing command of 
96 Hirshleifer, J. (1988) Price Theory and Applications (4h Edition) (Prentice-Hall: 
Englewood Cliffs) p. 474. 
97 Gombani, S. (1992) "Preface" to Antonelli, C., The Economics of Infonnation Networks 
(Elsevier Science Publishers: New York) p. l. 
98 Antonelli, C. (1992) "The Economic Theory of Information Networks" in Antonelli, C. 
(ed), The Economics of Information Networks (Elsevier Science Publishers: New York) 
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structural interdependence. 
Networks are the result of interdependence between agents which is not 
expressed by prices, but by a broader array of signals and quantitative and 
qualitative information. The typical example is of a telephone network. 
The value to an individual of being connected to the network is related in 
non-linear fashion to the number of other people connected to the 
network. Markets perform poorly in the presence of strong externalities 
since prices do not convey all relevant information so decision making 
may need to be co-ordinated through other· signalling processes, such as 
co-operation between firms or government intervention. 
Despite semantic arguments to the contrary,99 network externalities are 
accepted as significant in many important industries where there are no 
physical networks.100 Any technology that requires specific training is 
subject to network externalities since the training is more valuable if the 
associated technology is more widely adopted. This forms part of 
"adoption externalities". Adoption externalities are characterised b_y the: 
• interdependence between potential users and actual adopters of a 
new technology; 
• role in the diffusion process of adoption externalities engendered 
p. 5 at p. 15. 
99 Some commentators reject the "network" adjective where ro physical network is 
present, e.g. Dam, K.W. (1995) "Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual 
Property Protection of Software" Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 24, pp. 321-377. 
100 Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C. (1986) "Product Compatibility Choice in a Market with 
Technological Progress" Oxford Economic Papers pp. 146-165 at p. 146. 
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by the adoption behaviour; and 
• creation and maintenance of skills through use of the technology. 
The first characteristic, interdependence of one agent's utility in 
consumption with the behaviour of other agents in the economy in 
respect of their consumption choices, can be more simply phrased: 
people's preferences are interrelated with what other people will want to 
buy.101 The dynamics of adoption externalities affect the pricing and 
performance of new products, and have serious effects on the demand for 
information technology artefacts. Demand and diffusion effects of a new 
artefact are closely correlated as the benefit which a consumer derives 
from the use of a good is often an increasing function of the number of 
other consumers pµrchasing compatible items. This is particularly so 
where complementary goods are required to use the product effectively or 
to achieve significantly increased utility for the consumer. Many 
examples of network effects entail indirect externalities associated with 
the provision of a durable goods and a complementary good or service. In 
these cases the externalities arise when the amount and variety of 
complementary goods available increase with the number of durable good 
units sold. For instance, computers and programs must be used together 
to produce computing services and the greater the sales of hardware, the 
more surplus the consumer is likely to enjoy in the software market due 
to increased entry. An interesting point' is that very strong network 
101 Here, network economics diverges widely from neo-classical economics, as neo-
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externalities may suggest a demand and supply curves behaving similarly 
to a Veblen distribution, as people take the increase in price to signal an 
increase in functionality, usability or complementarity with other 
products. 
Both external102 and internal103 information networks facilitate the 
exploitation of information by organisations. Once it is accepted that 
innovation is a matter of gathering, assembling and transforming 
information into knowledge, information networks can be seen to have a 
role in directing the process of innovation. 
An example of economies of scope is where a product may have functions 
or features such that a combination of such functions is more valuable to 
the consumer than each of the functions independently. Although 
economies of scope can be achieved by product variety104 the 
interdependence implied by the generation of economies between these 
products should also result in network economies of inputs to production 
and also feedback effects.105 Where there is an existing market lead time 
classical analysis assumes consumer tastes, technology and market structures as given. 
102 Rogers, E. (1982) "Information Exchange and Technological Innovation" in Saha!, D. 
(ed.) The Transfer and Utilization of Technical Knowledge (Lexington Books: 
Lexington) pp. 105-123. 
103 Allen, T.J. (1977) Managing the Flow of Technology: Technology Transfer and the 
Dissemination of Technological Innovation within the R&D Organisation (MIT Press: 
· Cambridge). 
104 Teece, D.J. (1980) "Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise" Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organisation, Vol. l, pp. 223-247; Baumol, W.J., Panzar, J.C. 
and Willig, R.D. (1982) Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure 
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York); and Goldhar, J.D. and Jelinek, M. (1983) 
"Plan for Economies of Scope" Harvard Business Review, Vol. 83, pp. 141-148. 
105 Lamberton, D.M. (1988) "Communication in Economic Processes" in More, E. and Lewis, 
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advantage, plus network externalities, depending on the nature of the 
product, the firm may be able to consciously generate and exploit 
economies of scope by including additional functionality or usability to 
deliberately setting up a demand for complementary products or services. 
The concept of network externalities discussed above is an important 
feature of informationally rich markets which contrasts with the 
commodity based perspective of orthodox economics. Network 
externalities can be the source of enormous benefits to consumers but 
may also provide the foundation for significant market power by 
producers. An information perspective suggests that the realisation of 
network externalities - enhancement of information flows - is critically 
important for the design of intellectual property rights. The realisation of 
network externalities in the area computer programs is pursued in 
Chapter Six. 
3.4 Summary 
Viewing information as dynamic and technological progress as 
cumulative alters the perception of which factors will influence the 
market for information technology artefacts. 
Information is a capital resource, the cost of which is independent of the 
scale on which it is used. One implication is that a pattern of sharing of 
this intellectual capital is rational. Another is that innovation is an 
G. (Eds) Australian Communications Technology and Policy (Australian 
Communication Association: Sydney) pp. 197-207. 
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ongoing, cumulative process of imitation and learning. An information 
perspective also holds distinct implications for the market. Lead times ·in 
production and distribution can be significant the greater the degree of 
information embodied in a product and the greater the degree of 
knowledge required to make use of it. This suggested that information 
was to a degree and for a time excludable. In contrast to the assumptions 
of perfect competition and costless information flows, information 
economics suggests that the economy is likely to exhibit significant lead 
times and make investment in innovation rational in the absence of 
intellectual property protection. Given limited information processing 
abilities and limited available information economic actors behave in a 
''bounded rationality" which suggests innovation based on trajectories 
supported by product leadership and bandwagon effects. A market 
characterised by network externalities will not exhibit the same behaviour 
as commodity based markets and in particular provides scope for 
significant exploitation of market power. 
This chapter has explored the perspective of information as a resource 
and its consequences for economic thinking. It is the basis for the 
development of the innovation model in Chapter Four which is applied 
to computer programs in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Four 
An Informational Model of 
Technological Innovation 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters Two and Three have outlined and contrasted the orthodox and 
information economics perspectives on the question of technological 
innovation. The information perspective is adopted in this thesis as 
appropriate to the question of intellectual property in general, and to 
computer programs in particular. One objective of this thesis is to use 
information economics to develop a model of innovation within the 
software industry and to use this model as a benchmark to assess 
copyright policy in this context. 
This chapter develops an informational model of technological 
innovation. 106 The model is developed from two conceptual 
distinctions. Both distinctions provide a counterpoint to the 
conventional view that technology is highly appropriable. The first is a 
division between tacit and codified knowledge drawn from Polyani's 
theory of tacit knowing and Mandeville' s model of codified inform a ti on 
and technological change. The process of transforming tacit to codified 
106 Although us€d more generally in Chapters Two and Three, here it is used more 
specifically as analogous to Mandeville's concept of "innovative process": 
Mandeville, T. D. (1996) Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, 
and the Patent System (Ablex: New Jersey). 
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information is part of the process of innovation and it is costly and 
excludable. The second distinction is drawn from Monk's distinction 
between "technology" and "technological artefacts"; the means of 
production and the product. This distinction rejects the assumption -
implicit in much of the conventional economic literature - that 
distribution of the applied technology necessarily discloses the knowledge 
underlying its creation. The economic implications of the model are 
discussed and the model integrated with fundamental concepts of 
intellectual property doctrine, with particular focus on the idea-expression 
dichotomy within copyright. 
4.2 Tacit and codified knowledge 
The idea that awareness follows a characteristic structure, whereby 
particular aspects of consciousness are known subsidiarily and depend on 
the particular conscious focus, comes from Polyani, who argued that:l07 
All knowledge falls into one of these two classes: it is either tacit or 
rooted in tacit information. The idea of strictly explicit knowledge 
is indeed self-contradictory; deprived of their tacit coefficients, all 
spoken words, all formulae, all maps and graphs, are strictly 
meaningless. 
The subsidiary element is known as "tacit knowledge". Subsidiary 
elements need not be vague or at the edge of consciousness, they may 
range from scientifically ordered and coherent facts to unspecified or even 
unspecifiable - "ineffable" - elements. 
107 Polyani, M. (1969) Knowing and Being (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London) p. 195. 
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This thesis adopts a narrower definition of which is "tacit" such that "tacit 
knowledge" represents intangible information only. Thus "tacit 
knowledge" as used in this thesis is essentially identical to the concept of 
"uncodified information" used by Mandeville,108 and is consistent with a 
range of parallel concepts adopted by innovation theorists as set out 
below: 
Table 4-1: Parallel Concepts to Tacit and Codified Knowledge 
Uncodified Informationl09 Codified Information 
Schum peter' s "invention" Schumpeter's "innovation" 
Nelson's "logy" Nelson's "technique" 
Mansfield's "unembodied" Mansfield's "embodied" technology 
technology 
Macdonald's "innovative process" Macdonald's "innovation process" 
Abernathy's "fluid" state of Abernathy's "specific" state of 
technology technology 
Teece' s "leading edge" technology Teece's "state of the art" technology 
Jensen and Macdonald's Jensen and Macdonald's 
"technology" "technique" 
Leonard-Barton and Roger's Leonard-Barton and Roger's 
"horizontal" diffusion model "classical" diffusion model 
108 Mandeville, T. D. (1996) Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, 
and the Patent System (Ablex: New Jersey) p. 50. 
109 The source for the table is Mandeville who cited Schumpeter, J. (1939) Business Cycles 
(McGraw Hill: New York); Nelson, R.R. (1982) "The Role of Knowledge in R&D 
Efficiency" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 97, p. 453; Mansfield, E. (1968) The 
Economics of Technological Change (Norton: New York); Macdonald, S. (1983) 
·. "Technology Beyond Machines" in Macdonald, S., Lamberton, D. and Mandeville, 
T.D. (eds) The Trouble with Technology - Explorations in the Process of Technological 
Change (Pinter: London); Abernathy, W.J. (1978) The Productivity Dilemma -
Roadback to Innovation in the Automobile Industry Oohns Hopkins University Press: 
Baltimore); Teece, D.J. (1977) "Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The 
Resource Costs of Transferring Technological Know-How" Economics Journal, Vol. 87, 
p. 242; and Jensen, RC. and Macdonald, S. (1982) "Technique and technology in 
regional input-output" Annals of Regional Science, Vol 16, p. 27. 
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The personal nature of tacit knowledge gives rise to an important 
characteristic: it is not in a state which is readily communicable to others. 
This is crucial, as information cannot diffuse through society without 
communication. To aid in its communication and to implement the 
knowledge in production, tacit information is codified. The manufacture 
of an information technology product in turn relies on codified 
information such as formulae, laboratory procedures and blueprints.110 
Codified knowledge is in a form which is intended to permit its 
communication. In a codified form knowledge becomes disembodied 
from individuals and would be described by some writers as 
"information" rather than knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, can be 
viewed as a "matrix" of information which has been contextualised and 
digested either consciously or subconsciously:lll 
Knowledge is not a pile of homogenous material, but a complex 
structure of heterogenous thoughts, each available at zero marginal 
cost but usable only together with resources available only at 
positive, and often very high cost. 
As an example, a bread recipe listing ingredients and approximate cooking 
times represents codified knowledge. Underlying this codified knowledge 
will be a body of tacit knowledge which includes techniques of sifting, 
110 Nelson, R.R. (1980) "Production Sets, Technological Knowledge and R&D: Fragile and 
Overworked Constructs for Analysis of Productivity Growth" American Economic 
Review, Vol. 70, p. 62. 
111 Machlup, F. (1982) "Optimum Utilization of Knowledge" Knowledge, Information 
and Decisions: Society, Vol. 20, p. 10 
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kneading, yeast preparation (depending on the variety) and judgment 
about precise cooking times based on appearance and other factors. 
The process of turning tacit knowledge into codified knowledge 
(information) by giving it form is described by Polanyi as "articulation". 
Articulation is typically achieved through symbolic representations in 
language, mathematics, graphs and pictures. The "text" produced 
through this process of articulation specifies not only the particulars of 
experience but also the pattern of their integration: a conceptual 
framework referenced by the environment. This suggests that codified 
knowledge is derived from a variety of formal and informal information 
channels and will rarely be limited to processes internal to a particular 
firm. Successful innovators, for example, are those who are sensitive to 
feedback mechanisms particularly involving understanding of user 
needs.112 
The ability to transmit codified knowledge as information does not 
necessarily ensure understanding by the person to whom it is being 
transmitted. For example, possession of a recipe book does not imply 
mastery of the relevant skills to bake bread of high quality or at all. To 
understand the recipe book, one would need in turn to understand the 
terminology, the use of kitchen appliances and in many cases the process 
of conversion between metric and imperial scales. As a preliminary factor 
112 Freeman, C. (1973) "A Study of Success and Failure in Industrial Innovation" in 
Williams, B.R. (ed) Science and Technology in Economic Growth (Wiley: New York) 
p. 227. 
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the possessor of the book needs also to understand the language in which 
the book is expressed (another form of tacit knowledge). This is a useful 
example, as it highlights one further aspect. Commodity-based arguments 
presume that knowledge is perfectly and costlessly communicable, yet 
particular skills are required to receive and make sense of information 
before it becomes knowledge. The ability to use a technology is only partly 
explained by the existence of codified sources. Practice, and feedback 
through criticism, are necessary for the learning and retention of many 
skills. Extending the cooking example, learning a baking process is 
significantly enhanced when a more experienced chef (mother) watches, 
explains, directs and corrects. This relates to Von Hippel's observations 
·on learning by doing and learning by using.113 It should also be noted that 
Monk114 used the additional terms "blueprint knowledge" to describe 
semi-formal and empirical information resources relating to product 
design, and "theoretical knowledge" to representing more formal and 
analytical information resources. These terms contrast against Monk's 
characterisation of "tacit knowledge" as essentially informal and the 
product of learning by doing. 
This distinction between tacit and codified knowledge challenges the 
convention assumptions of technology exhibiting "public good" 
characteristics, in the sense of expensive production and inexpensive 
113 Von Hippel, E. (1988) The Sources of Innovation (Oxford University Press: New York). 
114 Monk, P. (1989) Technological Change in the Information Economy (Pinter Publishers) 
pp. 132 - 134. 
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reproduction.115 Tacit knowledge is not a public good since it requires a 
learning process on the part of the recipient which can be costly and time 
consuming.116 Information needs to flow through capable individuals. 
Lamberton117 argues that modelling of innovation needs to recognise 
capability as an important component of organisational capital. 
Significant absorption costs qualify the public good assumption 
conventional theory attaches to technologies. 118 
The importance of the distinction between tacit and codified knowledge is 
that is challenges the orthodox assumption that information is highly 
appropriable as discussed in the previous chapters. The development of a 
model of information technology "artefacts" in the following section 
seeks to pursue a conception of technological development which 
involves products whose underlying technologies are not appropriable 
and do provide incentives to innovate without strong intellectual 
property protection. 
4.3 A model of IT innovation 
Monk has analysed technological change and the role of information 
115 Nordhaus, W.D. (1969) Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of 
Technological Change (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge). 
116 Lamberton, D.M., Macdonald, S. and Mandeville, T.D. (1986) "Information and 
Technological Change - A Research Program in Retrospect" in Hall, P. (ed.) 
Technology, Innovation and Economic Policy (Philip Allan: Oxford) p. 231. 
117 Lamberton, D.M. (1994) "Innovation and Intellectual Property" in Dodgson, M. and 
Rothwell, R. (eds) Handbook of Industrial Innovation (Edward Elgar: London). 
118 Mandeville, T.D. (1996) Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, 
and the Patent System (Ablex: New Jersey) p. 61. 
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resources.119 He suggested that analyses of the economics of innovation 
have been focussed on the characteristics of its producers and the nature 
of the market for its products, rather than the technology itself.120 Neo-
classical economists have been criticised for failing to account for the role 
of technology in the economy and in the dynamics of technological 
change.121 One of Monk's significant contributions was that a distinction 
can be drawn between "technology"122 - the knowledge or ability required 
to enable economic production - and "artefacts", which are the physical 
embodiments of information. Technology is composed of coherently 
related sets of information while technological artefacts are physical 
products which result from application of the technology to production. 
These artefacts are labelled "information technology artefacts" ("IT 
artefacts") in subsequent discussion. The importance of Monk's 
distinction is that:123 
119 Monk, P. (1992) "Innovation in the Information Economy'' in Antonelli, C. (ed.) The 
Economics of Infonnation Networks (Elsevier Science Publishers: New York) pp. 35-50 
at pp. 40-41. 
120 Monk, P. (1989) Technological Change in the Information Economy (Pinter Publishers) 
p. 10. 
121 Jewkes, J. Swayers, D. and Stillerman, J. (1956) The Sources of Invention (Macmillan: 
London). 
122 "Technology" must have some present or potential value in use in production. 
Information which has ro potential use value in production cannot be considered as 
part of "technology". 
123 Monk, P. (1989) Technological Change in the Information Economy (Pinter Publishers) 
p. 134. 
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It allows the existence of [information] resources to be considered 
separately from the form in which they are embodied and from the 
forms in which they are implemented in economic production. 
Confusion between the existence, embodiment and 
implementation of technological information resources may 
account for some of the persistent difficulties and contradictions 
found in the literature. 
As an example, the science of engineering is a type of technology. A 
machine, bridge, or chemical compound would be an artefact. More 
appropriately for this thesis, computer science constitutes an information 
technology, while software is an information technology artefact. A 
graphical representation of the concept of IT artefacts outlined in this 
section is found in Figure 4-1. 
IT artefacts will have significantly different economic characteristics from 
their underlying technologies.124 The significant characteristic for the 
purposes of the model in this thesis is that that the knowledge underlying 
the creation of IT artefacts is not readily discernible to the person using 
the artefact. This is an important assumption since it implies that the 
artefact will not suffer from the same degree of appropriability and market 
failure (in the absence of intellectual property protection) which is 
assumed by conventional analysis. The conventional view outlined in 
chapter two assumes that technology is always highly codified in the sense 
used by Mandeville,125 and competitors or users can quickly and cheaply 
appropriate the knowledge underlying an IT artefact. 
124 Ibidem pp. 169 - 170. 
125 Mandeville, T.D. (1996) Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, 
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Figure 4-1- Information Technology Artefacts 
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This thesis rejects the conventional analysis. An IT artefact is generally 
excludable since it is typically a physical good and its value in use is 
thereby appropriable from users. The information (or technology) 
underlying its creation will typically be difficult or impossible to access 
merely from its use. At this point it is important to distinguish between 
the technological elements embodied in artefacts and their surface 
design.126 For example, a Rolex watch can be "copied" on the basis that 
the copy is in surface design and behaviour similar to the original. The 
copier is likely, however, to have appropriated little if any of the 
craftsmanship of the maker of the original. Even internal mechanisms of 
the watch might be reproduced, but this can be done without any 
understanding of the engineering underlying the mechanism or the 
aesthetics of the artistic composition involved. 
An IT artefact will not, under these conditions, display "public good" 
characteristics. The knowledge underlying production is not merely 
appropriated by access to the physical product. It follows that a sufficient 
incentive to innovate can exist provided at least that the reproduction (in 
the sense of replication) of the IT artefact is restricted. 
An information technology model of innovation derived from the above 
analysis is presented in Figure 4-2. The model can be explained by a focus 
on critical information flows represented by the arrows and elaborated in 
and the Patent System (Ablex: New Jersey). 
126 A theme pursued below in chapter six. 
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Figure 4-2 - An Informational Model of Technological Innovation 
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the following discussion. Innovation is determined by the tacit 
knowledge accumulated within individuals, including individuals 
within a particular firm. Tacit knowledge is important to developers in 
that it represents part of their capital in the form of organisational 
capability of information handling.127 Much of this knowledge base is not 
in a codified form and represents individual know-how or the know-how 
of several individuals ordered into organisational routines. It is 
important to note that knowledge must be accumulated within 
individuals and although firms may have legal personality, they are 
independently incapable of possessing knowledge. This privately held 
collection of tacit knowledge represents part of the capacity for 
innovation. 
The tacit knowledge of individuals within a firm will accumulate over 
time and derive in part from the process of articulating (codifying) the 
tacit knowledge so as to apply it to production. This suggests a two-way 
interaction between tacit and codified knowledge inherent in the concept 
of learning by doing. The firm's innovative activity must, at least to a 
degree, draw upon other sources including the "public domain". 
Information acquired from the environment - the public domain - will 
include the information networks existing not only between rival firms 
but between users of the IT artefacts. The model explicitly links the 
127 Lamberton, D.M. (1965) The Theory of Profit (Blackwell: Oxford) p. 197; and 
Weizsacker, C.C. Von (1984) "The Costs of Substitution" Econometrica, Vol. 52, pp. 
1085-1106 at p. 1085. 
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informational flows of users to those of the firm. Monk128 stated that the 
tacit knowledge of both developers and users is crucial to the practical 
evolution and implementation of technology. It is this relationship 
which most clearly suggests the existence of bounded rationality and 
network externalities within the process of innovation. The tacit 
knowledge influencing innovation incorporates important information 
from the marketplace such as product leadership, complementarities and 
economies of scope. This suggests a far more untidy and complex 
interaction with other individuals and firms as well as with existing 
(typically competing) information artefacts. Adopting a cumulative and 
interactive approach to innovation implies that technology must develop 
along a trajectory signposted by selection of successful routines. 
4.4 IT innovation and intellectual property 
Having developed a model of technological innovation in the previous 
section, the following discussion applies this model to the question of 
innovation and the role of intellectual property in regulating information 
flows. As discussed in Chapter Three, the promotion or restriction of 
information flows within the economy can have profound effects. The 
model is applied to three major intellectual property regimes: confidential 
information, patent, and copyright. The model is modified where 
appropriate to suit the assumptions of the particular regime. Copyright as 
128 Monk, P. (1989) Technological Change in the Information Economy (Pinter Publishers) 
p. 79. 
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the major source of protection for computer programs is given some 
emphasis. 
One implication from the model which follows from Monk's work is that 
although the "absolute" state of technology depends on the currently 
existing information set, the "effective" state of technology depends on 
the availability, distribution and allocation of the manifest forms of the 
knowledge. Consider this illustration: a discovery of cold fusion by 
technicians working for the Department of Defence would constitute a 
change in the absolute state of technology yet if this knowledge was kept 
secret for strategic purposes, there would be no effective change in the 
state of technology from the perspective of the rest of the world. 
"Absolute" technological change, therefore, occurs when the set of 
knowledge and abilities in the economy increases, irrespective of the 
availability of the technology - its social distribution. An "effective" 
technological change occurs where there is a change in the availability of 
information resources throughout the economy. This thesis takes 
Monk's argument one step further and argues that real technological 
change is promoted by a broadening of tacit knowledge. This means that 
policy makers should not only consider the availability of particular 
products to consumers, but also the distribution through society of the 
means by which such products are created. Policies should be adopted to 
ensure the promotion of the articulation of these means in forms which 
permit their dissemination. This section demonstrates why intellectual 
property laws can be seen as designed in such a way so as to enhance 
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inform a ti on distribution. 
4.4.1 Confidential information 
In an unregulated environment, information would flow between firms. 
This environment is illustrated in Figure 4-3. In particular, three type of 
flows would be expected. One is the exchange of tacit knowledge 
(industrial know-how) through processes of personal interaction, 
informal networks, and employee mobility. Another is a learning process 
where codified knowledge of one firm (blueprints, marketing 
information etc) is transmitted to another firm and becomes the subject of 
study. This information might be incorporated directly into the 
production process of the firm, but is more likely to result in the 
individuals within the second firm learning new or different means of 
production. Rosegger129 notes that copying of "the letters of learned 
men" in a growing network of postal services through Europe in the 16th 
and 17th centuries contributed to the spread of new ideas. Harris130 notes 
the role of espionage in effecting international information transfer 
during the 18th century. Employees at a follow-on firm may, as a result of 
access to codified information of the originating firm, deduce alternative 
solutions to particular applied problems. A third information flow, 
represented in blue on Figure 4-3, is that of environmental factors where 
information is obtained from study of the IT artefact and market feedback, 
129 Rosegger, G. (1991) "Advances in Information Technology and the Innovation 
Strategies of Firms" Prometheus, Vol. 9, pp. 5-20. 
130 Harris, J. (1986) "Spies who Sparked the Industrial Revolution" New Scientist (22 
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Figure 4-3 - Confidential Information 
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rather than from sources internal to other firms. In generic terms this 
may be described as "reverse engineering". 
These information flows are, however, regulated at a basic level by the 
laws governing confidential information. In many jurisdictions this type 
of legal right is described as "trade secret" protection. In Anglo-Australian 
law breach of confidence is protected by a number of distinct juristic bases 
including property rights131, fiduciary relationships132, and related 
obligations of good faith. In some instances (such as employer-employee 
relationships) it will be supported by contractual obligations. It is well 
established that a wide variety of commercial and industrial information 
can be subject to protection.133 The areas boxed in red on Figure 4-3 
represent a relationship of confidentiality. The inform a ti on flows 
between firms may be restricted by the use of confidential inform a ti on 
laws. The information flows from the general environment are not 
restricted. 
Davidson134, adopting a "good faith" analysis, noted that protection of 
confidential information, in contrast to patent and copyright, was not 
intended to encourage dissemination of innovative knowledge through 
May) p. 42. 
131 Such as comm.on law rights of property in unpublished works: Prince Albert v Strange 
(1849) 47 ER 1302; Philip v Pennell [1907] 2 Ch 577. 
132 Jones, G. (1968) "Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty" Law 
Quarterly Review, Vol. 84, p. 472. 
133 Ricketson, S. (1984) The Law of Intellectual Property (Law Book Company: Sydney) 
pp. 816 -817. 
134 Davidson, D.M. (1983) "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 
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society through disclosure. Instead, its purpose is to maintain standards 
of commercial ethics as well as encourage the generation of competitive 
advantage. This competitive advantage is typically manifest in market 
lead time, as the process of other firms imitating the IT artefact without 
access to the secret tacit and codified knowledge will be costly and time 
consuming. 
Reichrnan135 argued that "trade secrets" law has social value in that the 
task of reverse engineering unpatented, undisclosed innovation 
contributes to the innovative community's overall costs of research and 
development. Reverse engineering provides originators with natural 
lead time. Only followers who are prepared to defray the costs of study, 
analysis, and (in many cases) relearning will be able to exploit the cost 
reductions, technical improvements and potential new applications 
arising from the reverse engineering process. Reichman stated:136 
The technical community as a whole thus benefits from self-help 
diffusion of ·unpatentable skills and knowledge, while each 
competing firm's implementation of the resulting improvements 
and new applications becomes one of the best means of 
undermining the goodwill lawfully accruing to the first corner's 
own trademark. 
The legal principles regulating confidential information can be seen, 
within the information model, as promoting the growth of tacit 
knowledge in society by the encouragement of learning by imitation. This 
furimetrics, Vol. X, pp. 339 - 425 at p. 395. 
135 Reichman, J.H. (1994) "Legal Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms" 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 94, p. 2432 at pp. 2521 - 2523. 
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is because regardless as to whether confidential information has a 
proprietary or an equitable base, most jurisdictions permit independent 
creation. In contrast to the conventional model, the incentive to 
innovate does not arise from monopoly rights, but from competitive 
pressures137 and natural lead time. The presumed secrecy of the tacit and 
codified knowledge underlying this form of regulation agrees with the 
assumption that mere possession and use of at least some products ("IT 
artefacts") is insufficient to understand the technology underlying its 
production. This requires costly and time consuming analysis and 
learning. Yet, trade secrets ultimately encourage research and 
development as there is an incentive to imitate successful products. An 
example of this can be seen in the research conducted by Coca Cola's 
competitors to refine a drink with the same taste. Confidential 
information model most closely fits the concept of the IT artefact 
discussed above. 
4.4.2 Patent 
Patents are a particular form of property created by legislation. In 
Australia, a patent creates a monopoly over the exploitation of 
innovations in the sense of a "manner of new manufacture", broadly 
conceived as technology develops over time.138 Subject matter which is 
136 Ibidem p. 2522. 
137 Discussed in section 3.3.1. 
138 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 
CLR 252 at 271 per Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer J. 
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patentable is also limited by the requirements of novelty and non-
obviousness.139 The patent laws grants exclusive rights to make use of, 
assign, or license the innovation for the term of the patent, which is 
limited to a time period specified by domestic legislation - typically 20 
years. Patent does provide a limited monopoly and does protect against 
independent creation but the aim of providing patent protection is that by 
extensive disclosure, the innovation should become part of the ordinary 
stock of technology which is available for use by all manufacturers.140 
Silberston, for example, speaks of the importance of the "publication of 
new technical specifications" facilitating the "rapid spread" of 
knowledge.141 
The application of the patent system to the innovation model is presented 
in Figure 4-4. There are three major information flows identified. The 
first is the disclosure of codified knowledge by the patent holder (Firm X). 
An important element of the patent system is the disclosure of the 
patented innovation through registration. Firms can make direct use of 
this information either through licensing from the patent holder or by 
waiting until the expiry of the patent term. Conventional analysis would 
suggest that mere disclosure permits rival firms to appropriate the means 
139 See generally Ricketson, S. (1984) The Law of Intellectual Property (Law Book 
Company: Sydney) Chapter 48. 
140 Lewitt, G., (1986) "Fostering General Awareness of the Importance of Inventiveness" 
Industrial Property p. 233 at p. 236. 
141 Silberston, A. (1967) "The Patent System" Lloyds Bank Review, Vol. 84, pp. 32-44 at 
p. 39. 
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of production at little cost or effort. Users and adopters are perceived to be 
contributing little to the innovation process, or are simply replicating the 
innovation._142 In the graphical representation, the typical perception 
would be that, by accessing the patent of Firm X, Firm Y is producing a 
clone of IT Artefact X rather than an improved, specialised, or cheaper IT 
Artefact Y. 
An informational approach would suggest that disclosure does not lead to 
perfect appropriation. A patent holder only makes available the means of 
production in a codified form - a great deal of technological know how is, 
however, in a tacit form. For this reason many patent licences are 
accompanied by "know-how agreements" where the licensing firm 
provides consulting staff in order that the patent can be used. Imitation is 
therefore not appropriation but a transfer and learning process. This 
represents the second information flow, between tacit and codified 
knowledge within Firm Y, in blue in Figure 4-4. An imitating firm will 
require considerable investment on learning as well as direct production 
costs, which suggests that imitating firms would not be in a superior 
economic position to originators. This implies, even under a patent 
system, considerable natural protection for technological innovation.143 
The serious impact of a patent system is the restriction on the flow of 
information from the environment which, as discussed above, would be 
142 Mandeville, T. D. (1996) Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, 
and the Patent System (Ablex: New Jersey) p. 46. 
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the dominant form of innovation in an unregulated environment, or 
one regulated simply by relationships of confidence. In an informational 
model the imposition of this legal structure on the process of innovation 
implicitly assumes that, for some industries and/ or innovations, the 
unregulated solution - reverse engineering - would too slow, costly, or 
difficult without disclosure from the original innovator(s). This 
conclusion is supported by the existence of the requirements of novelty 
and nonobviousness for patent protection to be granted. 
In Figure 4-4, the dotted green line represents the restriction on reverse 
engineering imposed by a patent system. The intention of the patent 
system is that firms should engage in learning from information licensed 
by the patent holder or not at all. Macdonald and Mandeville144 found, 
however, that firms in high technology industries engage in extensive 
second sourcing and cross-licensing as a means to pervert the patent 
system and that if the patent system were to work as intended, such firms 
would face significant retardation of information exchange with 
disastrous effects for innovation and competitiveness. 
4.4.3 Copyright 
In general terms, copyright provides legal redress to authors where their 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works as well as subject matters other 
143 Ibidem pp. 93 - 94. 
144 Macdonald, S. and Mandeville, T. (1987) "Innovation Protection Viewed from an 
Information Perspective" in Kingston, W. (ed.) Direct Protection of Innovation 
(Kluwer Academic: Dordrecht) pp. 157-170. 
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than works145 have been unfairly reproduced without their permission. 
Copyright protection is granted by specific legislation.146 The scope of 
protection depends not only on judicial interpretation of the legislation, 
but on the kind of work involved. Current copyright law finds 
infringement in a wide variety of direct and indirect forms of 
reproduction and adaptation. The term of protection is limited to the life 
of the author plus 50 years.147 No formalities are required for copyright 
protection as for patent. In order to determine infringement, copyright 
must be found to subsist in the plaintiff's work and the defendant must, 
on the balance of probabilities, be proven to have copied a "substantial 
part" of that work.148 Substantial taking is judged by analysing the quality 
of the part taken rather than the quantity.149 This is because, although a 
large quantity may have been taken, it may have been relatively 
unoriginal - the obverse is also true. An investigation of the originality 
of what is taken is essential in determining the question of 
substantiality.150 For copyright to subsist in a work its reduction to 
material form must contain an element of the author's intellectual 
output. Elements not resulting from this effort are not protected. 
145 Copyright also includes other subject matter such as broadcast, sow-d recordings, 
cinematograph films, and published editions. 
146 In Australia, by the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ("CA"). 
147 CA s. 33(2). 
148 CA s. 14{l){a). 
149 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273 at 293 per 
Lord Pearce. 
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Kreiss151 argues that the basic purpose of copyright law is to advance 
learning and knowledge. The laws constitutes an incentive system which 
encourages the production and dissemination of works, but to achieve the 
purposes of copyright, such works must be accessible. Under this model 
copyright constitutes a quid pro quo in which commercial rewards 
flowing to producers is balanced by the increase in knowledge in society, 
through a learning process stemming from the works' dissemination. 
This is but one of a number of analyses whose metaphor is a balancing 
process between exclusivity and accessibility. 
Copyright law addresses the balancing process by use of two principal legal 
tools: the idea-expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use. A third 
mechanism is the expiry of the copyright term, but for technological 
industries, this may be of little value .. The idea-expression dichotomy has 
been of most significance in decisions relating to IT artefacts and 
computer software in particular. The dichotomy upholds the principle of 
access to works in that while ideas contained in copyrighted works are 
freely available, the particular form of expression of those ideas may not 
be reproduced or adapted without permission.152 A concise statement of 
150 Warwick Films v Eisinger [1969] Ch 508. 
151 Kreiss, RA. (1995) "Accessibility and Commercialisation in Copyright Theory" 
UCLA Law Review, Vol. 43, pp. 1-76. 
152 Yen, C. (1989) "A First Amendment Perspective en the Idea/ Expression Dichotomy 
and Copyright in a Work's 'Total Concept and Feel'" Emory Law Journal, Vol. 38, p. 
393. 
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the principle was made by Lindley LJ in Hollinrake v Truswell:l53 
Copyright, however, does not extend to ideas, or schemes, or 
systems, or methods; it is confined to their expression: and if their 
expression is not copied the copyright is not infringed. 
While agreeable in abstract, the concept is difficult to apply in practice. 
Netanel154 describes it as "notoriously malleable and indeterminate". A 
few commentators favouring stronger and broader protection have 
argued against the application of this principle, and in favour of 
protection of ideas.155 This distinction does, however, accord with much 
of the economic literature surrounding intellectual property. Landes and 
Posner156, for example, examine copyright within a formal economic 
model of the effects of protection on the production of creative works. 
The model uses a single variable as a proxy for a range of policy decisions 
including the degree of similarity triggering infringement, the elements 
within a work which are protected, and the duration of the property right. 
The up-front fixed "cost of expression", principally the input of the author 
in creating the work, is treated as a fixed cost variable. 
The effect of an increase in copyright protection is both to increase the 
153 (1894] 3 Ch 420 at 427. 
154 Netanel, N.W. (1996) "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society" Yale Law Journal, 
Vol. 106, p. 283 at p. 304, noting comments in similar sentiment by Learned Hand Jin 
Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Circuit 1930) at 122. 
155 Christie, A.F. (1984) "Copyright Protection for Ideas: An Appraisal of the 
Traditional View" Monash University Law Review, Vol. 10, p. 175; Hopkins, D.B. 
(1982) "Ideas, their Time has Come: An Argument and a Proposal for Copyrighting 
Ideas" Intellectual Property Law Review, Vol. 14, p. 385. 
156 Landes, W.M. and Posner, R.A., (1989) "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law" 
Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 18, p. 325. 
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author's fixed cost of expression and the copiers' marginal cost of 
reproduction. The cost of expression is increased since a broadening of 
copyright protection will limit the availability of public domain material 
from which new works can be created, also, this may force the author to 
take costly steps to avoid infringement of existing works. As the level of 
copyright protection increases, through broadening or lengthening the 
scope of protection, there are two effects. One is that the potential profits 
of authors will rise, increasing the number of works produced (a 
movement along the supply curve) the other is that an increase 1n 
protection drives up the cost of expression (a shift to the left of the supply 
curve). Between a negligible amount of protection and the theoretically 
optimal level, the effect on authors' expected profits will dominate, 
increasing socially desirable works, but only up to a point. Beyond a 
critical level of copyright the effect of further expansion of copyright will 
both drive out copiers and also increasing the cost of expression so as to 
reduce the number of works created since the public domain will be more 
limited. Landes and Posner157 state: 
Some copyright protection is necessary to generate the incentives to 
incur the costs of creating easily copied works, but too much 
protection can raise the costs of creation of subsequent authors to 
the point where those authors cannot cover them even though 
they have complete copyright protection for their own originality. 
Some significant implications can be drawn from the Landes and Posner 
model which provide the basis for a framework for analysis of copyright. 
157 Ibidem p. 335. 
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Firstly, the "optimal" level of copyright (that which maximises welfare) is 
demonstrated to be at a level below that which maximises the number of 
works produced, or provides the maximum return to the producers of the 
works. This emphasises the importance of striking a balance between the 
need to provide incentives and the desirability for society's access to 
works, particularly to technological advances. Landes and Posner158 state 
that copyright protection: 
. .. trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the 
benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place. 
Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the 
central problem in copyright law. 
Secondly, the more the cost of expression increases with respect to the 
broadening of copyright protection the lower will be the optimal level of 
copyright protection. Copiers in the sense that Landes and Posner define 
them are limited to literal copying rather than non-literal copying such as 
reverse engineering. There would be a separate demand curve for non-
literal copies. This suggests that it is socially desirable to differentiate 
between literal copiers and those using the work to create new works. 
Protection should not be as extensive against the latter group. This 
accords with the informational model of innovation used in this chapter. 
Finally, Landes and Posner suggest that ex ante authors would, behind a 
veii of ignorance, choose a copyright rule which protected expression but 
not ideas. In theory, there is a level of copyright which policy setters will 
158 Ibidem p. 326. 
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seek to attune the law which evenly balances the increase in the cost of 
creating new works against the increase in revenues by copyright holders 
of existing works. This would be because they would not know whether 
they were to be the first or a later generation author. 
Copyright as applied to the innovation model is presented in Figure 4-5. 
Similar to the situation in the applications discussed above, part of the 
innovation process will involve the articulation of tacit knowledge into a 
codified form. In broad terms, tacit knowledge can be equated with 
copyright's conception of "ideas" and the process of codification as 
"expression" of these ideas. This process is identified in red on the figure. 
The significant difference between this depiction of the innovation 
process and those of the other intellectual property situations is that the 
codified knowledge is no longer separable from the IT artefact. For 
literary, dramatic and artistic works the codified knowledge is no longer a 
means to an end (means of production) but an end in itself. The artefact 
no longer has the characteristics of a "knowledge artefact" in the sense 
used by Monk. Since it is now a joint product (represented in blue) 
possession of a protected work will permit appropriation by users who 
will not contribute to the innovation process themselves. Copyright law, 
principally through the mechanism of the idea-expression dichotomy, 
promotes socially useful innovation by prohibiting replicative 
reproduction of the work but permitting further innovations by others 
based on similar ideas, systems and methods. This information flow is 
represented in green on Figure 4-5. Importantly, these ideas are not 
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simply obtained from the work itself, but also involve participants in the 
marketplace. Innovation, even in artistic endeavours, should progress 
along particular trajectories based on bounded rationality. This 1s 
represented as information flowing through the network of users. 
The important policy implication is that maintenance of a public domain 
of accessible ideas is important for the process of innovation. Yen159 
notes: 
All authors borrow from other works. By prohibiting borrowing 
from copyrighted works, copyright makes it harder for authors to 
produce new works. Those authors must pay to borrow, or they 
start from scratch. These obstacles hinder the production of 
beneficial works, thereby retarding "the progress of Science and 
useful Arts". 
If copyright is to govern innovation within a particular industry, striking 
the correct balance, or drawing the most appropriate line between idea 
and expression, will therefore be major determinant of the economic 
benefits and costs. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter developed a model of technological innovation from an 
information perspective. This model derives from literature within an 
information economics perspective and is based on two major theoretical 
constructs: 
159 Yen, A.C. (1991) "The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Betw~en 
Copyright and the Economics of Public Good s" Ohio State Law journal Vol. 52 p. 1343 
a t pp. 1364-1365. 
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• a distinction between tacit and codified knowledge; and 
• a distinction between knowledge and knowledge artefacts. 
Both these distinctions are at odds with orthodox literature which treats 
information as exhibiting "public good" characteristics. The model of "IT 
artefacts" as commodities embodying technological knowledge instead 
assumes that the underlying knowledge is not readily appropriable from 
possession of that artefact. This suggests that the market failure identified 
by Arrow will not apply to IT artefacts in the same way it might apply to 
information in a codified form. Competitors will not be able to quickly or 
cheaply extract the information embedded in the IT artefact, as opposed to 
its surface design. 
The model emphasised the interactive nature of innovation between 
individuals and firms and the importance of the public domain. The 
model also assumed the existence of bounded rationality and the 
potential for network externalities. 
This model was then used to illustrate the role of intellectual property 
laws within the contexts of: 
• confidential information; 
• patent; and 
• copyright. 
The application to each intellectual property regime each suggested that 
the key to successful innovation policy was the promotion of information 
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flows so as to enhance the creation and distribution of tacit knowledge. 
For confidential information, the mechanism was competitive pressures 
encouraging reverse engineering. For patent, the grant of property rights 
encouraged disclosure of codified information which in turn generated 
learning. For copyright, the idea-expression dichotomy promotes access to 
ideas as the means for creation of new works. 
The remainder of this thesis will examine one particular area of 
application of intellectual property law - copyright over computer 
software - and assess the economic justifications and legal determinations 
against this model of innovation. Chapter Five argues the proposition 
that software - computer programs - are an "IT artefact" within the 
meaning of the earlier discussion. The implications of this for 
innovation policy within the industry is discussed m Chapter Six, 
followed by an assessment of the current state of play within the 
international legal environment in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Five 
Software as an IT Artefact 
5.1 Introduction 
The earlier chapters in this thesis developed a model of innovation based 
on information economics and the concept of an IT artefact. This chapter 
argues that computer programs distributed in machine code form only are 
IT artefacts as defined in Chapter Four. This requires the overturning of a 
widely held assumption in the copyright literature - that the technology 
underlying a computer program is readily appropriable. Support of the 
contrary proposition requires closer examination of the nature of 
computer processing and in particular the nature of programming 
languages. It also requires an understanding of the software development 
process. These matters are set out in sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, with 
additional detail in the Appendices. 
The key issue is one of access to the underlying technology by possession 
of the IT artefact. One way to put this question in the context of computer 
programs is to consider to what degree the possessor of executable or 
machine code (the IT artefact) has access to its source code (the 
technology). This access is widely assumed within the literature, but 
challenged in this thesis. The principal reason is that, for third and 
higher generation languages (defined below) source code is not 
isomorphic with machine code, nor does decompilation provide a 
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technological solution. 
Having established this key proposition, the model of innovation 
presented in Chapter Four is then applied to software as an IT artefact, and 
some implications of the model discussed. In particular the model 
suggests a minimal role of copyright and a significant role in the 
encouragement of imitative competition for technological development. 
These implications provide the basis for the discussion of innovation 
policy which follows in Chapter Six. 
5.2 Computers and programs 
The term "computer" is capable of a variety of usages. The primary 
meaning is a short-form for an "electronic, digital, stored-program 
computer." The term "computer" is often used ambiguously and has 
three main meanings: 
• the complete apparatus; 
• the electronic components only (including keyboard, screen and 
power supply); and 
• in a narrow sense, the "central processing unit, (CPU) which is at the 
heart of the electronic componentry. 
This thesis uses "computer" to mean a device which is capable of 
performing a defined set of operations on a series of binary digits ("bits"), 
hence, the device is presumed to be digital. Each operation results in a 
change to some part of the machine's internal state. An operation is 
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performed when an instruction to do so is loaded into a part of the 
computer called the "instruction register". 
The complete set of instructions that a computer is capable of executing is 
called the computer's "machine-language". The set of instructions that 
makes up a machine-language is designed to be sufficiently rich to enable 
the computer to perform a particular function. A "machine language 
program" is a program that is expressed in a particular computer model's 
machine-language. Because of the nature of the technology used in a 
computer, a machine-language program is a series of bits, conventionally 
represented in human readable form as either "1" or "O". A computer is 
capable of executing any program that is expressed in its machine-
language. A computer is said to "execute" a machine-language program 
by loading successive machine-language instructions into its instruction 
register. The instructions that make up a machine-language program are 
accordingly often referred to as "executable code". 
The word "hardware" is used as a generic term for computers and 
associated physical equipment. This is complemented by "software", the 
generic of program. Although the terms "program" and "software" can be 
used in a restrictive manner, to refer only to machine-language programs 
comprising executable code, they are more commonly encompass code 
that is expressed in languages other than machine language, but which is 
convertible into executable code. 
Programming in machine-language is tedious and inefficient. One 
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important reason for this is that it is, definitionally, oriented towards the 
machine's internal structures, whereas, the purposes for which 
organisations and individuals want to apply computers have their own, 
different natural structures. Hence, for practical and economic reasons, 
very little programming is performed in machine-language. 
Instead, programs are usually expressed in some other language that is 
capable of being converted into machine-language. Many languages have 
been designed to fulfil two key requirements, to be: 
• convenient and efficient for expressing whatever organisations and 
individuals want to achieve; and, 
• capable of being translated into machine-language. 
Unlike machine-language formats, which are expressed in binary code, 
programs expressed in other languages use some form of "character-
representation code". The most commonly-used is "7-bit ASCII 
(American Standard Code for Information Interchange). This uses a 
series of 7 bits to represent a set of 128 characters, including all of the 
upper and lower-case letters of the Roman alphabet, the numerals 1-9 and 
zero, and punctuation marks. An example of this is that the binary string 
-
1000001 represents the letter "A". 
Other character-representation codes exist, including an 8-bit 
international code, ISO 8859 which has the capacity for 256 characters and 
can, therefore, support "diacritics" (qualifiers to the Roman alphabet such 
as i.i, 0, c;, and e) and a 16-bit code called Unicode, whose 65,000 
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combinations can also accommodate ideographic codes such as Kanji. 
5.3 Programming languages 
The term "low-level languages" is commonly applied to assembly 
languages and macro-assembly languages (second generation languages) 
and the term "high level languages" to third and higher generation 
languages.160 
First generation languages ("machine language") were expressions 
entirely in terms of the computer's instruction set. Problem solutions 
were expressed in machine terms, not human terms. Over time these 
instructions were condensed from binary to octal and hexadecimal 
notation for convenience and efficiency. 
Use of second generation languages ("assembly" and "macro-assembly") 
was a superior programming technique since these languages involved 
the use of mnemonic commands rather than arbitrary numeric 
commands. Problem solutions were still expressed in machine terms 
since the assembly languages were isomorphic with the underlying 
machine languages. 
The significant advance in computer programming was the emergence of 
third generation languages ("algorithmic" or "procedural") which enabled 
problem solutions to be expressed in a form more logically transparent 
160 This overview of software generations is principally drawn from Clarke, R. (1991) "A 
Contingency Approach to Application Software Generations" Database, Summer. 
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than machine or assembly language. The difficulty in development of 
third generation languages was the breaking of the isomorphic 
connection between the language and final machine code executable 
which had existed in the second generation. Third generation languages 
emerged in the early 1950's with major theoretical advances association 
withe Fortran ("formula translation" language), Algol ("algorithmic 
language") and COBOL ("COmmon Business Oriented Language"). In 
more recent times, languages such as Pascal and C have dominated the 
creation of programs for microcomputers. 
The fourth generation has been conceived as languages whose defining 
characteristics include productivity, end user development, relational 
data modelling, and non-procedural programming. This final 
characteristic has been the most widespread perception of fourth 
generation languages. Manifestations of fourth generational movements 
have been interest in reusability, object-oriented programming languages 
and application generators. 
The emergent fifth generation represents an interest in logical 
programming, expert systems, and artificial intelligence. Simplification of 
problem solving can be linked with the engineering of human expert 
knowledge within the computer architecture. This involves the creation 
and maintenance of a pre-defined knowledge base which includes the use 
of rules supported by reference data. The intention is to express a 
domain-specialist's knowledge about a particular problem domain. The 
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theoretical sixth generation would be a further level of abstraction from 
the machine limitations. Table 5-1 summarises the abstractions 
interpretation of application software generations. 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Table 5-1 - Application Software Generations 
Language 
Facilitative 
Descriptive 
Declarative 
Algorithmic 
or procedural 
Assembly or 
macro-
assembly 
Machine 
language 
Human Activity Machine Activity Man-Machine 
Relationship 
Collection and Development of Delegation by an 
provision of implicitly pre- operative to a "black 
empirical evidence defined domain model box" 
Definition of a Application of Delegations by a 
domain model implicitly pre- teacher to a "black 
defined problem box" 
solution 
Definition of the Application of an Delegation by a 
problem to solve explicitly pre-defined teacher to an educated 
problem solution clerk 
Expression of the Non-isomorphic Instruction by a 
problem solution in a translation teacher to a dumb 
natural form (compilation and clerk 
interpretation) 
Expression of the Isomorphic Use by the specialist 
problem solution in translation (assembly) of an extended tool 
mnemonic shorthand 
Expression of the Computation Use by a specialist of 
problem solution in a tool 
the machine's terms 
Source: Clarke, R. (1991) "A Contingency Approach to Application Software Generations" 
Database, Summer. 
The term "program" might now be defined. It is conventionally used 
only to refer to sets of instructions that are expressed in a language of 
generations 1-3 inclusive, i.e. a machine-language, an assembly-language 
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or a procedural language.161 A program is therefore an expression of an 
algorithm that is designed to cause a computer to perform a particular 
function. The term "instruction" is used to refer to each statement; 
whereas, later-generation languages comprise statements that are not 
suitably referred to in that manner. 
Because the approaches are still relatively new, there is no conventional 
term for blocks of statements that express problem-descriptions (fourth 
generation) or problem-domain-descriptions (fifth generation). What is, 
and what is not, a "program" is technology dependent and context driven. 
The term "source code" is used to refer to the statements that make up a 
program, irrespective of the language that is used - source code may be in 
machine-language, a low-level language or a high-level language. 
All programming languages are formally defined, with a set of rules 
defining the specific "instruction set" and "language syntax" that are to be 
used. The sets of instructions available in most languages are rich. The 
result is that, for any given function that needs to be performed, there are 
generally a number of ways in which the program can be expressed. For 
complex functions, there may be a myriad of different expressions that are 
functionally equivalent. 
161 Limiting the concept of a program to source and machine code agrees with 
commentators such as Samuelson, P. (1984) "CONTU Revisited: The Case Against 
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form" Duke Law 
Journal, Vol. 1984, p. 663 at p. 683. 
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To simply the process of program development, coding, and testing 
("debugging"), computer programs have been written in preliminary 
forms which are far more convenient for human scrutiny. "Source code" 
does not constitute a set of instructions: in that source does not direct the 
computer to perform a function. Source code is an outline of the steps to 
be taken in the solution to the problem forming part of the program. 
Source exists in varying levels of abstraction and sophistication and 
framed around "languages" which are, in a broad sense, symbolic 
statements in human-convenient form: for our purposes, a form 
representing English. 
When a program is expressed in a language other than machine-
language, it needs to be processed by a "translator". The output from a 
translator is referred to as "object code" - where "object" is user in the 
sense that this was the "object" or "objective" of the translation activity. 
The object code that is produced by a translator is one of the following: 
• executable code expressed in machine-language; 
• machine-language that is not yet executable, because it needs 
additional elements to be associated with it, which are drawn from a 
library of common components. The process involved in associating 
those additional elements is known as "linking; or, 
• an intermediate form that requires further translation before it is 
capable of being executed. 
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Translators are of various kinds, depending on the kind of language that 
· they translate, and when they are designed to be used. The classes of 
translators are: 
• for a translator that takes as its source code input a complete 
program: 
* if that program is expressed in a 2nd generation language - an 
"assembler"; 
* if that program is expressed in a 3rd or later generation 
language - a "compiler"; 
• for a translator that reads as input not a complete source code 
program, but merely the next statement in a source code program 
and provides the output for immediate execution - an "interpreter". 
Note that this approach can be used for any level of language. 
Combinations of these techniques are also possible. In particular, a high-
level language may also be compiled into intermediate code, that is 
subsequently handled, instruction-by-instruction, by a "run time 
interpreter". This enables programs written in a high level language to be 
run on different models of computer, provided that a run-time 
interpreter is available for each of the different machine-languages. 
The complexity of the translation process undertaken by compilers is 
generally much greater than that for assemblers, because the structures of 
the source code and the object code are so radically different from one 
another. The richness of the languages and the options that are available 
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to the people who construct compilers, are such that different compilers, 
designed to translate the same source code into object code for the same 
computer, may produce significantly different object code. 
A translator can only produce effective object code if the source code: 
• complies with the formal specification of the source code language; 
and; 
• expresses the function that the designer intended. 
Translators generally test for compliance with the language syntax and 
report errors back to the programmer. They cannot, however, test for 
compliance with the designer's intent1 because there is no external 
reference point with which to compare the source code or object code. 
This is an expression of the linguistic distinction between "connotation" 
(meanings and emotional states evoked by the words) and ''denotation" 
(literal meaning). Programs are only capable of understanding 
denotation. 
The majority of software is written in languages of the first three 
generations, hence, close attention needs to be paid to the manner in 
which programming is performed in these languages. Languages of the 
first three generations are referred to as "procedural" or "algorithmic" 
languages. By this it is meant that a program comprises a precise 
formulation of a plan (or procedure or algorithm) for scheduling actions 
to be performed by the computer. Examples of algorithms in everyday life 
would include: directions for reaching a particular destination by road; a 
page 94 
Chapter Five - Software as an IT Artefact 
cooking recipe; and the procedure for calculating the gross wages for a 
particular employee.162 A verbal representation of an algorithm is 
presented in Figure 5-1. 
Figure 5-1- Payroll Algorithm 
If the hours worked are less than or equal to 40, the pay is the product of 
the number of hours worked and the rate of $10.00 per hour. Also, if 
more than 40 hours are worked, the pay is $15.00 per hour, for each of the 
hours over 40. If more than 60 hours are worked, the pay is $20.00 per 
hour for each of the hours over 60. 
A representation of this algorithm in the programming language C is 
given in Figure 5-2. 
Figure 5-2 - Payroll Algorithm in C 
/* Example payroll algorithm * / 
#include <stdio.h> 
!Ila.in () 
{ 
} 
int hours, pay; 
scanf("%d", &hours); 
if (hours <= 40) 
pay = 10 * hours; 
else if (hours <= 60) 
pay = 10 * 40 + 15 * (hours - 40); 
else 
pay = 10 * 40 + 15 * 20 + 20 * (hours - 60); 
printf ("Gross pay is %d", pay) ; 
return O; 
Algorithms may be "foolproofed", or made "robust" by adding additional 
procedures to deal with anticipated errors in the input process. For 
example, if the program in Figure 5-2 receives alphabetical input rather 
than numeric, or if the total hours worked are negative or greater than 
162 This example based on Metrowerks Inc., (1995) Codewarrior: Principles of 
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some maximum level. The program could respond by the display of an 
appropriate error message or "alert". 
An important feature of algorithms is that two algorithms which appear 
to have substantially different structures may exhibit logical equivalence. 
For the same inputs, each algorithm will produce identical output. To 
demonstrate, take the algorithm in Figure 5-2 as one potential 
implementation of the verbal algorithm in Figure 5-1. The distinctive 
process involved is that the gross pay is calculated by way of a single 
computation using a different formula for each category. An alternative 
implementation is presented in Figure 5-3. 
Figure 5-3 - Alternative Payroll Algorithm 
/* Alternative payroll algorithm*/ 
#include <stdio.h> 
roain () 
{ 
int hours, pay; 
scanf("%d", &hours); 
pay = 10 * hours; 
if (hours > 40) { 
pay= pay+ (5 * (hours - 40)); 
} 
if (hours > 60) { 
pay= pay+ (10 * (hours - 60)); 
} 
printf ("Gross pay is %d", pay) ; 
return O; 
This second algorithm instead makes increments to the basic wage. If the 
two pieces of source code are compared, they are distinct in expression. 
They are also distinct in mathematical process. When applied to any 
Programming (Metrowerks) at pp. 45 - 63. 
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given set of inputs, however, the output will be identical. This is a trivial 
demonstration of the general proposition that, for any set of executable 
program behaviours, there are a range of potential source code strategies 
which can generate the same behaviour. 
5.4 Software development 
A software development project will typically include a number of input 
files which are collectively described as the project's "source code", even 
though only a small part of the project will be newly written source code 
in a higher level language. Central to this complex software development 
environment is a project file. Some application development 
frameworks use a project file to keep track of all the relevant source 
materials and object code, as well as specifications of the procedures 
through which the project is to be conducted, such as specifying the 
targeted operating system or setting optimisation parameters. Some of 
the principal components of a project will be source code files which are 
text format files containing parts of the program algorithm represented in 
a higher level language form such as C, C++ , Pascal, or BASIC or a lower 
level form of Assembler language. Depending on the particular language 
used, these source code files may also include interface files or header files 
which are other text format files containing definitions of the data and 
functions used in the source code. The compilers for some languages 
such as Pascal and C require formal specifications of functions and 
parameters used in the source code. 
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Another element of project source materials are resource files which are 
descriptions of items used within the source code, particularly in a 
graphical user interface environment. A typical resource file will contain 
descriptions of windows, dialog boxes, menus and other graphical items · 
which may have been constructed using a special application. Resource 
files may be in binary (object) format or in a text format requiring a special 
resource compiler to place it in binary format before being linked. 
All text format files, whether source code or resources, must be 
transformed into a binary form. The resultant code is described as object 
code. To obtain object code, the source code is "run" through a compiler 
which takes the higher level language expression and compares it with a 
predefined vocabulary, which is a cross-referencing of the higher level 
language expressions with their binary equivalents. Source materials will 
also include library files which are precompiled elements of source code 
which are common and reusable between different software projects. 
This avoids the need to rewrite source code such as that representing 
elements of the user interface (such as MacOS or Windows libraries). If 
part of the source materials are in Assembler language, then the object 
code will be produced using an assembler rather than a compiler. Once 
the project has been compiled or assembled into object code, the final 
stage is for a linker to take the object code and link the pieces together to 
form the desired software product. The most obvious product is an 
application or executable which is a file directly executable by the 
computer. The linker will ensure that the object code is compatible with 
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the central processing unit (CPU), such as those based on the Intel 80486 
chip used on IBM PC's, or the Motorola 68040 used on the Apple 
Macintosh. This process is illustrated in Figure 5-4.163 
Figure 5-4 - Compilation Process 
File 
A CodeWarrlf'f 
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F d0s Use.:1 by 
This Projecr: 
i----------r-:--1 -------- ,t __ , ;-:-~-0 ~·:--; \ 
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163 This analysis accords with other commentators such as Davidson, D.M. (1983) 
"Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" Jurimetrics, Vol. 23, p. 
337 at pp. 340 - 342. 
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So11rce: Mark, D. (1995) Learn Con the Macintosh (2nd Ed., Addison-Wesley) pp. 18-19. 
This process is presented in more detail in Appendix One, which also 
provides the basis for examples in further appendices. 
Once the algorithms have been coded, the program should be tested using 
an appropriate strategy based on comparison of a range of inputs 
(including deliberate errors to ensure that the program is robust) to 
expected outputs. If there are differences, the sources of the errors are 
investigated. An error may lie in the coding process, the algorithm itself, 
the design and structure of the program, or the computation of the 
expected results. Serious errors in the program are usually obvious, such 
as the program "freezing11 or "hanging" (execution stops or 1s 
continuously looped) or "crashing" (the program quits and/ or damages 
the systems software). 
If an error lies within the coding process, the strategy for identifying and 
removing these errors from the source code is described as debugging. 
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This process is assisted by a range of specialised applications. A debugger 
is a particular application which simulates and controls the execution of a 
program so that the programmer can observe the program running and 
the changes which are occurring internally. The appropriate debugger can 
execute the program statement by statement, suspend execution when it 
reaches a certain point, or interrupt the program if some particular value 
is reached in a memory location. The debugger allows the programmer to 
view the functions, examine and change the values of variables, and 
inspect the contents of the processor registers. Many debuggers allow the 
programmer to view the source code in its assembler form as well as in 
the source code equivalent. Some also facilitate editing of the source files 
during this process. 
To assist in the error detection, debugging and future maintenance and 
enhancement of programs, it is good practice to annotate the source code 
extensively. These annotations, which are themselves lines of code, are 
described as "comments", and are ignored in the compilation process. 
The comments should record a detailed explanation of the source code 
and its intended effect. This is particularly useful where different 
programmers may be asked to update or rewrite the code, such as the 
incorporation of new features in an existing application. Source code 
without comments is difficult to interpret, particularly within lengthy 
source code for a complex application. The example in Appendix Two 
demonstrates the usefulness of commented source code in providing a 
basis for understanding a program. 
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5.5 The Issue of Access 
Prefaced by the above discussion, this section argues that software is an 
"IT artefact" in the terms developed in the previous chapter. A key issue 
is the degree of access or "appropriability" exhibited by software. In terms 
of the model proposed by this thesis: 164 
The significant characteristic for the purposes of the model in this 
thesis is that that the knowledge underlying the creation of 
[software] is not readily discernible to the person using the 
[software] ... The information (or technology) underlying its 
creation will typically be difficult or impossible to access merely 
from its use. 
Such a proposition is at odds with a significant proportion of software 
copyright literature, which assumes that distribution of the program 
entails distribution of the ideas underlying its creation.165 This widely 
accepted - yet flawed - assumption in policy articles about computer 
program copyright is the argument that computer programs reveal a 
substantial amount of knowledge about the means of their creation on 
the "face" of the product. This section argues that such a degree of access 
is, however, a myth. Distribution of an application does not also mean 
disclosure of the means for creation of that application. 
One can use an application, or interact with an interface without 
understanding how it works. Users, for example, of Microsoft Excel may 
become proficient in spreadsheet design, and in the use of formulae and 
164 See Chapter Four, above. 
165 Soma, J.T., Winfield, G. and Friesen, L. (1994) "Software Interoperability and Reverse 
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macros. This does not mean that the same user is capable of constructing 
a spreadsheet application. It may provide some clues as to potential ways 
of implementing such an application, but learning from clues is the 
essence of access to ideas which copyright intends to promote. 
One fallacy lies in confusing copyright doctrine with the evidentiary 
issues involved in proving infringement. A common theme is that new 
technologies will permit copying in such a way as to avoid detection or 
the appearance of similarity between works.166 A plaintiff must prove 
access and substantial similarity. A major legal consideration should be to 
what form of the program the alleged infringer had access. The common 
assumption by commentators that "access is generally not an issue"167 
assumes one or more of the following: 
• that the infringer had access to the source code; 
• that source and machine code are interchangeable; or 
• that technology exists to translate machine code into source code. 
The following sections examine each of these cases in turn. 
Engineering" Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 20, p. 189 at p. 255. 
166 Casey, P.A. and Smith, D.K.W. (1994) "Understanding Some Intricacies of Software: 
Expression, Interfaces and Reverse Assembly" Computer Law, April, p. 16. 
167 McGahn, D.F. (1995) "Copyright Infringement of Protected Computer Software: An 
Analytical Method to Determine Substantial Similarity" Rutgers Computer and 
Technology Law Journal, Vol. 21, p. 88 at p. 111. 
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5.5.1 Access to Source Code 
One source of the misplaced assumptions regarding access arises from the 
fact that historically some programs were distributed in source code form. 
For example, Harris168 noted that the most likely scenario for reverse 
engineering of a computer program is by distribution of the program in 
source code form, or in assembler form with heavy comments such that 
the assembler language is readily accessible. Rilee169 also assumed that 
both source and object code were commonly licensed and thereby 
misappropriated. 
Both these commentators were writing in the early 1980's and their 
experiences based on practices in the 1970's principally dealing with 
mainframe and minicomputers. Such a situation no longer exists. For 
the microcomputer programs of today, it is extremely rare for software to 
be distributed in source code. As a practical matter, programs are 
distributed in a form which is understandable by computers - in the sense 
it is executable by the hardware and any system software - but not by 
human beings. This is particularly true of mass marketed software for 
microcomputers. For mass marketed or "shrinkwrapped" software, the 
source code is not revealed, and the distribution takes place only in 
168 Harris, J.R. (1985) "A Market-Oriented Approach to the Use of Trade Secret or 
Copyright Protection (or Both?) for Software" furimetrics Journal, Vol. 25, p. 147 at p. 
160. 
169 Rilee, E.W. (1980) "The Protection of Proprietary Rights in Computer Software" 
Akron Law Review, Vol. 14, p. 85 at p. 87. 
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machine code. 
5.5.2 Access to Machine Code 
Another source for the assumption of access is that machine code and 
source code are interchangeable. McGahn170, for example, incorrectly 
described a compiler as "nothing more than" a program which "converts" 
source code into machine code. Portraying executable code to be a 
translation of source code in the same manner as English translates into 
French, would be misunderstanding the nature of programs. Viewing 
machine code as a "mere translation" of source code promotes the 
misconception that compilation is isomorphic, and confuses the artefact 
with the knowledge underlying the artefact. Such misconceptions are 
evident in assertions by commentators such as Davidson that "reverse 
engineering" of a machine is required to understand the means of its 
creation but an understanding of a computer program is obtained simply 
by "reading" the computer language.171 
In part this incorrect assumption may also be grounded in legislative and 
judicial history. The first case in Australia,172 for example, concerned the 
170 McGahn, D.F. (1995) "Copyright Infringement of Protected Computer Software: An 
. Analytical Method to Determine Substantial Similarity" Rutgers Computer and 
Technology Law Journal, Vol. 21, p. 88 at p. 94. 
171 Davidson, D.M. (1983) "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 
Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 23, p. 337 at p. 366. 
172 Apple v. Computer Edge (1984) 53 A.LR. 225; see Clarke, R.A. (1988) "Judicial 
Understanding of Information Technology: The Case of the Wombat ROMs" The 
Computer Journal, Vol. 31, p. 25; and Liberman, A. (1984) "The 'Apple' Cases: A 
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protection of a ROM chip which only involved assembly code and 
executable code. Similar cases were considered in the United States.173 As 
the expert evidence led was limited to the case at hand no consideration 
of any more complicated processes was necessary. This set the ground (in 
Australia) for a conception of computer programs as merely being 
constituted of "source" (assembler) and "object" (executable) code - one 
being an identical translation of the other. This relationship is illustrated 
in Figure 5-5. 
Figure 5-5 - ROM Cases 
.......__ ____ Isomorphic 
translations 
Translation of source materials into machine code is "mechanical" only 
in the sense that it is carried out by a machine. When dealing with third 
and higher generation languages, it would be incorrect to compilation this 
as an "isomorphic" translation in the sense of an identical mapping of 
one to the other. In discussion the compilation process, Davidson 
incorrectly asserted:174 
Comparison of the American and Australian Decisions" U.N.S. W. Law Journal, p. 143. 
173 Apple Computer, Inc. v Franklin Computer Corp. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), 104S Ct 
690 (1984); see Touponse, M.J. (1985) "The Application of Copyright Law to Computer 
Operating System Programs: Apple Computer, Inc. v Franklin Computer Corp." 
Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 17, p. 665. 
174 Davidson, D.M. (1983) "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 
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The code has changed; the ones and zeros of object code are very 
different than the letters, numbers and symbols of source code. But 
the expression remains the same; only the size of the alphabet has 
been reduced. 
Davidson's statement suggesting inherent isomorphism between source 
and object code would only be valid in respect of the relationship between 
assembler and machine code, and would be invalid in respect of a third 
generation language (such as Pascal). 
As discussed above a computer program is merely a mechanised manner 
of solving a problem expressed in the form of an algorithm. Logically, as 
there may be more than one means of solving a problem, more than one 
algorithm may serve the same purpose. Samuelson et az.175 noted that 
two programs with different texts176 can have equivalent behaviour. To a 
large degree, in programming, the algorithm selected will depend on the: 
• tacit knowledge and inherent problem-solving ability of the 
originating programmer or programmers; 
• computer language selected for the original and the recompiled 
program; 
• the compiler program and the program used to decompile; 
• amount of time available to complete and test both the original 
furimetrics Journal, Vol. 23, p. 337 at pp. 367 - 368; emphasis in original. 
175 Samuelson, P., Davis, R., Kapor, M.D. and Reichman, J.H. (1994) "A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
94, p. 2308 at pp. 2317 - 2318. 
176 Samuelson et al. use the examples of Lotus 1-2-3, VP-Planner and The Twin. 
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program and the program to be recompiled; and, 
• processing capacity and speed of the processor on which both the 
original and the recompiled program is to run. 
Given the functional equivalence of algorithms, it follows that the same 
function can be expressed by a range of distinct algorithms. Identifying 
the precise algorithm, expressing the internal logic of the source code, is 
for any sizeable or complex program, an impossible task if only the 
machine code is available. The proposition that there is equivalence 
between source and object code is incorrect. Mere access to machine code 
does not imply access to the source code. 
5.5.3 Access by Decompilation 
Some of the copyright literature assumes that technological means exist to 
facilitate access to the underlying source code. The recovery of lower level 
source code is referred to as "disassembly". The process of conversion 
into higher level language source code is referred to as "decompilation". 
The concept of decompilation raises the question as to whether the 
particular source code that gave rise to a particular program in machine 
code can be recovered from the executable code with the aid of a 
decompilation program. The literature is replete with statements about 
the ease of access to source code by means of decompilation. Davidson177 
177 Davidson, D.M. (1983) "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 
furimetrics Journal, Vol. 23, p. 337 at p. 368; emphasis added. 
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asserted, for example, with no evidence that: 
It is possible with many computer languages to reverse object code 
back into a form of source code. This quasi-source code would not 
necessarily look the same as the original source code, but would 
contain virtually the identical specific logic and design which is the 
expression of the program. 
The use by Davidson of the words "virtual" and "identical" significantly 
distorts the true situation. Similarly, Walter178 proposed that, given 
training in the relevant syntax, humans could understand "the 
information expressed in any computer language". More recently, 
Samuelson et al.179 stated that: 
The object code in software packages can, through a decompilation 
process, be translated into a form that approximates to some degree 
the source code that the program's developer maintains as a trade 
secret. 
These assertions are misplaced. Whereas executable code is particular I y 
prone to direct replication, it is extremely unlikely that the results of 
disassembly or decompilation will resemble the original source code, 
even in terms of its general "logic and design". Trotter Hardy180 noted 
that one problem with the analogy of "translation" applied to programs is 
that translation is usually reversible. Computer program translation 
178 Walter, C. (1988) "Defining the Scope of Software Copyright Protection for Maximum 
Public Benefit" Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 14, p. 1 at p. 39. 
179 Samuelson, P., Davis, R., Kapor, M.D. and Reichman, J.H. (1994) ''A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
94, p. 2308 at p. 2336. 
180 Trotter Hardy, I. (1984) "Six Copyright Theories for the Protection of Computer Object 
Programs" Arizona Law Review, Vol. 26, p. 845. He uses the analogy of translating 
musical notation to holes on a pianola roll. 
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from source to object code is not reversible, despite the widespread 
assumption that decompilation provides a technological vehicle for 
reconstruction of the original source code. 
This is due to several factors such as the large number of functionally 
equivalent expressions that could possibly have produced a given 
executable code program. This lack of isomorphism between source and 
object code has been discussed above. Further, to approximate 
functionally equivalent code, a programmer would need to know not 
only the precise version of the particular translator that was used to 
produce the object code, but also the full internal details of the design 
features of that translator as well the precise versions of any other 
components of object-code that were linked together to make up the 
executable code (see sections 5.3, 5.4 and Appendix One). 
Another difficulty is encountered in attempting to reconstruct the 
original source code. In many modern programs, comments lines entered 
into the original source code for the purpose of legibility to a human 
reader are ignored and redundant code is discarded as part of the 
compilation process - so do not form part of the final software product. 
The importance of comment lines in understanding the structure and 
rationale and the source code is discussed above and illustrated in 
Appendix Two. Any commercial software project would require 
extensive annotations in the form of comments, as well as 
documentation of the design and implementation process for successful 
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maintenance, debugging, and upgrading. 
At a practical level, decompiled code is typically at a low level and 
decompilation software can at best translate the set of instructions 
contained in the final binary into an assembler form.181 The word 
"decompile" is typically used incorrectly to suggest a reversal of the 
compilation process. In many instances the word "disassemble" is more 
appropriate. When a program is "decompiled", the result is typically code 
resembling an assembly language. The algorithms within a decompiled 
program can only be represented at a very low level of abstraction - the 
set of instructions to the CPU to make specific calculations and to deal 
with variables identified by register. Assembler is based on a set of basic 
calculation directives to the CPU based on values contained in registers, as 
well as comparisons and copying of values between CPU registers and 
other locations in memory. In such a form, the decompiled code will at 
best be cryptic and at worst be unintelligible. Often, the content and 
interrelations of these registers remain uncertain. For programs of any 
size or complexity decompilation will offer few clues as to the nature of 
the original source rnaterials.182 
181 Johnson-Laird (1994) "Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World" University of 
Dayton Law Review, Vol. 19, p. 843. 
182 See also Carlson, B.A. (1997) "On the Wrong Track: A Response to the Manifesto and a 
Critique of Sui Generis Software Protection", furimetrics, Vol. 37, pp. 187 - 203 at p. 
196. 
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Samuelson et al. 183 argued that, given access to decompilation software, 
not only surface design but also internal design lies "near the surface" of a 
software product. This proposition is incorrect for third generation 
languages and particularly unjustified in respect of higher level languages 
or where sophisticated compilers and optimisers have been used to 
produce the executable code. Increasingly sophisticated optimisation 
procedures and intelligent compilers and linkers also can result in the 
final binary code bearing no resemblance to the original text based work of 
the programmer. It is difficult if not impossible to determine whether a 
program has been optimised either generally, or specifically for a 
particular CPU architecture. Optimisation may even rearrange sequences 
of instructions sent to the CPU to draw upon that particular CPU's 
strengths so that processing time can be minimised. Such optimisation is 
typical in reduced instruction set computing (RISC) environments, such 
as the PowerPC architecture. Daughtrey's description184 of the usefulness 
of decompiled code is the most accurate and appropriate of the 
commentators in the area: 
183 Samuelson, P., Davis, R., Kapor, M.D. and Reichman, J.H. (1994) "A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
94, p. 2308 at p. 2336. 
184 Daughtrey, S.C. (1994) "Reverse Engineering of Software for Interoperability and 
Analysis" Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 47, p. 145 at pp. 151 - 152. 
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Reading decompiled code is comparable to reading a novel that has 
been stripped of all adjectives, adverbs, articles, and other 
explanatory words; reorganised to be completely chronological with 
no chapters or paragraphs; and changed so that the characters, 
places, and other nouns are represented by a single letter followed 
by a single digit. 
This description is supported by Appendix Three which provides an 
example of a small section of decompiled machine code, extracted from 
the binaries in the SillyBalls project illustrated in Appendix One. 
Decompilation has been assumed to be able to create a competing 
integrated product. But in programs of any significant size or complexity, 
such a task would be impossible or at the very least prohibitively costly. 
Reverse engineering of a computer program using decompilation will 
usually be more difficult than writing a program from scratch.185 The 
usefulness of decompilation more typically lies in close analysis of some 
small element of the executable program with a view to error correction 
or, more commonly, interoperability with other software and interfacing 
with communications hardware. A person seeking to write a competing 
program w·ould benefit more from possession of the manual rather than a 
decompiled program. The assumption that decompilation provides 
access to the source code of a program is incorrect. 
185 Reichman, J.H. (1989) "Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: 
Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research" 
Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 42, p. 639 at p. 699, n. 312; also Davidson, D.M. (1986) 
"Comrron Law, Uncommon Software" University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 47, 
p . 1037 at pp. 1090 - 1094. 
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5.6 A software innovation model 
Section 5.5 demonstrated that software met the key element in the 
definition of an "IT artefact" from Chapter Four - that the artefact does 
not of itself disclose the means of its creation. It should be noted that this 
will only be true in respect of programs which are distributed in machine 
(executable) code alone. This reflects, however, the nature of software 
commercially distributed in the consumer and desktop business markets. 
Given that such software agrees with the concept of "IT artefact", the 
innovation model presented in the Chapter Four can be adapted to reflect 
the programming process set out in this Chapter. This programming 
innovation model is presented in Figure 5-6. 
5.6.1 Explanation of the model 
Tacit knowledge in the model resembles an abstract solution algorithm 
applied to solve a particular programming problem; it would also include 
the know how arising from programming expertise and technique 
appropriate to a particular hardware architecture and systems software. 
The codification process, or "articulation" of this solution is the creation 
of software project source materials. While part of these materials would 
be "source code", in the sense of new third or later generation language 
code written for the project, they would also include libraries, reusable 
code from other projects, and the collection and integration of these 
materials within a project file or application framework. The software 
development process described above in section 5.4 and illustrated in 
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detailed in Appendix One would be applied to these source materials to 
produce the machine or executable code application. This accords with 
the concept of codified knowledge as a means of production. The 
application in its executable form is the IT artefact, the form in which the 
software is distributed to the marketplace. Most microcomputer 
applications are licensed and distributed only in their machine code 
forms. Since the compilation process is non-isomorphic, the application 
does not convey to users an understanding of the source code. At best the 
machine code can be decompiled into an assembly language. Reverse 
engineering and cumulative innovation will occur through use of the 
application and observation of its execution. The programming ideas at a 
high level of abstraction can be used by other developers in the 
construction of their own applications. Computer programmers create 
improved programs by studying the work of earlier programmers.186 
5.6.2 The role of copyright 
The model of copyright discussed in section 4.4.3 is not the appropriate 
model of innovation given the above discussion of access. The copyright 
model assumed a joint product (represented in blue in Figure 4-5) which 
combined the characteristics of codified knowledge with the artefact itself. 
In this model, possession of a protected work permitted appropriation by 
users who did not contribute to the innovation process. In contrast, the 
186 Ibidem pp. 689 - 690; cited by Kriess, R.A. (1995) "Accessibility And 
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principal proposition in this chapter is that program users do not have 
access to the codified knowledge (source code). 
Given this lack of access, the policy objectives of copyright would appear 
to be in conflict with the nature of the technology. This proposition is 
supported by writers such as Kreiss187 who argued that, without copies 
that can be perceived and studied by individuals, society was not getting 
the kind of access that is at the heart of the copyright system: 
For competing programmers, the barrier to access to computer 
programs imposed by distribution in object code serves to thwart 
copyright's traditional objectives. In more traditional contexts, a 
competing author who wishes to learn the writing techniques in a 
published novel or a poem can purchase the work and study those 
techniques. 
Academics who filed an amicus curiae brief in the case of Sega v 
Accolade188 rejected the assumption that public use of the work equated 
with the objectives of the laws: 
This argument incorrectly assumes that the only public purpose 
served by access is consumer use of the work in question. In fact, 
distribution to the public for consumption has nothing whatever to 
do with the idea/ expression distinction or the goals of section 
102(b) [which] are aimed at defining what later authors can freely 
use in creating new works. 
The legal effect of a broad scope of program protection would be that 
copyright holders would be able not only to maintain the source code as 
Commercialization in Copyright Theory" U.C.L.A. Law Review, Vol. 43, p. 1 at p. 12. 
187 Kriess, R.A. (1995) "Accessibility And Commercialization in Copyright Theory" 
U.C.L.A. Law Review, Vol. 43, p. 1 at p. 34, n. 114. 
188 "Brief Arnicus Curiae of Eleven Copyright Law Professors in Sega Enterprises Ltd v 
Accolade Inc." (1992) ]urimetrics journal, Vol. 33, p. 147 at p. 156. 
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confidential information, but also to exploit that competitive advantage 
for a period significantly longer than the natural lead time would permit. 
Samuelson189 noted that CONTU190 believed that providing copyright 
protection over programs would reduce reliance on trade secret laws and 
provide a greater flow of information through the programming 
community. In fact the evidence suggested that the industry had no 
intention of abandoning secrecy as a means of competitive advantage. 
But for one characteristic of computer programs, the above discussion 
suggests that a copyright regime is unnecessary to promote innovation. 
Since, however, the machine code form of a computer program is easily 
and cheaply replicable, there will be market failure which should be 
corrected by a legal rule against such replication. The basic argument 
from traditional analysis is that "software is expensive to create but easy to 
copy".191 The economic impact is a lack of sufficient lead time to recoup 
research and development expenses. This argument explains and 
justifies, to a degree, the application of copyright law to literal or near-
literal copying of computer programs. Machine code is easily replicated. 
Independent creation of identical machine code is extremely unlikely. 
189 Samuelson, P. (1984) "CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for 
· Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form" Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1984, p. 663 
at pp. 723 - 725. 
190 The United States' National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted 
Works. 
191 Davidson, D.M. (1983) "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 
Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 23, p. 337 at p. 339. 
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Prohibiting the replication of machine code without permission of the its 
creator corrects a potential market failure, and provides an incentive to 
invest in program innovation. It is the ease of replication of digital 
medial92 which posed significant challenges to intellectual property laws, 
and generated initial policy moves towards copyright protection of 
software.193 Copying of machine code represents appropriation of the 
program's behaviour at no cost and with no independent development 
effort or learning process. This represents the most serious danger of 
market failure in the absence of regulation.194 
5.6.3 Imitative competition and lead time 
The implication of the innovation model to programming suggests that it 
is highly analogous to the confidential information scenario discussed in 
section 4.4.1. The tacit and codified knowledge, including project source 
materials, are represented in red on Figure 5-6 as being protected by 
secrecy and confidentiality within the bounds of the firm. Only the 
application in machine code form is. exposed to the market and from its 
192 Samuelson, P. (1990) "Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual Property 
Law" Rutgers Computer and Technology Law journal, Vol. 16, p. 323 at p. 324. 
193 In Australia, initiated and justified by a copyright symposium sponsored by the 
federal government: see Dempsey, G.C. (1995) "Evolution of Copyright Protection for 
Software Programs in Australia" Law and Policy, Vol. 17, p. 283; in the United States, 
promoted by CONTU: see Miller, A.R. (1993) "Copyright Protection for Computer 
Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since 
CONTU?" Haroard Law Review, Vol. 106, p. 1033. 
194 Samuelson, P., Davis, R, Kapor, M.D. and Reichman, J.H. (1994) "A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
94, p. 2308 at p. 2382. 
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use and observation of its functions other firms will initiate projects of 
their own which are intended to compete with each other. This involves 
a process of learning by imitation in an environment where an innovator 
will be protected by natural lead time. Competing firms will create their 
own project source materials and in doing so, expand tacit knowledge. 
Some commentators195 rally in favour of broader protection of non-literal 
elements on the assertion that the software industry is "unique" is having 
a short time between release of one product and the emergence of 
imitators. These same commentators often also assume a substantial 
research and development phase underlying one product and negligible 
time and effort for imitation. Samuelson et al. argued that information 
products such as computer software:196 
... bear so much of the technical know-how required to make them 
on or near the surface of the product that natural lead time for this 
kind of industrial product may not suffice. 
The previous section has rejected this proposition where a program is 
distributed in machine code form only. As Daughtrey197 stated: 
... this form of a computer program, unlike most literary works, 
does not disclose on its face the ideas underlying the work. 
195 e.g. Paley, M.A. (1992) "Lotus Lookalike Litigation: Landmark or Limbo?" Buffalo 
· Law Review, Vol. 40, p. 283 at pp. 310 - 311. 
196 Samuelson, P., Davis, R., Kapor, M.D. and Reichman, J.H. (1994) "A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
94, p. 2308 at p. 2367. 
197 Daughtrey, S.C. (1994) "Reverse Engineering of Software for Interoperability and 
Analysis" Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 47, p. 145 at p. 150. 
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Lead time is not eroded in a market destructive way. The evidence is 
widely accepted that, for computer hardware, primary vendors have had a 
lead time advantage since competitors needed to study the product after 
release to the marketplace and engage in the non-trivial task of 
development of compatible and competitive products.198 This lead time 
brings with it more enduring competitive advantages such as reputation, 
product quality and price. Brand recognition for earlier innovators has 
been found to be particularly significant.199 In an industry where rapid 
obsolescence is increasingly the case, by the time a second developer's 
product is released to the market, the first developer may have already 
completed an upgraded version. Combined with brand loyalty, such a 
situation provides a natural reward to the first innovator.200 
A similar situation is present within the software industry. Evidence 
supporting this supposition is that in the United States, the program 
industry grew without any direct intellectual property protection from an 
output of $450 million in 1969 to $3,200 million by 1974. The fact that a 
large amount of growth can occur without exclusive proprietary rights 
may indicate that innovation is also rewarded through other factors such 
198 Jacobs, M.A. (1989) "Copyright and Compatibility" Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 30 p. 91 
at p. 93. 
199 Victor, D. (1993) "An Analysis of an Affirmative Defense for Reverse Engineering 
Within a System of Legal Protection for Computer Software" Southern Cal if om ia 
Law Review, Vol. 66, p. 1705 at pp. 1736-1737. 
200 Swinson, J. (1991) "Copyright or Patent or Both: An Algorithmic Approach to 
Computer Software Protection" Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 5, p. 145 
a t pp. 164-165. 
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as the first mover advantage,201 or may be motivated by a fear of losing 
market share to competitors who innovate.202 Market lead time may be 
significant in light of the rapid obsolescence of programs.203 Breyer has 
suggested that lead time alone may be sufficient for program 
manufacturers to recoup their investment.204 Such arguments have 
typically been rejected as naive.205 
MeneU206 outlined other features of the software industry by which 
software developers could internalise the public goods problem. One was 
by the use of licensing agreements with customers prohibiting 
reproduction and dissemination. Due to policing problems,207 such 
strategies are more effective in software written for mainframes and 
201 Plant, A., (1934) "The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books" Economica, Vol. 1, p. 
167; also Besen, S.M., (1986) "Private Copying, Reproduction Costs, and the Supply of 
Intellectual Property" Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 2, p. 5. 
202 Machlup, F., The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States 
(1962) p.75; also Schmalensee, R., (1982) "Product Differentiation Advantages of 
Pioneering Brands" American Economic Review, Vol. 72, p. 349 at p. 360. 
203 Multilateral Trade Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Intellectual 
Property Rights Problems in Overseas Markets: Summary Report (July 1988) p. 11. 
204 Breyer, S., (1970) "The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs" Harvard Law Review, Vol. 84, p. 281 at p. 289. 
205 Tyerman, B.W. (1971), "The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection of 
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer" UCLA Law Review Vol. 18 p. 1100; and 
see Landes, W.M. & Posner, R.A. (1989), "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law" 
Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 18 p. 325 at pp. 331 - 332. 
206 Menell, P.S., (1989) "An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for 
Application Programs" Stanford Law Review Vol. 41 pp. 1045-1044 at pp. 1060-1065. 
207 Bender, D. (1986) "Protection of Computer Programs: The Copyright/Trade Secret 
Interface" University of Pittsburg Law Review Vol. 47 p. 907 at pp. 922-923; and 
Bahler, D.D. (1985) "Shrink-Wrapped Software Agreements" Licensing Law and 
Business Reporter Vol. 8 p. 37. 
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minicomputers rather than rnicrocomputers.208 Another technique was 
the prevention of replication through technological measures including 
"software locks".209 Other solutions included use of research consortia to 
spread development costs and share the benefits of new technologies. 
Government research expenditure, particularly on space and defence 
technologies in the United States, and indirectly through funding 
universities has also been significant in promoting invention. Firms can 
also reap benefits by providing associated services to a software product, 
such as installation, training, maintenance and strategic management 
consulting. 
The phenomenon of computer programs applied to the innovation 
model suggests that copyright - if it is to govern the process of innovation 
in the software industry - should sanction of the process of learning by 
imitation, where competing firms obtain ideas from the use of other 
applications. These issues of policy are discussed in the following chapter. 
As discussed in section 4.4.l, this task of reverse engineering unpatented, 
undisclosed innovation contributes to the innovative community's 
overall costs of research and development. Reverse engineering provides 
208 Harris, J.R. (1985) "A Market-Oriented Approach to the Use of Trade Secret or 
Copyright Protection (or Both?) for Software" Jurimetrics Journal Vol. 25 p. 147; and 
McNeil, M.J. (1987) "Trade Secret Protection for Mass Market Computer Software: Old 
Solutions for New Problems" Albequerque Law Review Vol. 51 p. 293 at pp. 307-308. 
209 Gilbume, M.R. & Johnston, R.L. (1982) "Trade Secret Protection for Software 
Generally and in the Mass Market" Computer Law Journal Vol. 3 p. 211 at pp. 229-237; 
and Sacks, J. (1985) "To Copy Protect or Not to Copy-Protect?" Popular Computing 
(October) p. 73. 
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originators with natural lead time. Only followers who are prepared to 
defray the costs of study, analysis, and relearning will be able to exploit the 
cost reductions, technical improvements and potential new applications 
arising from the reverse engineering process - Reichman' s concept of 
"self-help diffusion"210. 
5.7 Summary 
This Chapter has analysed the nature of a computer program. In 
particular it has outlined the nature of the programming process, 
including languages and algorithms, development of source materials, 
compilation and debugging. 
The key issue for this chapter was the proposition that software is an IT 
artefact within the definition developed in Chapter Four. Under this 
definition, computer programs (distributed in machine code only) do not 
reveal their underlying technology (source code). Section 5.5 
demonstrated that widely held assumptions about "access" were 
misplaced. One important aspect of this argument was a demonstration 
that codified information relating to programs is not revealed to users 
through use of the artefact and is markedly altered by the process of 
compilation and decompilation. Treating source code as a mere 
translation of executable code has led to the misconception that source is 
revealed through possession of the executable code. Decompilation is of 
210 Ibidem p. 2522. 
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limited use in understanding the underlying source code of a program of 
any size or sophistication. Such a task becomes impossible when 
combined with restrictive licensing conditions prohibiting disassembly.211 
By perceiving decompilation to be a simple process, a program can be seen 
to suffer from appropriability problems, even when distributed only in 
machine code form. This perception aids the presumption that 
information contained in programs is easily misappropriable . . 
Having established that software has the characteristics of an IT artefact, 
innovation in the software industry was adapted from the model of 
technological innovation in Chapter Four. The close analogy to the 
scenario of confidential information suggested a role for intellectual 
property law in the encouragement of learning by imitation. The nature 
of programs in executable form did, however, imply a basic level of 
protection against replication of machine code. 
Adopting this analysis, Chapter Six considers the justification of the 
extension of copyright laws beyond this basic level of protection. This is 
followed by an assessment of the current state of play within international 
copyright regimes. 
211 Hayes, D.L. (1993) "Shrinkwrap License Agreements: New Light on a Vexing 
Problem" Hastings Commercial and Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 15, p. 653; 
Leaffer, M. (1994) "Engineering Competitive Policy and Copyright Misuses" 
University of Dayton Law Review, Vol. 19, p. 1087; Rice, D.A. (1992) "Public Goods, 
Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License 
Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering" University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 
Vol. 53, p. 543. 
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Chapter Six 
Implications for Copyright 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed software within the context of the model 
of innovation outlined in Chapter Four. This model was developed from 
a foundation of information economics. One . message from this 
perspective is that the flow dimension of information is critical within an 
institutional framework of property rights governing innovation. 
Property rights which support, rather than restrict, information flows are 
essential in encouraging innovation. Chapter Five established that 
software distributed in machine code form required only a minimal level 
of protection against replication to encourage development. This was 
based on a model of imitative competition where natural lead time and 
other economic advantages support innovation rather than monopoly 
rights granted through intellectual property laws. 
This chapter examines the issue of the appropriate scope of copyright 
protection beyond that of replication - "literal" or "near literal" copying -
to find that little justification exists for extending protection beyond this 
basic level. Software is both a physical object and an abstraction. The 
physical object, although not humanly perceptible, does rest in electrical 
patterns within computer storage media. The abstraction is the algorithm 
and/or function on which the program is based. One difficulty for 
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economic analysis and the application of economic policies to legislation 
and cases is the psychological tendencies to extrapolate the abstract to the 
physical and the physical to the abstract. Davidson212 describes this as the 
"Cheshire cat grin" fallacy: 
[S]oftware is not seen as the cat itself (a copy of the software) nor the 
unique pattern of stripes which identifies the cat (the specific design 
and logic of the program); software is viewed as in between, like the 
grin - not as tangible as the cat but not intangible either, since 
software can operate a computer. 
One consequence of the "Cheshire cat grin" fallacy is the argument that a 
program with no objective similarity to another program may yet infringe 
copyright on the basis of reproduction of "non literal" elements. 
McGahn213 equates this term with the "intangible", "stylistic"214 and 
"creative" aspects of a program. Based on the model of innovation 
developed in the earlier chapters, and a critical analysis of the literature, 
this form of infringement carries serious dangers to the maintenance of 
information flows and reflects a treatment of information as a mere 
commodity. 
The chapter begins with a critical reflection on the economic and 
creativity arguments favouring broader protection for software. The 
212 Davidson, D.M. (1983) "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 
jurimetrics journal, Vol. 23, p. 337 at p. 344. 
213 McGahn, D.F. (1995) "Copyright Infringement of Protected Computer Software: An 
Analytical Method to Determine Substantial Similarity" Rutgers Computer and 
Technology Law journal, Vol. 21, p. 88 at p. 95. 
214 Hobbs, P. "Methods of Determining Substantial Similarity in Copyright Cases 
Involving Computer Programs" University of Detrioit Law Review, Vol. 67, p. 393 at 
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economic arguments are based on an extension of the commodity 
perspective outlined in Chapter Two. The creativity arguments 
misconceive the nature of the computer programming as akin to a 
literary or artistic endeavour. This leads to a consideration of the major 
policy issue in the literature and in the case law - protection of standards 
and user interfaces. 
6.2 Economic arguments 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the traditional economic model of 
informational artefacts is one which emphasises appropriability problems, 
and as a question of policy would seek to create "vendible 
commodities"215 out of intangibles.216 Chicago writers are particularly 
prone to this type of analysis. Dam,217 for example, argued that copyrights 
were: 
... best thought of as property rights ... 
and that:218 
... economic concerns can be better assessed once we accept that the 
appropriability problem must be solved by some form of property 
p. 396. 
215 Gordon, W.J. (1994) /1 Assertive Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles" Columbia Law 
Review, Vol. 94, p. 2579 at p. 2579, n.l. 
216 Netanel, N.W. (1996) "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society" Yale Law Journal, 
Vol. 106, p. 283 at p. 286. 
217 Dam, K.W. (1995) "Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property 
Protection of Software" Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 24 pp. 321-377 at p. 332. 
218 Ibidem p. 335. 
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rights. 
As a result, limitations of the exclusivity of intellectual property rights -
such as compulsory licensing and fair use - are seen as severely 
detrimental on the incentive to invest and the operation of the market 
mechanism in allocating resources.219 Conventional wisdom asserts that 
stronger intellectual property rights will inevitably increase the pace of 
invention, induced by the greater rewards available to the original 
inventor.220 
In discussing computer programs, Yanaga221 argued that social welfare is 
maximised where copyright awards the inventor a property right that is 
equal to the software's entire marginal value to society. Such sentiments 
are echoed by Palmer's222 assertion that by setting a longer term of 
copyright protection, there is a greater incentive to work on software with 
greater durability. Palmer's explicit assumption was that an expansion of 
intellectual property would always generate additional incentives to 
invest in additional software development. Similar sentiments were 
219 Gordon, W.J. (1989) "An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory" Stanford Law Review, Vol. 41, p. 
1343; also see Goldstein, P. (1994) Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the 
Celestial Jukebox. 
220 Nelson, R.R. (1994) "Intellectual Property Protection for Cumulative Systems 
. Technology" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 94, p. 2674 at p. 2676. 
221 Yanaga, B. (1991) "An Economic Analysis of Computer Software Copyright: A 
Welfare Model of Intellectual Property Rights" Computer Law Journal Vol. 11 pp. 
173-196 at p. 179. 
222 Palmer, J.P. (1986) "Copyright and Computer Software" Research in Law and 
Economics Vol. 8 p. 205 at pp. 220 - 221. 
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evident when the decision of the US Congress to provide protection for 
works of architecture223 was justified in part on the basis that the 
monopoly incentive would "stimulate excellence in design".224 
Economic policy in this arena is influenced by the argument linking a 
high degree of expenditure or commercial value to various parts of a 
program to justify protection. Commentaries on the United States case of 
Whelan v Jaslow225 appear to have adopted without question the court's 
finding that development of the structure and logic of the program 
generated a significant portion of the cost of producing a computer 
program.226 This justified the court's protection of a program's 
"structure, sequence and organisation". By comparison, when the 
question was whether or not the user interface should be protected, the 
assertion was that a well-designed user interface was "extremely resource 
intensive"227, and "typically the most time-consuming part of the 
223 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act 1990 104 Stat 5133. 
224 Sterk, S.E. (1996) "Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law" Michigan Law Review, 
Vol. 94, p. 1197. 
225 e.g. Gage, T.M. (1987) "Whelan Associates v faslow Dental Laboratories: Copyright 
Protection for Computer Software Structure - What's the Purpose?" Wisconsin Law 
Review, Vol. 1987, p. 859 at p. 883; discussed in Chapter Seven. 
226 ·. See also Eland, S.H. (1994) "The Abstraction-Filtration Test: Determining Non-
Literal Copyright Protection for Software" Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, p. 665 at 
p. 679. 
227 Miller, A.R. (1993) "Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and 
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?" Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 106, p. 1033. 
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development process". 228 
This reasoning is analogous to "trivial acquisition" arguments. If a 
competitor is seen as able to obtain a portion of the market share of the 
original innovator through imitative competition, the reduced potential 
for monopoly profit fails to generate sufficient incentive to invest, 
inviting intellectual property intervention. Followed to a logical 
conclusion, some commentators would propose that all imitative 
competition be prohibited, at least for some appropriate degree of market 
lead time. For example, Samuelson et az.229 propose a "cloning" 
prohibition for innovators to recoup research and development expenses. 
A major reason for this approach is the belief that reverse engineering -
by writing new entirely new source code - is only "somewhat more 
demanding" than replicative copying of the machine code. Such an 
assumption is at odds with the analysis of software development in 
Chapter Five. 
The problem with this economic argument is that it begins to suggest that 
abstract ideas, concepts, and other elements of what copyright would 
traditional treat as part of the public domain, should be protected. A 
common fallacy is to equate the commercial value of a software product 
with its function, and attempt to support this commercial value through 
228 Ibidem p. 1034, n. 258, quoting Lotus' experts in Lotus v Paperback. 
229 Samuelson, P., Davis, R., Kapor, M.D. and Reichman, J.H. (1994) "A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
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copyright through some prohibition on replication of the function or of 
the "total concept and feel". Samuelson et az.230, in using the "trivial 
acquisition" argument, appear to confuse the means of creation with the 
program behaviour and its functional design: 
Such know-how is, i!lescapably, present on the face of the product, 
and immediately evident on inspection. The hard-won insights 
and innovations embodied in surface design are prominently 
displayed by the program in operation ... Paperback needs nothing 
more than the ability to run Lotus 1-2-3 and observe its behaviour 
in order to clone it. 
Such an argument inevitably leads to suggstions that "conceptual 
metaphors"231 be protected through intellectual property laws. It is 
difficult to see how a conceptual metaphor is something different from an 
unprotectible "idea" in copyright doctrine. 
Strong monopoly powers are seen as desirable for the stimulation of 
levels of investment required for "revolutionary" invention.232 The 
computer software industry is, however, widely accepted as incremental 
and cumulative rather than revolutionary in this economic sense. The 
price for an intellectual property monopoly over elements of surface 
design, interfaces and total "concept and feel" is that identified by Landes 
and Posner. Competitors are also "authors" who are discouraged from 
94, p. 2308 at pp. 2337 - 2339. 
230 Ibidem pp. 2333 - 2337, quotation at p. 2335. 
231 Such as the concept of "virtual paper" in word processing. 
232 Scherer, F.M. (1991) "Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress" in First, H. et al. (eds) 
Essays on Legal, Economic, and Political Policy p. 140. 
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creative investment by the barriers intellectual property law can erect.233 
Broadening the scope of protection to ideas, metaphors, look, feel or 
functionality forecloses entire areas of potential output by other authors. 
One element of the policy argument protecting surface design elements 
and interfaces is that software is a creative process analogous to traditional 
literary works. The following section challenges the proposition that 
software is creative in the literary sense. 
6.3 Creativity arguments 
Although some commentators have argued that: 
The imagination, originality, and creativity involved in writing a 
program is comparable to that involved in more time-honoured 
literary works.234 
such comments are misleading. The assertions relating to creativity are 
intended to demonstrate that computer programs should be protected in 
the same manner as the other works on the account that they involve a 
similar creative process. Whilst it is true to assert that all invention 
involves creativity, some inventions are more restrictive in the scope of 
their expression than others. 
233 
234 
Kriess, RA. (1995) "Accessibility And Commercialization in Copyright Theory" 
U.C.L.A. Law Review, Vol. 43, p. 1 at p . 29; see also Merges, R.P. and Nelson, R.R. 
(1990) "On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 90, p. 
839. 
Miller, A.R., "Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and 
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?" (1993) 106 Harvard 
Law Review 977 at p.983; also Clapes, A.L., Lynch, P. & Steinberg, M.R., (1987) 
"Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright 
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One reason for the assertions of substantial creativity is that 
jurisprudence, particularly in the United States, has emphasised that 
some minimum element of creativity235 - stemming from the 
requirement of "originality" - is necessary for copyright protection.236 
This requirement was recently reinforced by the decision of the US 
Supreme Court in Feist v Rural Telephone.237 
Under copyright, protection of the artefact is not intended to limit access 
by other authors to the means of creation of further works. Although 
computer programs may appear to be similar to other works, in that 
respect, upon a deeper analysis and understanding of the process of 
programming and on the manner in which programs operate, it can be 
seen that the similarity is superficial at best. As a program is ultimately 
rendered in binary, if it is to be efficient it must be limited in its 
expression. For each particular program in each particular source 
language, there is an ideal set of algorithms which would result in an 
optimal solution in terms of the desired functionality and speed. The 
consequence of this is that good programming is exemplified by 
functionality, economy of code and efficiency in causing the computer to 
Protection for Computer Programs" UCLA Law Review, Vol. 34, p. 1493. 
235 L. Batlin & Sons Inc. v Snyder 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976). 
236 Phalen, M.S. (1989) "How Much is Enough? The Search for a Standard of Creativity 
in Works of Authorship Under Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976" Nebraska 
Law Review, Vol. 68, p. 835. 
237 111SCt1282 (1991); also see Ginsburg, J.C. (1992) "No 'Sweat'? Copyright and other 
Protection of Works of Information after Feist v Rural Telephone" Columbia Law 
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carry out the programmer's instructions.238 From this it can be seen that 
a program's expression is necessarily directly related to and inseparable 
from the substantive outcome desired in terms of the program's 
operation. Portraying programmers as having distinctive "styles" 
suggestive of an artistic activity akin to writing a novel239 marginalises 
the object of efficiency as a necessary part of programming and fails to 
recognise that the public domain for a programmer is far more limited 
and technology-dependent than it is for other authors. The nature of 
programs, especially the fact that their utility lies in interpretation by a 
machine rather than a human being, should have led to a deeper 
consideration of their suitabilty for protection under copyright. 
It is the understandability of the symbolic language and use of English 
based mnemonics which has led "almost inexorably"240 to the 
characterisation of source code as "literary works". The improper 
argument which then follows is that analogies to infringement principles 
in traditional literary works is appropriate. The case is markedly different 
for computer programs which interact with a processor and direct that 
Review, Vol. 92, p. 338. 
238 Beutel, R.A., (1991) "Software Engineering Practices and the Idea / Expression 
Dichotomy: Can Structured Design Methodologies Define the Scope of Software 
Copyright?" furimetrics Journal Journal, Vol. 31, p. 1 at p. 28. 
239 Clapes, A.L., Lynch, P. & Steinberg, M.R., (1987) "Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: 
Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs" UCLA 
Law Review, Vol. 34, p. 1493 at pp.1535-1536; also Kernighan, B.W. & Plauger, P.J., 
The Elements of Programming Style (1974) p.132. 
240 Karjala, D.S. (1987) "Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism" 
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processor to perform in certain ways. A computer program is the 
machine. Focus on the symbolic language used in programming is 
misleading. Samuelson et az.241 correctly described programs as 
"machines whose medium of construction is text". 
There is also a common thread in the generation of "time-honoured" 
works which is absent from computer programs. This common thread 
that can be drawn upon these works despite the constraints under which 
they laboured, is that these works have the power to evoke an emotional 
response. Although computer programs contain their own vocabularies, 
grammar and syntax, as do these other works, a program has no ability to 
convey emotion. A CPU is not alive and cannot care about the elegance 
of the program which it is running. As was demonstrated in Chapter 
Five, at some point before the running of a program, the program will 
check the words entered in source against a predefined vocabulary. This 
vocabulary usually exists in the form of a library which tells the program 
which locands within the machine to send the instruction to once the 
instruction exists in executable code. The result of this is that whilst 
words expressed in languages by which human beings communicate 
contain both connotation (meanings and emotional states evoked by the 
words) and denotation (literal meaning), programs have only denotation. 
furimetrics Journal, Vol. 27, p. 33 at pp. 37 - 38. 
241 Samuelson, P., Davis, R., Kapor, M.D. and Reichman, J.H. (1994) "A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" Columbia Law Revi ew, Vol. 
94, p. 2308 at pp. 2320 - 2324. 
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When a program is given the instruction "run", the CPU cannot ponder 
whether the program intended it to trot or move to a swift canter (it does 
neither). 
Of all the alleged similarities with other works, computer programs most 
resemble architectural plans. Like computer programs, even fanciful 
architect's plans have effective constraints placed upon them by their 
functional nature. The design of a structure will depend on user 
requirements, subject to constraints such as the need for tensile stength, 
load bearing and planning laws. In terms of the nature of their creation, 
programs and architects plans are similar, however, in terms of their 
execution, this similarity wanes. A CPU must execute the program which 
is passed to it in executable form, whereas, builders have liberty to alter 
and interpret plans, and to use a range of materials to comply with a 
given plan. The quality of "inclusions" and finishing touches often have 
significant impact on the value of the completed building. Architectural 
plans have both connotation and denotation as their ultimate instrument 
of interpretation and implementation is human. Computer programs are 
incapable of expressing connotation as their ultimate instrument of 
interpretation is a CPU which can only understand limited mathematical 
algorithms. 
It is questionable whether it is socially desirable to discourage 
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standardisation in programming architectures.242 Whereas variety has 
social value in drama and literature it has little value in programming, 
where standardisation is more advantageous.243 The need for efficiency 
and reliability within program construction has, in practice, produced a 
set of "standard" programming techniques, which constrain the design 
choice regarding substance, structure, and form of programs.244 One aspect 
of recent industry and academic thinking seen as the key to improving 
program development productivity and quality is the notion of 
reusability.245 
Many commercially available development environments include a 
prepackaged application framework, generating source and object code for 
commonly used routines such as maintaining the user interface, accessing 
mathematical functions, and manipulating strings of text. These 
frameworks break code into reusable "building blocks" to avoid 
unnecessary reinvention and encourage development as a process of 
component composition within an overall product design. One 
commercial advantage of software reuse is its potential for reducing the 
242 Note Conrick, P.M., "Courts Unlikely to Adopt Lotus Position" (1991) 4 Intellectual 
Property Law Bulletin 16. 
243 · Clarke, R.A., (1989) "Property Rights in Knowledge-Based Products and 
Applications" Expert Systems, Vol. 6, p. 158 at p.160. 
244 Farrell, J., (1989) "Standardisation and Intellectual Property" furimetrics Journal, 
Vol. 30, p. 35. 
245 Biggerstaff, T.J. and Richter, C. (1987), "Reusability Framework, Assessment, and 
Directions" IEEE Software, Vol. 4, no. 2. 
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cost of software development. Additionally, the reuse of robust 
components can increase the reliability of any final composite product, 
and enhance debugging activities.246 
Reusability is also implicit within an object oriented programming (OOP) 
philosophy.247 The essence of OOP is that a program is built upon classes 
and objects. A class is a description of an entity used by a program. That 
entity may be a menu, an invoice, or a customer file. Classes describe 
these entities in terms of properties (data) and functions which can be 
applied to these properties. Once established, a class is used as a template 
to create objects (special instances of that class) which the program uses. 
These objects draw upon a class library whereby all objects created from 
the one class will share a minimum set of properties and functions. In 
turn classes can draw upon properties and functions of other classes 
through a process of inheritance. Languages such as C++, based on class 
libraries and inheritance, promote software development as a process of 
modifying existing code libraries and drawing upon base classes rather 
than writing entirely new code. New software projects are increasingly a 
combination of general classes already developed and objects - special 
instances of the classes - built particularly for the project. As more 
projects are completed by an entity, some of the classes developed for any 
246 Bollinger, T.B. and Pfleeger, S.L. (1990), "Economics of Reuse: Issues and Alternatives" 
Infonnation and Software Technology, Vol. 32, no. 10, p. 643. 
247 Henderson-Sellers, B. (1993), "The Economics of Reusing Library Classes" Journal of 
Object Oriented Programming, July I August, p. 43. 
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particular project can be incorporated within the general code library to be 
the basis for future projects. This suggests far greater emphasis on the 
design stages of any software project and larger up front costs in creating 
the reusable code library. 
There is also an increasing trend towards programming within systems 
software environments which use sophisticated graphical user interfaces 
(such as MacOS or Windows). Many programmers will develop or 
purchase application frameworks which provide the "shell" or operating 
infrastructure for their software. The usefulness of these frameworks is 
in recognising common needs for program interaction with the systems 
software and providing customisable solutions to these needs. Extensive 
source code is provided which is elaborated by the programmer. One 
consequence of the use of such application frameworks is that 
increasingly, programs will exhibit similar behaviour at the user interface 
level. Two examples of such frameworks within the MacOS 
environment are EasyApp (written in C) and PowerPlant (written in 
C++). Both are outlined in Appendix Four. 
A recurring methaphor is that programming is a engineering process, not 
an artistic endeavour.248 Writing programs is therefore an industrial 
248 Beutel, R.A., (1991) "Software Engineering Practices and the Idea I Expression 
Dichotomy: Can Structured Design Methodologies Define the Scope of Software 
Copyright?" /urimetrics Journal Journal, Vol. 31, p. l. 
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design process akin to the design of physical machines. Davidson249 
agreed that a major fallacy in the literature of software protection is to 
view it as the result of artistic creativity. He argued that software is an 
engineering, not an artistic process: 
Software is created like most engineering products: by a process of 
problem or project definition, followed by designing the product 
(the program), creating a prototype (writing the source code), testing 
the prototype (debugging), and ultimately realizing a commercially 
marketable product. 
Computer programs do not exhibit creativity in the same way as other 
literary and artistic works. The implication for policy is that the extension 
of intellectual property protection, via the "Cheshire cat grin" fallacy, to 
justify literary tests for infringement such as "non-literal" copying, is 
improper. Where a competitor can infringe by imitative copying even 
where there is no replication of source or object code, this has serious 
consequences for incremental development and the realisation of 
network externalities. The major focus of this conflict is discussed in the 
following section, which examines the question of protection of elements 
of compatibility and interfaces. 
6.4 Compatibility an_d_I n_te_rf_a_c_e_s _ ____ _ 
Compatibility is about ease of communication, both between systems and 
its users, and between parts of the system itself. The former can be 
249 Davidson, D.M. (1983) "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 
furimetrics Journal, Vol. 23, p. 337 at p. 342. 
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generally described as the "user interface" and the latter as "internal 
interfaces". Examples of internal interfaces would be between a particular 
hardware (chip) architecture and an operating system, or between an 
operating system and an application. Interfaces will also exist between 
systems and other systems. Communications protocols, many of which 
are defined by market leaders, are increasingly important as means for 
transmitting information and enabling access to networks.250 The 
question of compatibility raises serious economic consequences in 
situations where strong network externalities exist.251 Elements necessary 
to achieve compatability, including features of a user interface which is a 
de facto standard in the marketplace is seen by some commentators as a 
significantly different type of intellectual property question.252 
One conclusion from the existence of network externalities253 is the 
demonstration of the importance of standardisation in some elements of 
computer programming. From an informational perspective, the 
potential restrictions on the realisation of these externalities - essentially 
information flows - is of serious concern. This section critically examines 
250 Jacobs, M.A. (1989) "Copyright and Compatibility" furimetrics fournal, Vol. 30 p. 91 
at pp. 97 - 99. 
251 Farrell, J. (1987) "Standardisation and Intellectual Property" furimetrics Journal, Vol. 
· 30, p. 35; Menell, P.S. (1987) "Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software" 
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 39, p. 1329 at pp. 1340-1341. 
252 Teter, T.S. (1993) "Merger and the Machines: An Analysis of the Pro-Compatibility 
Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases" Stanford Law Review, Vol. 45, p. 1061 
at p. 1062. 
253 Discussed in Chapter Three. 
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the arguments promoting the copyright protection of elements which are 
surface design, standards, user interfaces, or otherwise related to 
compatibility. 
6.4.1 Economic justification 
The major justification for protection of surface design and compatibility 
elements rests on incorrect economic propositions already discussed in 
section 6.2. According to traditional analysis, the fact that the "look and 
feel" of software is considered commercially valuable, or is expensive to 
create, warrants monopoly protection per se.254 Some studies have 
shown that development of a sophisticated graphical user interface (GUI) 
can be the subject of an expensive processes of "human factors 
engineering" involving elements of cognitive psychology.255 Economic 
commentators appear to assume that where expenditures are necessary to 
create a standard, and its existence is valuable, that the copyright incentive 
is justified. It seems to follow that the policy objective of copyright law is 
to protect the valuable elements of a computer program, which is widely 
perceived to be partly driven by the popularity of its interface.256 
254 Kellner, L.F. (1994) "Trade Dress Protection for Computer User Interface 'Look and 
Fell"' University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 61, p. 1011; Wrenn, G.J. (1989) 
''Federal Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software Audiovisual Look 
and Feel: The Lanhan, Copyright and Patent Acts" High Technology Law Journal, 
Vol. 4, p. 279. 
255 Curtis, W. (1989) "Engineering Computer 'Look and Feel': User Interface Technology 
and Human Factors Engineering" furimetrics Journal, Vol. 30, p. 51. 
256 Houston, J. (1993) "A Unified Test for the Copyright Protection of the User Interface to 
Computer Programs" Duqesne Law Review, Vol. 32, p. 133 at p. 137. 
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Kellner257 described investment in user interface construction as building 
"consumer recognition" of programs. 
Computer program developers have great financial incentive to restrict 
the ability of competitors to adopt similar screen displays and user 
interfaces.258 Developers have argued that without legal protection, any 
competitive advantage is short lived and object to competitors imitating 
features which have become popular in the marketplace.259 This debate 
isalso characterised by a reliance property rights rhetoric. McGra th260, for 
example, argued that denying protection to de facto interface standards 
would "divest" copyright owners of their property rights. 
6.4.2 Standards competition 
One traditional incentive argument is typically extended to the picture of 
firms setting out to develop new and different standards for the 
marketplace. Some commentators argue that competition amongst 
interface standards is desirable and that legal protection is warranted to 
257 Kellner, L.F. (1994) "Trade Dress Protection for Computer User Interface 'Look and 
Fell'" University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 61, p. 1011. 
258 Benson, J.R. (1988) "Copyright Protection for Computer Screen Displays" Minnesota 
Law Review, Vol. 72, p. 1123. 
259 Beutel, R.A. (1988) "Trade Dress Protection fior the 'Look and Feel' of Software: A 
New Source of Proprietary Rights Protection for the Software Industry?" The 
Computer Lawyer, October, p. 2. 
260 McGrath, W.T. (1991) "Copyright Protection for User Interfaces in the Nineties: Of 
Perilous Journeys on the Drooping Shoulders of Giants" Software Law Journal, Vol. 4, 
p. 597 at p. 601. 
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provide such an incentive.261 The outcome of such a competition is the 
emergence of a theoretically superior standard. This is known as the 
11QWERTY" argument,262 by analogy to the fact that standardisation of the 
QWERTY keyboard has precluded widespread adoption of the superior 
Dvorak configuration.263 The theme of not being "inefficienctly locked 
into old choices"264 is evident is policy discussion of copyright and 
computer software.265 Landes and Posner's266 assertion that the creation 
of an industry standard as a "tribute to the expressive skills of the 
particular manufacturer" belies an assumption that the market will 
invariably choose the qualitatively superior standard.267 
Such an argument may be misplaced since network externalities may 
entrench an arbitrary standard. Some firms may adopt pricing and 
261 Clapes, A.L., Lynch, P. & Steinberg, M.R., (1987) "Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: 
Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs" UCLA 
Law Review, Vol. 34, p. 1493. 
262 Liebowitz, S.J. and Margolis, S.E. (1990) "The Fable of the Keys" Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 33, p. 1. 
263 David (1985) "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY" American Economic Review, Vol. 
75, p. 332. 
264 Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1987) "Product Standadization and Competitive Strategy" 
in Gabel, H.L. (ed.) Competition, Compatibility and Standards: The Economics of 
Horses, Penguins and Lemmings, p. 9. 
265 Colloquy on Copyright Protection of Computer Software (1990) Jurimetrics Journal, 
· Vol. 31, p. 165. 
266 Landes, W.M. & Posner, R.A. (1989), "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law" 
Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 18 p. 325 at p. 352. 
267 Compare Farrell, J and Saloner, G. (1986) "Installed Base and Compatability: 
Innovation, Product Pronouncements, and Predation" American Economic Review, Vol. 
76, p . 940. 
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marketing strategies to ensure that their interface becomes popular. The 
forces of network externalities can make the introduction of new and 
competing interfaces costly and subject to a high risk of failure, even 
though the interface may be theoretically superior.268 MeneU269 argued 
that the availability of legal protection for interface standards may provide 
an incentive for firms which a large base of installed users to adopt 
incompatible interface standards to reap increased monopoly rewards. In 
commenting on the success of Microsoft one industry analyst wrote:270 
The success of any technology company depends to a great degree 
on its ability to forge new technology standards and persuade the 
rest of industry to adopt them. Gates' flair for doing that has made 
him the envy of one of the world's most lucrative and strategic 
businesses. 
6.4.3 Standardisation 
The arguments set out above ignore the effect of network externalities, 
and make the implicit assumption that variety is just as important in user 
interfaces as it is in the content of novels and motion pictures. Paley271~ 
for example, argued that standardisation "in its own right stifles 
creativity". Although Landes and Posner speak of copyright promoting 
268 Farrell, J. (1989) "Standardisation and Intellectual Property" ]urimetrics Vol. 30 pp. 
35-50. 
269 · Menell, P.S. (1989) /1 An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application 
Programs" Stanford Law Review, Vol. 41, p. 1045 at p. 1068. 
270 Plunkett, S. (1993) "High Stakes in Race for Key Software" Business Review Weekly, 
July 2, p. 32. 
271 Paley, M.A. (1992) "Lotus Lookalike Litigation: Landmark or Limbo?" Buffalo Law 
Review, Vol. 40, p. 283 at p. 311. 
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economic efficiency through maximising "the benefits from creating 
additional works"272 there is an implicit assumption that benefits 
necessarily follow in linear fashion from the number of works produced. 
This assumption does not necessarily hold for some elements of software 
artefacts. While creative diversity and originality may be a virtue in 
literature and the arts, the technology literature stresses consistency, 
intuitiveness, reusability and interoperability as features of a desirable 
information infrastructure. Efficiency and compatibility are objectives in 
computer programming, yet copyright is not designed to achieve 
uniformity, but rather variety.273 
In the software industry, Mene11274 noted that major firms work together 
to develop operating systems ·and interfaces in the public domain. This 
behaviour assists in defining markets and directing development 
resources to improvements of products within these particular standards. 
Besen and Raskind275 noted that users benefit from the existence of 
standardised interfaces through a larger array of complementary inputs 
272 Landes, W.M. & Posner, R.A. (1989), "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law" 
Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 18 p. 325 at p. 326, emphasis added. 
273 Goldstein, P. (1986) "Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs" University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 47, p. 1119. In some cases, however, it has also been 
shown that compatibility standardisation will create "mix-and-match" 
opportunities, thus increasing variety: Matutes and Rigabeau (1988) "Mix and Match: 
Product Compatibility Without Network Externalities" Rand Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 19, p. 221. 
274 Menell, P.S., (1989) "An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for 
Application Programs" Stanford Law Review Vol. 41 pp. 1045-1104 at p. 1063. 
275 Besen, S.M. and Raskind, L.J. (1991) "An Introduction to the Law and Economics of 
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available, and the reduction in switching costs between systems or 
applications.276 The shape of the user interface is increasingly being 
determined by empirical research into human factors.277 This has 
influenced choices as to command based, menu-driven and natural 
language programs;278 menu design;279 and colour and highlighting 
techniques.280 Beutel suggests that protection would be most appropriate 
were an approach adopted which would not extend protection to any 
aspects of a program dictated by logical structure or efficient design 
requirements, including specific operating characteristics, standard 
algorithms and features dictated by hardware and program 
requirements.281 Standardisation of user interfaces also prevents "lock-
276 
Intellechtal Property" Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 5 pp. 3027 at p. 17. 
Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1985) "Standardisation, Compatibility and Innovation" 
RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 16 pp. 70-83; Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C. (1985) 
"Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility" American Economic Review 
Vol. 75 pp. 424-440. 
277 Francis, S., (1992) "Copyright Protection of Computer Software and User Interfaces: 
Just What Should be Protected?" Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 18, p. 584. 
278 Haupbnann, A.G. & Green, B.F., (1983) "A Comparison of Command, Menu-Selection, 
and Nahtral Language Computer Programs" Behaviour and Information Technology, 
Vol. 2, p. 163. 
279 e.g. Kiger, J.I., (1984) "The Depth/Breadth Trade-Off in the Design of Menu-Driven 
User Interfaces" International Journal of Man-Machine Studies , Vol. 20, p. 201. 
280 Benbasat, I., Dexter, A.S. & Todd, P., (1986) "The Influence of Color and Graphical 
Information Presentation in a Managerial Decision Simulation" Human-Computer 
Interaction, Vol. 2, p. 65. 
281 Beutel, R.A., (1991) "Software Engineering Practices and the Idea I Expression 
Dichotomy: Can Struchtred Design Methodologies Define the Scope of Software 
Copyright?" /urimetrics Journal Journal, Vol. 31, p. 1 at pp.8-10. 
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in" or the imposition of switching costs.282 Permitting compatibility 
encourages entry, a broader range of choice and more competitive prices. 
Samuelson et al. stated:283 
Consumers are also becoming less tolerant of stand-alone, 
idiosyncratic software. hence, the market is increasingly driven by 
the need for interoperability, in several senses: Software must 
operate on a variety of hardware platforms, across networks, and 
most of all, programs must work together. 
Farre11284 noted that the conventional assumptions regarding intellectual 
property protection no longer hold when confronted by network 
externalities. Strong protection may provide an inappropriate incentive 
for an innovator to encourage widespread adoption, through penetration 
pricing or other means, of their innovation even when it may not be 
socially useful. Innovators who develop potentially superior innovations 
may derive no reward at all, or may harm the base of installed users who 
choose not to adopt the innovation - a "stranding" externality. Farrell 
argued that within network externality industries, the goal of intelletual 
property protection ought to be the encouragement of useful innovations 
while also ensuring the network benefits are fully realised. He concluded, 
282 Jacobs, M.A. (1989) "Copyright and Compatibility" furimetrics Journal, Vol. 30, p. 91. 
283 Samuelson, P., Davis, R., Kapor, M.D. and Reichman, J.H. (1994) "A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
94, p. 2308 at p. 2375. 
284 Farrell, J. (1989) "Standardization and Intellectual Property" Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 
30, p. 35 at pp. 45 - 46. 
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in relation to computer software that:285 
[UJseful innovations should have some degree of protection, but 
the user interface, the format for data storage and transmission, and 
other relatively arbitrary aspects that must be standardized in order 
to achieve compatibility benefits, should be unprotected, so that 
other software developers are encouraged to achieve 
standardization. 
Walter286 argued that the judicial applications of copyright to the user 
interface will protect design ideas underlying computer programs, with 
possible stifling of innovation. Samuelson and Glushko287 found that 
79% of user interface designers surveyed did not believe copyright 
protection was appropriate for elements of the interface which were de 
facto standards. 
6.4.4 Implications 
A number of interrelated policy recommendations arise from the above 
analysis, and have been articulated by some commentators already 
mentioned. 
At a basic level, it can be seen as an improper use of intellectual property 
to permit dominant firms to protect their market position by the 
imposition of switching costs by proprietary ownership of particular 
285 - Ibidem p. 47. 
286 Walter, C. (1988) "Defining the Scope of Software Copyright Protection for Maximum 
Public Benefit" Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 14, p. 1 at p. 62. 
287 Samuelson, P. and Glushko, R.J. (1993) "Comparing the Views of Lawyers and User 
Intreface Designers on the Software Copyright 'Look and Feel' Lawsuits" f urimetrics 
Journal, Vol. 30, p. 121. 
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interface standards. Hemnes288 argued that the law should not protect 
"any part of a computer program that potential buyers would prefer not to 
re-learn before buying a competitive product". 
It is the user interface which is extremely critical to the realisation of 
network externalities. MeneU289 argued that little protection should be 
given to user interface elements of a computer program. 
A broader set of policy recommendations would agree with Teter,290 who 
argued that copyright should not protect the following elements of 
software: 
• elements dictated by efficiency; 
• internal interface elements required to achieve compatibility; and 
• elements of user interfaces which have become de facto standards. 
As a general statement is clear from the discussion in this chapter and the 
model developed in Chapter Five that broadening of copyright protection 
of computer programs to protect "non-literal" copying is undesirable from 
the perspective of technologication innovation. This is where "non-
literal" copying means imitating some aspect of behaviour of another 
288 Hernnes, T.M.S. (1990) "Three Common Fallacies in the User Interface Copyright 
Debate" Computer Law, February, p . 14 at p. 18. 
289 Menell, P.S., (1989) "An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for 
Application Programs" Stanford Law Review Vol. 41 pp. 1045-1104. 
290 Teter, T.S. (1993) "Merger and Machines: An Anlysis of the Pro-Compatibility Trend 
in Computer Software Copyright Cases" Stanford Law Review, Vol. 45, p. 1061 at pp. 
1070 -1072. 
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program without access to the source code of the original. In the presence 
of network externalities, a prohibition against "non-literal" copying can 
deliver profound market power to a firm able to influence industry 
standards. 
6.5 Summary 
This Chapter has examined the implications for computer program 
copyright of the model of technological innovation developed in 
Chapters Four and Five. Key to this discussion is the proposition that 
realisation of network externalities and avoidance of potential abuses of 
market power were desirable for copyright policy. Economic arguments 
which assume that innovation is driven in linear fashion by the degree of 
monopoly and the size of the commercial return to innovators ignores an 
important contrary factor. This creates a bias in the economic 
jusitification which, together with assertions about artistic creativity, leads 
inexorably to policy conclusions about the desirability of preventing 
imitative competition, and treating interfaces as proprietary. Such a 
policy has profound implications for the realisation of network 
externalities in the software industry. 
As was discussed in Chapter Five, much of the policy literature has 
misconceptions of the nature of programming and the degree of access to 
the knowledge underlying the creation of programs distributed only in 
machine code. This thesis rejects this reasoning. The correct model of 
innovation should be that of reverse engineering. The source code of an 
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innovator is effectively confidential information. Competitors must 
engage in their own learning and engineering process, which is both 
costly and time-consuming. This reasoning applies just as strongly to the 
question of interfaces as it does entire programs. Any competitor wishing 
to adopt a particular interface feature will need to implement their own 
programming solution. As Spector291 stated: 
Protecting the code that implements the interface should be 
sufficient to provide reward to the interface designer. 
Based on the discussion in Chapters Five and Six, the following 
conclusions can be reached in respect of intellectual property protection of 
software: 
• replication of machine code ("piracy") should be prohibited, to 
ensure that the value of the IT artefact is appropriable to the 
innovator; 
• the law should encourage an innovation model based on reverse 
engineering, on the basis that source code (codified knowledge) 
remains effectively confidential to the innovator, and competitors 
must implement their own source code solutions; 
• the law should not prohibit, but encourage, imitative competition 
provided that competitors write their own source code; 
291 Spector, A.Z. (1989) "Software, Interface and Implementation" furimetrics Journal, 
Vol. 79 p. 88. 
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• decompilation should be permitted to provide a limited degree of 
access to some subsidiary elements of programs, such as interfaces 
between operating system and application, and communications 
protocols; 
• programming elements dictated by requirements for efficiency and 
compatibility should not be the subject of intellectual property; and 
• reproduction of elements of a user interface should not be grounds 
for infringement. 
The following chapter examines the current legislative and judicial 
approaches to computer program copyright in Australian and 
international jurisdictions. These approaches will be critically examined 
against the policy recommendations above. The intention is to assess the 
degree to which current interpretations of copyright laws in respect of 
computer programs promote or detract from the informational economic 
perspective set out in the earlier chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter Seven 
Evaluation of International 
Copyright Laws 
7 .1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the current state of copyright 
legislation and case law internationally, with specific emphasis on the 
United States, Europe and Australia. The operation of the law will be 
compared with the policy objectives outlined in the previous chapter. 
Principally this thesis agrees with Karjala292 who stated that the software 
protection goal should be protection against "piracy", meaning literal or 
near-literal copying of program code. The role of copyright is to prohibit 
misappropriation in this sense. 
As discussed in the previous chapter there are cases and a supporting 
literature which would extend protection beyond program code to include 
more abstract "non-literal" elements. Closer examination of the 
reasoning behind examination of the "look and feel" and "structure, 
sequence and organisation" cases reveal that the approaches of the courts 
can be reconciled with the policy objectives developed in this thesis, 
pro_vided that a distinction is drawn between misappropriating source 
code and developing a competing product writing fresh source code. Such 
292 Karjala, D.S. (1994) "Recent United States and International Development in 
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a distinction would assist courts in reconciling evidentiary and doctrinal 
issues currently confused within the case law. 
The focus of the chapter is on the effectiveness of two key mechanisms for 
maintaining the balance between providing a basic level of protection 
while encouraging innovation, already mentioned in section 4.4.3 First is 
the "idea-expression" distinction, drawing the line between the protected 
and the unprotectable, permeates the case law and associated literature but 
has been applied with little consistency. The second is the doctrine of 
"fair use" (or "fair dealing"), which authorises acts of reproduction and 
adaptation of works (which would otherwise infringe) for particular 
purposes such as research and study. Of particular importance to 
computer programs is whether fair use endorses a reverse engineering 
approach generally, and authorises disassembly (decompilation) in 
particular. A central concern is the degree to which interfaces, both 
internal interfaces (with hardware or software) and user interfaces, may be 
imitated by competitors. 
The jurisdictions were selected as representative of distinct perspectives 
in terms of copyright policy. The United States as the largest domestic 
market and dominant exporter of software internationally, represents a 
key legal environment and the overwhelming proportion of litigation 
concerning software copyright issues has taken place there. Europe with a 
growing telecommunications and information technology infrastructure 
Software Protection (Part 1)" European Intellectual Property Review, p. 13 at p. 14. 
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is an important potential competitor to the United States. Australia by 
contrast is a small country and net importer of software, although with 
very similar legal traditions to the United States in the area of intellectual 
property. As discussed below, the different circumstances and legal-
political environment of the European Community (EC) have created an 
explicit statement of software copyright policy lacking in the other 
jurisdictions, with some notable endorsements of reverse engineering 
and compatibility. 
The conclusion is that while the current direction of the law (as at 
December 1997) appears to be closer to the policy recommended by this 
thesis, this may be short lived. 
7 .2 Legislation 
At a basic level the source code and object code of computer programs is 
protected under copyright as a "literary work", in each major jurisdiction 
achieved by specific legislation. 
7.2.1 United States 
The United States Congress created the National Commission on New 
Technology Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTD) to report on the 
question of software copyright. The recommendations of this committee 
were embodied in 1980 amendments (Computer Software Copyright Act 
1980) to the 1976 Copyright Act. Congress adopted a definition of a 
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computer program as:293 
A set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly 
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result. 
Under this definition copyright may protect both readable source code as 
well as human imperceptible machine code (object code). In the United 
States, this proposition was confirmed by Apple Computer Inc. v Franklin 
Computer Corp294. 
7.2.2 Europe 
In 1985, the Commission of the European Community (EC) initiated 
discussion on harmonisation of national laws on intellectual property.295 
In 1991, the EC's Council of Ministers approved a directive requiring 
European copyright protection of computer software (EC Directive).296 
Article 1 of the EC Directive required member states to protect computer 
programs as literary works under copyright. The United Kingdom has 
earlier incorporated computer programs with the passing of the Copyright 
(Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985 as a temporary measure, prior 
to a review of intellectual property and the later passing of the Copyright, 
293 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1988). 
294 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); 104 Sc. Ct. 690 (1984); see also Apple Computer Inc. v 
Formula lnt'l Inc. 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) in respect of systems software. 
295 For a detailed legislative history see Palenski, R.J. (1991) "The EC Software 
Directive: Meeting the Challenges of the Information Age" Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 10, p. 191. 
296 Council of the European Communities Directive 91/250 Directive on the Protection of 
Computer Programs 1991 OJ (L 122) 42. 
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Designs and Patents Act 1988. This legislation was in turn amended to 
bring it into line with the EC Directive in 1992.297 
Article 1 did not, however, contain any definition of a "program", 
although an earlier Explanatory Memorandum suggested "a series of 
instructions which causes a machine to perform its function". The EC 
Directive does include "preparatory design materials" as part of a 
program. 
7.2.3 Australia 
In Australia, the Commonwealth passed special legislation to incorporate 
computer programs within the Copyright Act 1968. Computer programs 
are "literary works"298 and computer program defined in the following 
terms: 
"Computer program" means an expression, in any language, code 
or notation, of a set of instructions (whether with or without 
related information) intended, either directly or after either or both 
of the following: 
(a) conversion to another language code or notation; 
(b) reproduction in a different material form, 
to cause a device having digital information processing capabilities 
to perform a particular function. 
Part of the explanation for the detailed definition within the Australian 
297 Chalton, S. (1993) "Implementation of the Software Directive in the United 
Kingdom: The Effects of the Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992" 
European Intellectual Property Review, p. 138. 
298 Section 10(1). 
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legislation is that it was legislated in response to a court finding that 
computer program machine code was not necessarily protected under 
traditional principles of copyright: Apple Computer Inc. v Computer 
Edge.299 The definition was based in part on the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation's (WIPO) model provisions for protection of 
computer software and a meeting held in Canberra during 1984 with the 
Attorney-General's Department.300 The High Court later confirmed the 
protection of machine code under the 1984 amendments.301 In 1995 the 
Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC) recommended that the 
definition of "computer program" in the Act be replaced by a broader 
definition effectively replicating that in the United States.302 
7 .3 The idea-expression distinction 
A key approach to the determination of questions of copyright within 
information technology is the application of the idea-expression 
distinction. Copyright does not protect ideas, schemes, systems or 
methods but is confined to the expression of those ideas.303 This 
principle, at least in abstract, is agreed by all three jurisdictions. Explicitly 
299 (1983) 50 ALR 581; reversed on appeal, see (1984) 53 ALR 225 and (1986) 65 ALR 33. 
300 Crisp, P. (1986) "The Legal Protection of Computer Software - Recent Developments in 
Australia" Journal of Law and Information Science, Vol. 2, p. 53 at p. 61. 
301 Autodesk v Dyason (1992) 173 CLR 330. 
302 Copyright Law Review Committee (1995) Computer Software Protection (AGPS: 
Canberra) para. 2.04(c). 
303 Hollinrake v Tmswell [1894] 3 Ch 420 at 427. 
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within the United States legislation, copyright does not extend to any 
"idea, process, system [or] method of operation".304 Although no similar 
statutory provision exists in Australia, it has been held that the United 
States legislation merely reflects the general law principles.305 
Under the EC Directive Article 1: 
Ideas and principles which underlie any element of a computer 
program, including those which underlie its interfaces, are not 
protected by copyright under this Directive. 
The application of the idea-expression dichotomy to software has often 
been based on the approach of the United States Supreme Court in Baker 
v Selden,306considered to be the landmark ruling on this issue. In that 
case, a book published by the plaintiff presented a system for bookkeeping. 
Included in the book were example ledgers which demonstrated the 
system. The defendant did not copy the book but instead implemented 
the system of bookkeeping. The Supreme Court found there to be no 
infringement, on the basis that the description of the system did not give 
the author an exclusive right to use of that system. Only the expression of 
the system, its articulation within the book, was protected. Applying 
Baker v Selden to computer programs, the source code and object code of 
the program would · constitute a unique "expression" deserving of 
protection. The functions performed by the program would be an 
304 17 u.s.c. § 102(b) (1988). 
305 Powerjlex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation [1997] FCA 490. 
306 101 us 99 s Ct (1880). 
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unprotectable "idea". Three potential methodologies for applying the 
distinction are discussed below, each emerging from United States courts. 
The first arises from a situation of imitative competition, in that the 
defendant wrote their own program without access to the plaintiff's 
source code. The second and third both deal with situations of 
misappropriation, where there was a degree of access to protected source 
code. This difference in facts between the cases will assist in reconciling 
their approaches in section 7.4, based on an confusion of doctrinal with 
evidentiary questions. 
7.3.1 Synercom 
A pioneer case suggesting that interfaces could be imitated in competing 
programs to promote compatibility was Synercom Technology Inc. v 
University Computing Co.307 which dealt with a structural engineering 
program. At issue was whether the defendants had infringed input 
formats used in the Synercom program. These formats were a number of 
cards with lines and spaces arranged in a particular order indicating how 
the engineering data should be entered into the computer. The intention 
was that the users would be able to write the necessary data on these cards 
to facilitate their use of the program. The court found that the blank cards 
to be protected literary works for the purposes of copyright. The 
defendants did not reproduce these cards but their competing program's 
307 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D.Tex. 1978). 
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input routine was structured on the particular sequence of data in the 
Synercom cards. Users of the defendant's program would then be able, 
without retraining, to enter data already written on Synercom cards to 
make similar engineering calculations. The defendant's manual 
provided detailed instructions on data entry which the court found to be a 
"mirror image" of the Synercom forms. 
The court found that substantial similarity in the two descriptions of the 
data entry process, the logic and sequence of the process adopted by 
Synercom, was an unprotectable idea which the defendants were free to 
imitate in their program. Any similarity in expression was inevitable 
results of borrowing the unprotected ideas. The court used the analogy of 
the figure-H pattern of a gearstick. Although the manual for the original 
vehicle using the gearstick would be protected by copyright, a second 
manufacturer adopting the unprotected figure-H pattern would be at 
liberty to describe its use despite any similarity this may have to the 
original description.308 
The Synercom case is significant in that its clear implication is that 
achieving compatibility is not of itself prohibited by copyright. It is also 
important in terms of the model of software innovation developed in the 
previous chapters. The court explicitly endorsed the "borrowing of an 
idea" in terms of development of a competing program imitating 
308 Ibidem p. 1013. 
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behaviour of the first but without access to or copying from the source 
code. The court stated:309 
Hence [the defendant's] preparation of a FORTRAN preprocessor 
program from the descriptions contained in the manuals cannot 
constitute an infringing use provided this was done without 
copying of the plaintiff's FORTRAN program, as it was. 
This thesis endorses the Synercom approach as consistent with the 
objective of promotion of innovation from an information perspective. 
The case has, however, been overshadowed by rulings that, despite no 
objective similarity in code, similarities in "non-literal" elements can 
constitute infringement. These cases are discussed below. 
7.3.2 Whelan 
A significant decision in terms of subsequent case law in the United States 
was Whelan Associates Inc. v faslow Dental Laboratory Inc.310 
("Whelan"), a decision of the Third Circuit. Whelan wrote a program in 
the language EDL for managing the business operations of Jaslow's dental 
laboratory, called Dentalab. Whelan was to own copyright in the program 
while Jaslow was to sell it to others on behalf of Whelan. Two years 
following the completion of the program, Jaslow began selling its own 
dental management program, Dentcom, written in BASIC but performing 
similar functions to the program written by Whelan. Experts at trial 
found little similarity in source code (principally due to the different 
309 Id . 
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languages used) and distinct logic in the sub-routines. The experts agreed, 
however, that there were "overall structural similarities" in that five 
modules had similar functions and there were noticeable similarities in 
file structures and screen displays. 
The issue on appeal was whether the observed similarities in structure 
were sufficient to ground an infringement of Whelan's copyright. This 
turned on the question of whether the structure of a program is part of 
the idea or its expression. Whelan held that "expressive" non-literal 
elements should be afforded protection provided that they were not 
merged with their underlying ideas. The merger doctrine denies 
protection to expression where there were a limited number of ways in 
which to express a particular idea. The policy behind merger was that by 
protecting expression, the law did not provide a monopoly over the 
underlying idea.311 Using this as the basis for applying copyright to the 
computer program, the court held that the "idea" of the program could be 
found in its "function or purpose" which it held to be the efficient 
management of a dental laboratory.312 The defendant had used similar 
subroutine structures, file structures, and screen displays. Since a range of 
these structures and displays could support the same 11idea" (purpose), the 
particular "structure, sequence and organisation" used by the plaintiff was 
310 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
311 e.g. Morrissey v Proctor & Gamble Co. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). 
312 797 F.2d at pp. 1238-1240. 
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protected by copyright. The test stated by the Third Circuit was that:313 
... the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the 
work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or 
function would be part of the expression of the idea. 
The case has suffered heavy criticism although its impact on subsequent 
case law was considerable. Gross314 argued that the court's approach in 
Whelan begged the question since in particular it did not explain the 
methodology for arriving at the particular "idea". The level of abstraction 
of the idea in Whelan was at a very high level - the function of the 
program. In addition, this function was delineated in terms of overall 
purpose rather than the specific functions performed during its 
operations. It is arguable that this overall purpose is so abstract as to 
render the idea-expression distinction meaningless.315 Drahos described 
the approach of Whelan in the following terms:316 
This approach basically amounted to increasing the abstractness of 
the abstract object so that identity judgments concerning computer 
software could include their non-literal elements. 
Englund317 argued that while easy to apply, the rule in Whelan would 
313 797 F.2d at p. 1236; it can be noted that this approach reflected the reasons in Apple 
Computer Inc. v Franklin Computer Corp. 714 F.2d 1240 at p. 1253 (3d Cir. 1983). 
314 Gross, LR. (1994) "A New Framework for Software Protection: Distinguishing between 
Interactive and Non-Interactive Aspects of Computer Programs" Rutgers Computer 
·and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 20, p. 107 at p. 135. 
315 Kretschmer, M.T. (1988) "Copyright Protection for Software Architecture: Just Say 
No!" Columbia Business Law Review, Vol. 1988, p. 823. 
316 Drahos, P. (1996) A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Dartmouth: Sydney) pp. 
155-156. 
317 Englund, S.R. (1990) "Idea, Process or Protected Expression? Determining the Scope of 
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have undesirable consequences. Ideas for program functions and 
structures typically arise from observing the works of others and is then 
improved upon and combined with original material. Prohibitions on 
programmers imitating behaviour at any abstraction below an overall 
purpose would effectively provide a monopoly over an unprotectable 
process, and hamper the innovation process within the industry.318 
Whelan entrenches market leaders and may consequently encourage 
software inefficiencies.319 From the perspective developed in this thesis, 
acceptance of a Whelan approach would be harmful to future innovation 
within the software industry. 
7.3.3 Computer Associations v Altai 
The landmark case which articulated an alternative methodology to 
Whelan was Computer Associates International Inc. v Altai Inc.320. In 
that case, Computer Associates owned CA-SCHEDULER, a program which 
controlled the operation of a computer in carrying out a schedule of tasks. 
Integrated within CA-SCHEDULER was a compatibility component, called 
Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs" Michigan Law Review, 
Vol. 88, p. 866 at p. 881. 
318 Gage, T.M. (1987) /1 Whelan Associates v faslow Dental Laboratories: Copyright 
Protection for Computer Software Structure - What's the Purpose?" Wisconsin Law 
Review, Vol. 1987, p. 859. 
319 Wright, W. (1991) "Litigation as a Mechanism for Inefficiency in Software Copyright 
Law" U.C.L.A Law Review, Vol. 39, p. 397; and Spivack, P. (1988) "Does Form Follow 
Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer 
Software" U.C.L.A. Law Review, Vol. 35, p. 723. 
320 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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ADAPTER which translated the scheduler language into machine 
language for execution. The purpose of ADAPTER was that CA-
SCHEDULER could be used with a range of systems software and 
hardware architectures. Altai began marketing ZEKE, a competing 
scheduling program which unlike CA-SCHEDULER was only able to run 
on one operating system. An Altai employee who had access to the 
ADAPTER source code in violation of his previous employment with 
Computer Associates, wrote OSCAR which, in version 3.4, was released 
with ZEKE by Altai to operate ZEKE on multiple systems. Computer 
Associates sued for infringement and Altai eventually admitted to 
copying 30% of ADAPTER for OSCAR 3.4. Altai subsequently rewrote 
OSCAR by way of a cleanroom process to purge it of all code copied or 
modified from ADAPTER and then released OSCAR version 3.5. The 
Second Circuit held that OSCAR 3.5 did not infringe Computer 
Associates' copyright in ADAPTER. 
The court explicitly rejected Whelan, noting that the major flaw in that 
case was the assumption that only one "idea" underlies a given computer 
program. Altai also rejected the proposition that the "structure, sequence 
and organisation" of a program was copyrightable expression. Instead the 
Sec.ond Circuit used a three stage procedure to determine infringement.321 
This has been described by commentators as a process of "abstraction-
321 982 F.2d 693 at p. 706. 
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filtration-comparison".322 Under this approach, the court first breaks 
down the original program into its constituent structural parts abstracted 
from the literal code.. By examining each of these parts for: 
• incorporated ideas; 
• expression necessarily incidental to those ideas; 
• elements dictated by efficiency; 
• elements dictated by external factors; and 
• elements taken from the public domain; 
a court filters out all the non-protectable material, leaving a "kernel" or 
"golden nugget" of creative expression. Finally the court compares the 
remaining expression and determines whether the protectable elements 
of both programs are substantially similar as to find infringement. 
Effross323 noted that Altai's exclusion of elements dictated by efficiency 
parallelled the copyright doctrine of merger, while the elimination of 
element dictated by external factors was analogous to the scenes a faire 
doctrine. Similarities between programs based on efficiency might be 
attributed to the industry-wide pursuit of efficiency, not of copying, just as 
similarities reflecting standard industry practices or interoperability do 
322 e.g. Zadra-Symes, L.J. (1992) "Computer Associates v Altai: the Retreat from Whelan 
v Jaslow" European Intellectual Property Review, p. 327. 
323 Effross, W.A. (1993) "Assaying Computer Associates v Altai: How Will the 'Golden 
Nugget' Test Pan Out?" Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 19, p. 1 at 
p. 48. 
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not necessarily represent copying. According to Altai the external factors 
giving rise to similarities would include:324 
(1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a 
particular program is intended to be run; 
(2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a 
program is designed to operate in conjunction; 
(3) computer manufacturers' design standards; 
(4) demands of the industry being serviced; and 
(5) widely accepted programming practices within the computer 
industry. 
More importantly as a question of policy the court rejected the argument 
that programmers needed to be provided with extensive protection to 
invest in software development. The interest of the copyright law was 
not simply to confer a monopoly on industrious persons, but to advance 
public welfare by promoting the free use and development of non-
protectable ideas and processes. The court observed that:325 
... serious students of the industry have been highly critical of the 
sweeping scope of copyright protection engendered by the Whelan 
rule, in that it enables first comers to "lock up" basic programming 
techniques as implemented in programs. 
At one level Altai suggested an evolving jurisprudence based on careful 
and pragmatic evaluation of alleged similarities, taking into consideration 
industry practices and real-world functional constraints.326 One 
324 982 F.2d at pp. 909-910. 
325 982 F.2d 693 at p. 708. 
326 Rinck, G.M. (1992) "The Maturing US Law rn Copyright Protection for Computer 
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implication for software development was as an encouragement for 
competitors to imitate features of best-selling computer programs.327 This 
approach, closer to the policy in this thesis, was reflected in some 
decisions heard in the same year. For example, in Apple Computer v 
Microsoft Corp.328 the court rejected Apple's argument that the overall 
look and feel of its Macintosh graphical user interface was infringed by the 
Microsoft Windows. It examined instead each of the distinct features 
surrounding the systems software functions, and suggested that items 
such as the "trash can" icon and the "zooming rectangles" feature when 
opening a document or application might be protectable, but in each case 
were not protected due to a limiting doctrine such as scenes a faire or 
merger. The court also cited Synercom with approval, drawing an 
analogy between the visual displays and user commands of the Macintosh 
user interface and a car's "dashboard, steering wheel, gear shift, brakes, 
clutch and accelerator".329 
Using the same approach, Brown Bag Software v Symantec Corp.330 
found that Symantec's "Grandview" outlining program did not infringe 
Programs: Computer Associates v Altai and Other Recent Case Developments" 
European Intellectual Property Review, p. 351. 
327 . Effross, W.A. (1993) "Assaying Computer Associates v Altai: How Will the 'Golden 
Nugget' Test Pan Out?" Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 19, p. 1 at 
p. 51. 
328 799 F.2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
329 Ibidem at p. 1023. 
330 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Brown Bag Software's "PC-Outline" program. The alleged similarities 
were divided into four major features each of which was found not to be 
infringing. First was the list of options in the opening menu, found to be 
unprotectable concepts fundamental to a host of computer programs, such 
as opening files, editing and printing. Second was a set of nine functions 
in the menu bar, held to be incidental to the idea of a computer outlining 
program. Third, the use of pull-down windows was held non-original 
and standard practice within the computer industry, and finally, the use 
of a blue background which was held to be merely functional. On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit endorsed the I/analytic dissection" of the two programs 
and stated that individualised evaluations to determine whether 
similarities result from unprotectable ideas or protectable expression were 
required. 
A difficulty is that the Altai approach, however, is that it leaves open the 
possibility that subsequent courts may still choose to limit or expand the 
"kernel" of protectable expression. One example was CMAX/Cleveland 
Inc. v UCR Inc.331 which appeared to rule that program design is a 
protectable non-literal element. 
In applying the Altai procedure, the court found that file structures (the 
selection and arrangement of field definitions within a file) were 
protected on the basis that being arbitrary, not alphabetic or systematic, 
331 804 F. Supp. 337 (M.D. Ga. 1992). 
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they were not dictated by efficiency or industry considerations. Using the 
same reasoning, transaction codes used by the program as labels for short-
cuts to executing particular transactions were protected. According to the 
court, having to retrain employees to learn new transaction codes in a 
competing program did not constitute an external factor so as to deny 
copyright. Another danger with the Altai approach is that it leaves open 
the possibility of copyrightable expression being conferred upon non-
literal elements which are genuinely new and unusual, falling outside 
the filtration process as outside industry practice or not dictated by 
external factors. Effectively the court would be conferring patent-type 
protection on useful functions or user interface elements which meet an 
implicit "novel and non-obvious" threshold. There is also the danger of 
a chicken-and-egg problem. In a filtration test elements which have 
become standard practice are removed from consideration. At some point 
in time, however, all standard programming devices would have been 
seen as unusual or experimental, or perhaps unique to a particular 
application. 
While superior to Whelan from a policy perspective, the approach in 
Altai remains at odds with the preferred approach in Synercom. The 
application of Altai to cases where the defendant had no access to the 
source code of the plaintiff may also lead to overly broad protection. The 
Lotus litigation discussed in section 7.6.l is one example. A recognition 
that "non-literal" copying is driven by evidence rather than doctrine, 
discussed in the following section, would reconcile these approaches. 
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7 .4 Non-literal copying 
Since direct evidence of copying by admission or otherwise is typically 
unavailable in copyright infringement cases, the courts have developed a 
jurisprudence based on evidence of substantial similarity. In the United 
States the test of substantial similarity is typically expressed in terms such 
as the following:332 
... whether the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff's work 
that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the 
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protectable 
expression. 
Given that substantial similarity turns on an inference from 
circumstantial evidence, the courts have adopted tests based on an overall 
pattern of similarity without regard for differences in detail. This is based 
on the need for the courts to ensure that "colourable alterations" to 
disguise copying do not permit infringers to avoid judgment against 
them. An infringing work therefore need only have captured, for 
example, the "total concept and feel" of the original.333 In applying this 
approach to computer programs, the courts have encountered significant 
difficulties. One of the difficulties is that legislators have provided little 
guidance to the courts in making policy choices in the approach to 
questions of infringement and determination of what is copyrightable. 
332 Atari Inc. v North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Crop. 672 F2d 607 at 614 (7th 
Cir. 1982). 
333 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v McDonald's Corp. 562 F.2d 1157 at 1167 
(9th Cir. 1977) quoting Roth Greeting Cards v United Card Co. 429 F.2d 1106 at 1110 
(9th Cir. 1970). 
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Samuelson334 noted that CONTU, for example, displayed a remarkable 
lack of teclmological understanding. As McGahn335 stated: 
The result is a variety of judicially created tests, which rely on 
amorphous terms such as "ordinary observer", 
"extrinsic/ intrinsic", "total concept and feel" and "iterative". 
The approach to infringement based on substantial similarity shares a 
great deal with the orthodox economic concepts presented in Chapter Two 
and stands in contrast to the information economics approach in Chapter 
Three. Under established copyright doctrine a plagiarist cannot use as a 
defence an argument as to the level of independent contribution, even if 
this is overwhelming. For example, in Meredith Corp. v Harper & Row 
Publishers Inc.336 the defendant was a publisher who intended to create a 
book to compete with a leading book in psychology. One group of the 
defendant's employees studied the book and provided a detailed report to 
a second group who had no access to the book. This second group then 
wrote the competing book. The court found similarity in structure and 
evidence to support approximately 11 % close similarity in the text, but 
that most of the remainder constituted new ideas, research, topics and 
some differing structure. Despite this originality and lack of access by the 
writing team to the original, the court found infringement. The 
334 Samuelson, P. (1984) "CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Code" Duke Law Journal, p. 663. 
335 McGahn, D.F. (1995) "Copyright Infringement of Protected Computer Software: An 
Analytical Method to Determine Substantial Similarity: Rutgers Computer and 
Technology Law Journal, Vol. 21, p. 89 at p. 91. 
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judgment is typical in suggesting that using an existing work as a model 
to create a new competing work may be prohibited by copyright.337 Once 
an inference of copying is supported by substantial similarity, the defence 
is usually limited to demonstrating that the similarity is merely 
coincidental. This jurisprudence makes an implicit assumption that 
innovation is by creation of wholly independent and original works. 
While this may reflect actual practice in the fields of art and literature, 
where the encouragement of diversity may be appropriate,338 its 
application to technological progress may be misplaced. Indeed, Karjala339 
argued that substantial similarity was not appropriate for incremental 
developments since each new product is, it is unimproved portion, 
substantially similar to the first product. 
It is a mistake, albeit promoted by some commentators,340 to argue that 
since the user is only interested in the "non-literal" elements of a 
program - its functionality and user interface - that the law should also 
be narrowly focussed on non-literal similarity. Instead the courts need to 
be aware that in dealing with program copyright they may be dealing with 
one of two distinct situations. The first is where the alleged copier had 
336 413 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y., 1975). 
337 See also Midway Mfg. Co. v Bandai-American Inc. 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982). 
338 See Chapter Six. 
339 Karjala, D.S. (1994) "Recent United States and International Development in 
Software Protection (Part 1)" European Intellectual Property Review, p. 13. 
340 e.g. Plaey, M.A. (1992) "Lotus Lookalike Litigation: Landmark or Limbo?" Buffalo 
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access to the original source code, such as where an ex-employee sets up a 
competing business using the source code of the original program as a 
short cut to software development. Making use of the source code of an 
existing program by inspection, determining its flow and structure, or 
plagiarising key routines can be seen as inappropriate. The second is 
where a competitor simply studies the program in its executable form and 
writes their own code to imitate some of the functions or interfaces. This 
behaviour by contrast can be seen as desirable to promote competition and 
cumulative innovation. 
It is a trivial matter to change comments, names of routines, variables 
and other symbolic labels, as well as the order and structure of the source 
code files used in a software project. Given this opportunity for cosmetic 
modification of source code to disguise copying, similarities in structure, 
file formats, screen displays and other elements of the user interface do 
provide circumstantial evidence of actual copying of source code. The 
danger is that, in guarding against colourable imitation, the courts have 
created the jurisprudential basis for broad protection of non-literal 
elements, such as the "structure, sequence and organisation" in Whelan. 
The unstated assumption in these cases is that the alleged infringer is 
likely to have had access to the source code. Such an assumption may be 
entirely unrealistic in other cases. 
The rationale for protecting "structure, sequence and organisation" in 
Law Review, Vol. 40, p. 283 at p. 290. 
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cases like Whelan should be seen as based on evidence, not on copyright 
doctrine. Indeed, the courts will typically only be able to compare program 
"structure, sequence and organisation" in a source code form. One source 
code will be compared with another source code. It is clear than in 
Whelan, Altai, and cases which followed the courts were principally 
comparing two sets of source code as the basis for its decision. In Plains 
Cotton Co-op. Assn. v Goodpasture Computer Serv.341 the same 
programmers wrote both programs and had access to the designs of the 
first when writing the second. Similarly, in SAS Inst. Inc. v S & H 
Computer Sys. Jnc.342 the defendant held a licence for much of the 
plaintiff's source code. 
Conley and Bryan343 argued that there is no a priori basis for treating the 
test of substantial simil~rity as the sole determinant of liability where 
more direct evidence is available. Substantial similarity is at best an 
inference made from circumstantial evidence. They recommend that 
courts should not follow literary cases by assuming that no direct 
evidence of copying is available and disposing of the case solely on the 
basis of substantial similarity. Davidson344, for example, suggested that 
341 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. ); the court here found that similarities in sequence and 
organisation were dictated by the cotton market for which they were designed. 
342 605 F.Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). 
343 Conley, J.M. and Bryan, R.M. (1985) /1 A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of 
Computer Software Copyright Cases" North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 63, p. 563 at 
p. 597. 
344 Davidson, D.M. (1983) "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 
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with proper expert testimony, it should be possible to argue successfully 
that source code changed in symbolic representation to disguise copying 
contains the same expression of the original. An example was Midway 
Mfg. Co. v S trohon345 in which substantial similarity was grounded in a 
finding of 89% identity at the machine code level. Another was Willia ms 
Elecs. Inc. v Artie Int'l Inc.346 where in addition to significant object code 
identity there was evidence of identical errors in the program as well as 
the plaintiff's copyright notice buried in the object code. In the landmark 
case of Apple Computer Inc. v Franklin Computer Corp .347 the name of 
the Apple programmer was found embedded in the code of the 
defendant's programs. 
The major issue for interpretation of the copyright legislation is in 
making a clear distinction between the similarity in function or the "total 
concept and feel" of two programs which derives from defendant 
independently writing a competing program and that which derives from 
access to the plaintiff's source code or a detailed description of that code. It 
is a contention of this thesis that source code and object code alone should 
be protected under copyright. Non-literal aspects or abstractions of 
function or interface, if protected at all, should be by patent or by copyright 
furimetrics, Summer, p. 337 
345 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. III, 1983). 
346 685 F.2d 870 (3d. Cir. 1982). 
347 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
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subsisting in the artistic or literary content embedded in the program, 
such as the cinematograph films implicit in computer games, or the text 
of a literary work distributed in CD-ROM. Some indications of courts 
moving in this direction are discussed in section 7.6, below. 
7 .5 Fair use exception 
This section examines the extent to which fair use provisions of copyright 
legislation authorise reverse engineering activities with respect to 
software generally and, in particular, to decompilation. Fair use is an 
exception to exclusive rights and a defence to infringement. 
Graham and Zerbe348 argued that reverse engineering of computer 
software should be allowed, and provide four main economic 
justifications. First, a prohibition against reverse engineering allows the 
innovator to prevent others from accessing the unprotected ideas 
underlying the creation of the work. Secondly, reverse engineering of 
ideas, but not expression, does not conflict with the mandate of the 
copyright legislation, eliminating the "excess" protection software 
producers claim they deserve. Thirdly, reverse engineering as a policy 
question is justified by the functional nature of software and the close 
analogies to patent. Finally, permitting reverse engineering provides a 
means of access where no other means are available. 
348 See also Reichman, J.H. (1994) "Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright 
Paradigms" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 94, p. 2432. 
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Part of the learning process in reverse engineering can be disassembly 
(decompilation), which may be of some use in understanding small 
elements of the overall program, such an interoperability with the 
systems software or telecommunications functions. Kreiss349 argued that 
the doctrine of fair use should permit disassembly for study purposes. 
Similar calls have been made for a right for users to modify lawfully 
acquired software.350 There has been a typical assumption that access 
necessarily involves decompilation, which is itself assumed to be an 
infringement.351 In the light of recent United States decisions, some 
commentators have argued that where decompilation is a necessary step 
in ensuring compatibility, such intermediate copying should not be 
infringement.352 This proposition is in agreement with the policy 
developed in Chapter Six. 
349 Kriess, RA. (1995) "Accessibility And Commercialization in Copyright Theory" 
U.C.L.A. Law Review, Vol. 43, p. 1 at p. 59. 
350 Samuelson, P. (1988) "Modifying Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright 
Doctrine to Accommodate a Technology" Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 28, p. 179. 
351 Graham, L.D. and Zerbe, R.O. (1996) "Economically Efficient Treatment of Computer 
Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection, and Disclosure" Rutgers Computer and 
Technology Law Journal, Vol. 22, p. 61 at p. 110 
352 Samuelson, P. (1993) "Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable 
Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob, and Sega" Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, p. 49; c.f. Stem, R.H. (1992) "Sega Enterprises Ltd v 
Accolade Inc: No Accolades for an Ill-Conceived Analysis of Software Copyright 
Infringement and Fair Use" Computer Law Reporter, Vol. 15, p. 263; Wessel, M.R. 
(1989) "Introductory Comment on the Arizona State University Last Frontier 
Conference on Copyright Protection of Computer Software" Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 
30, p. l. 
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7.5.1 United States 
In the United States, fair use is in section 107 of the Copyright Act, which 
provides that fair use means use of a copy for purposes such as "criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research". The 
United States courts have ruled that fair use authorises the making of 
interim copies and also decompilation for purposes of reverse 
engineering where this is essential for interoperability. Atari Games 
Corp. v Nintendo of America Inc.353 Federal Circuit ("Atari") explicitly 
held that the making of interim copies for study as part of the reverse 
engineering process was not infringement but fell within the fair use 
exception.354 The court in Atari also stated:355 
An author cannot acquire patent-like protection by putting an idea, 
process, or method of operation in an unintelligible format and 
asserting copyright infringement against those who try to 
understand that idea, process, or method of operation. 
In Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade Inc.356 ("Sega") Accolade manufactured 
video game cartridges and had considered becoming a licensee of Sega. 
This licence was not pursued since Sega's conditions would have required 
that Sega be the exclusive manufacturer of all Accolade games. Instead 
Accolade reverse engineered the Genesis game console interface 
353 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
354 Ibidem at p. 843. 
355 975 F.2d 832 at p. 842. 
356 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) 
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specifications and manufactured Sega compatible video games. The 
Ninth Circuit ruled that Accolade was entitled to disassemble parts of 
Sega's code in order to determine the necessary compatibility 
requirements of the Sega Genesis, and reproduce a short segment from 
Sega's compatibility code, known as a "TMSS initalization code" in their 
own cartridges. In evaluating the question of fairness the court 
emphasised commercial use of the reverse engineering was indirect and 
the public benefited from dissemination of additional creative works. 
Both Sega and Atari support the principle that an author cannot expect 
copyright protection, which has the goal of dissemination of ideas, while 
at the same time attempting to keep the public from extracting these 
ideas.357 
Similarly, in Lewis Galoob Toys Inc. v Nintendo of America Inc.358 the 
court upheld fair use by the defendant in developing a hardware device 
for improving a cartridge game machine. The "game genie" altered the 
behaviour of the Nintendo games, in particular allowing players to 
customise their difficulty level and a range of "cheats" such as proving 
additional "lives" to prolong a game. In part the court believed the use 
was fair given evidence that the device did not have an adverse economic 
357 Soma, J.T., Winfield, G. and Friesen, L. (1994) "Software Interoperability and Reverse 
Engineering" Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 20, p. 189 at p. 235. 
358 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
page 182 
Chapter Seven - Evaluation of International Copyright Laws 
impact on Nintendo, but instead enhanced sales.359 
7.5.2 Europe 
In contrast to the United States and Australia, where reverse engineering 
policy has been articulated in the courts, the EC has adopted a "top-down" 
policy which promotes the explicit recognition of the reverse engineering 
process within the EC Directive. 
Article 5 explicitly permits a legitimate user to "observe, study or test the 
functioning of the program" in order to determine its ideas or principles. 
This endorses a model of innovation consistent with that set out in this 
thesis, that is, imitative competition by observation of rival products 
without access to the underlying source code. This is also described as 
"black box" reverse engineering. 
Article 6 of the EC Directive creates an explicit reverse engineering 
exception permitting decompilation, reproduction and adaptation where 
these actions are: 
... indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the 
interoperability of an independently created computer program 
with other programs. 
The express intent of the exception is to encourage the development of 
open systems, to make it possible:360 
359 Ibidem pp. 968-969. 
360 EC Directive, p. 43. 
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... to connect all components of a computer system, including 
those of different manufacturers, so that they can work together. 
Under Article 6 a reverse engineer using decompilation will have to 
demonstrate that this was "indispensable" to achieving interoperability. 
Implicitly, this demonstration would include an explanation of why 
observation of the operation of program was insufficient. Authorisation 
codes such as those in the Sega and Atari cases are likely to fall within 
Article 6, as are specifications for internal interfaces such as software-
software and software-hardware protocols. Bainbridge361 stated that Sega 
is consistent with the EC Directive and with pre-existing United Kingdom 
laws. 
User interfaces, however, are more likely to fall within Article 5. 
Karjala362 argued that the EC Directive represented a political 
compromise which was flawed particularly in limiting reverse 
engineering practices to purposes of interoperability, for example in 
disassembly. It is arguable that this interoperability includes 
interoperability with the systems software as well as with peripherals such 
as printers and storage devices, but possibly not user interfaces. 
Also important is Article 9 which required that contractual provisions 
which were contrary to the reverse engineering practices set out in 
361 Bainbridge, D. (1994) Software Copyright Law (2nd Ed.) (Butterworths: London) p. 
159. 
362 Karjala, D.S. (1994) "Recent United States and International Development in 
Software Protection (Part 1)" European Intellectual Property Review, p. 13 at p. 19. 
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Articles 5 and 6 were to be rendered null and void. This was a particularly 
important element of the EC Directive to ensure that copyright holders 
did not exploit licensing agreements to overcome these exceptions. 
One effect of the EC Directive has been the more explicit recognition of 
the rights of competitors in removing protection from interfaces and 
authorising access to internal interfaces by means of disassembly. In part 
this was driven by a different legal civil law tradition within Continental 
nations from Anglo-American law, preventing application of the fair use 
doctrine. Instead, the EC Directive was stated in explicit terms, albeit 
based on analogy to fair use approach. 
7.5.3 Australia 
Against the precedent in both the United States .and Europe, the 
Australian High Court decision in Autodesk Inc. v Dyason363 extended 
the scope of copyright infringement effectively to prohibit the form of 
reverse engineering used in that case. In doing so it overturned the 
decision of the Full Federal Court which held there to be no 
infringement.364 The suit alleged infringement of a computer aided 
design program, AutoCAD. As a means to prevent piracy, the program 
required the presence of a hardware lock, AutoLock, a circuit which acted 
as a shift register which responded to challenges from the computer 
363 (1992) 173 CLR 330. 
364 Dyason v Autodesk Inc. (1990) 24 FCR 147; overturning the first instance ruling of 
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program every few seconds while in operation by returning an 
appropriate response. The register was based on a 127 bit string and 
associated routine contained within the code of the AutoCAD program, 
described by the court as Widget C. If the lock returned the correct 
response the program continued to function. Kelly, a computer expert, 
did not open the hardware device or examine the code of the program but 
instead used an oscilloscope to observe the challenges and responses to 
AutoLock and created a "look-up table" which mimicked the behaviour 
of AutoLock. Having done this he manufactured AutoKey which he then 
distributed to users of AutoCAD. 
The High Court held that Widget C, as a subset of the AutoCAD program, 
in itself constituted a protectable computer program, and that copyright 
was infringed by the manufacture of AutoKey since AutoKey contained a 
copy of the 127 bit look-up table. The court found that this string was a 
"substantial part" of Widget C in the sense that it was essential for the 
operation of AutoLock, hence qualitatively substantial despite being 
quantitatively insignificant. In finding the look-up table protectable the 
High Court took the decision in Whelan as persuasive. Applying 
Whela.n, the "idea", of function, of Widget C was the protection of the 
AutoCAD program. The "expression", or method for arriving at that 
function, was the use of a locking device employing a look-up table. The 
particular form of the look-up table chosen by Autodesk therefore 
Northrop J at (1989) 15 IPR 1. 
page 186 
Chapter Seven - Evaluation of International Copyright Laws 
constituted protectable expression. 
If this approach was applied by the High Court to the facts in the Sega case 
it would find infringement. The TMSS initialisation code, although 
quantitatively small would be ruled as qualitatively substantial since in 
that case the code was essential for operation of the game console, just as 
the 127-bit look-up . table in Autodesk, was essential to the operation of 
Widget C. The approach in Autodesk is therefore inconsistent with the 
policy objectives developed in Chapter Six. 
In Australia, the Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC) in 1993 
endorsed the approached adopted in the EC and Sega.365 In its 1995 report 
on Computer Software Protection it recommended the extension of the 
fair dealing provisions to include explicitly decompilation where 
necessary to achieve interoperability with software or hardware, based on 
the text of the EC Directive.366 Unfortunately the CLRC accompanied this 
measure with a proposal to render other purposes for decompilation, 
except for error correction367, per se illegal. These would include: 
• enhancing program performance,.368 
365 Copyright Law Review Committee (1993) Draft Report on Computer Software 
Protection (AGPS: Canberra) para. 10.72. 
366 Copyright Law Review Committee (1995) Computer Software Protection (AGPS: 
Canberra) para. 2.23 
367 Ibidem para. 2.27, although this itself is limited to where an error free version of the 
program cannot be obtained within a reasonable time at a normal commercial price. 
368 Id. para. 2.24. 
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• networking a computer program;369 
• porting a program to another platform;370 
• circumventing a program lock;371 and 
• understanding the program's underlying techniques.372 
This final prohibition has been the subject of particular criticism373, and is 
inconsistent with the EC Directive. In addition, reverse engineering not 
involving decompilation - "black box" reverse engineering - should be 
limited, according to the CLRC, to "non-commercial" activities.374 
Based on the High Court decision, and the recommendations of the 
CLRC, the use of fair dealing exceptions as a basis for reverse engineering 
will continue to be severely limited in Australia. 
7.6 Current case law 
This section examines current case to assess the approach taken with 
respect of subsistence of copyright in "non-literal" elements of computer 
programs. These cases use different methodologies for applying the idea-
369 Id. para. 2.25. 
370 Id. para. 2.26. 
371 Id. para. 2.29. 
372 Id. para. 2.28. 
373 Christie, A. (1996) "The Future of Australian Copyright Protection for Computer 
Programs and Related Products" journal of Law and Information Science, Vol. 7, p. 87 
at pp. 94-96. 
374 Ibidem para. 2.28. 
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expression distinction and recent litigation in the United States and 
Australia raise similar issues which remain unresolved in both 
jurisdictions. European law has yet to encounter serious litigation 
interpreting the EC Directive although the indications from recent cases 
in the United Kingdom375 suggest that the lead of the United States courts 
may be critical for future developments. 
7.6.1 United States 
In Lotus Dev. Corp. v Paperback Software Int'[376 ("Paperback") the 
defendants admitted that they had intentionally imitated the user 
interface of "Lotus 1-2-3" in their competing program "VP-Planner". At 
the centre of the interface was a tree of menu commands from which the 
user could select and which included prompts explaining each command. 
It was accepted, however, that the VP-Planner program consisted entirely 
of new and original source code. Paperback argued that the user interface 
of 1-2-3, which at that time was the industry standard, was an 
uncopyrightable idea which could be legitimately used to develop a 
competing program. The court found that the logical organisation of the 
user interface of 1-2-3 was copyrighted. The key element of this logical 
organisation was the use of the slash (/) key to activate spreadsheet 
commands located in a series of menus. The user first activated a menu 
375 Section 7.6.2. 
376 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). 
page 189 
Chapter Seven - Evaluation of International Copyright Laws 
and then chose a command from within this menu. These commands 
were organised into a logical "tree" over which the user moved a cursor 
to select the appropriate command. 
Since there were a number of ways in which to express the idea of a menu 
of commands to the user, competitors should be prohibited, according to 
the court, from imitating the particular menu structure adopted in 1-2-3. 
The court found, however, that the expression of the idea of an electronic 
spreadsheet as a rotated "L" with letters and numbers designating 
columns and rows was limited and so unprotectable. Also, given the 
limited range of keys on a computer keyboard, the use of the slash (/) key 
to invoke the menu system, or the "+", ''-", "*" or "/" characters to 
represent arithmetical functions was not protected. 
It might be noted that in making its findings the court disregarded expert 
evidence and legal articles on the issue, as well as rejecting the evidence 
of Daniel Bricklin, the inventor of the electronic spreadsheet who had 
argued against copyright for non-literal elements of programs. Despite 
the explicit statements in the judgment to the contrary Keeton J appeared 
to apply the Whelan approach in reaching its conclusions. Some 
statements in the judgment are difficult to interpret in this context.377 
The wake of Paperback appeared to leave the state of the law in the United 
377 Samuelson, P. (1990) "How to Interpret the Lotus Decision (And How Not To)", 
Communications of the ACM, November, p. 27. 
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States on non-literal protection in confusion.378 
The same judge (Keeton J) ruled at first instance in Lotus Development 
Corp. v Borland International Inc.379 ("Borland") that a copy of the Lotus 
menu tree infringed Lotus' copyright even when it was invisible to the 
user and not part of the visual user interface. At issue was the similarity 
between 1-2-3 and Borland's Quattro and Quattro Pro user interfaces, 
including the menu structure and organisation, long prompts, function 
key assignments and the macro380 commands and associated macro 
language. The approach was again implicitly that of Whelan. Having 
determined the "idea" of the interface - a structure for a hierarchical 
system of menus which facilitated access to the spreadsheet operations -
the specific menu structure of 1-2-3 was found to be protectable 
expression. This was based on the finding that the names of the 
commands and menus themselves (such as "Worksheet", "Range", 
"Copy", "Move", "File" and "Print") could have been renamed and 
reordered in "at least hundred and perhaps thousands" of ways, 
·373 Gross, I.R. (1994) "A New Framework for Software Protection: Distinguishing 
Between Interactive and Non-Interactive Aspects of Computer Programs", Rutgers 
Computer and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 20, p. 107 at p. 139. 
379 . 831 F. Supp. 223 (Mass. 1993). 
380 "By writing a macro, a user can designate a series of command choices with a single 
macro keystroke. Then, to execute that series of commands in multiple parts of the 
spreadsheet, rather than typing the whole series in each time, the user only needs to 
type the single pre-programmed macro keystroke, causing the computer to recall and 
perform the designated series of commands automatically." See Lotus Development 
Corporation v Borland International lnc. 49 F. 3d 807 {1st Cir. 1995). 
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generating some "millions of satisfactory menu trees"381. That the 
ordering in the menu was based on expected frequency of use of the 
various commands was not seen as a significant functional limitation on 
the arrangements of commands and menus. 
Keeton J rejected Borland's argument that the menu structure was a 
program element dictated by software compatibility, on the basis that the 
menu structure was linked to the 1-2-3 macro language. Rather, it was 
held that since the menu structure preceded the macro language, and 
since this structure was arbitrary, not dictated by efficiency, the structure 
was copyrightable, even if all the user macros derived from it.382 
In close analysis of the cases, commentators such as Carleton383 have 
argued that the test articulated by Keeton Jin Borland is not substantively 
compatible with the Altai approach. In particular the Keeton J test 
focused on the issue of idea-expression merger and ignored the 
application of the scenes a faire doctrine, or the examination of external 
factors such as interoperability or industry practice.384 The result of the 
application of the Keeton J approach is likely to undermine the objectives 
of compatibility and standardisation in user interfaces. Which element of 
381 Ibidem pp. 217-218. 
382 799 F. Supp. at pp. 213-214. 
383 Carleton, D.M. (1995) "Lotus Development v Borland International: Determining 
Software Copyright Infringement is not as Easy as 1-2-3" University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review, Vol. 56, p. 919. 
384 Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Lotus Dev. Corp. v Borland Int'[ 
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1-2-3 was created first should not be relevant. According to Carleton:385 
What matters in this case is that [Lotus']macro system was created 
prior to the Borland interface, and thus became a pre-existing 
condition which limited the manner in which Borland could 
implement the interface which was to read and execute those 
macros. 
The clear implication of both Keeton J rulings in the Lotus litigation was 
that copyright can be used to prevent a competitor from producing 
compatible software. Interfaces, even if de facto standards, were rendered 
proprietary by these cases.386 As a question of policy Keeton J accepted the 
Lotus propositions in these respective cases that Paperback and Borland 
were competitors free riding on Lotus' innovations and efforts in making 
1-2-3 the industry standard.387 
On appeal to the First Circuit,388 however, the court ruled in favour of 
Borland, and held that the menu command hierarchy was not protected 
by copyright. Importantly, the court found that Altai did not apply to this 
particular situation. The situation was not one of "non-literal" copying 
but of "literal" copying of the menu command hierarchy. The issue for 
Inc. 799 F.Supp. 203 (D.Mass. 1992) at p. 38. 
385 Carleton, D.M. (1995) "Lotus Development v Borland International: Determining 
Software Copyright Infringement is not as Easy as 1-2-3" University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review, Vol. 56, p. 919 at p. 943. 
386 Friedman, D. (1994) "Standards as Intellectual Property: An Economic Approach" 
University of Dayton Law Review, Vol. 19, p. 1109 at p . 1126. 
387 Friedman, D. (1994) "Standards as Intellectual Property: An Economic Approach" 
University of Dayton Law Review, Vol. 19, p. 1109 at p. 1126 fn . 62. 
388 Lotus Development Corporation v Borland International Inc. 49 F. 3d 807 (1st Cir. 
1995). 
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the court was not the application of the "abstraction-filtration-
comparison" test, but whether a menu command hierarchy is itself 
protectable. The court suggested that application of Altai would "obscure" 
this more fundamental question.389 Indeed, the court was critical of using 
traditional copyright approaches to computer programs "in cookie cutter 
fashion, as if the programs were novels or play scripts", and felt that 
courts which had done so were mistaken. 
The First Circuit agreed with Borland's argument that the menu 
command hierarchy is uncopyrightable as a "method of operation" 
excluded from protection by s. 102(b) of the United States legislation. This 
was based on the finding that the command hierarchy provides the 
means by which users control and operate Lotus 1-2-3 An analogy was 
drawn between the 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy and the buttons used 
to control a video cassette recorder (VCR): 
That the buttons are arranged and labelled does not make them a 
"literary work", nor does it make them an "expression" of the 
abstract "method of operating" a VCR via a set of labelled buttons. 
Instead, the buttons themselves are the "method of operating" the 
VCR ... Without the menu commands, there would be no way to 
"push" the Lotus buttons. 
In its decision the court clearly linked the issues of program compatibility 
and standardisation to the question of whether a menu hierarchy is 
protectable. The court rejected as "absurd" the implication from Lotus' 
arguments that a user should learn how to perform the same operation 
389 The court appeared to disagree with Gates Rubber Co. v Banda Chem. Indus. Ltd 9 F. 
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(such as printing material) in a different way for each different program 
they were using. It was also seen as inappropriate to force users who had 
written macros for 1-2-3 to rewrite these macros to suit a different 
command hierarchy. There was also explicit recognition of the danger to 
incremental innovation if the Lotus submission was upheld: 
"[B]uilding" requires the use of the precise method of operation 
already employed ... Original developers are not the only people 
entitled to build on the methods of operation they create; anyone 
can. Thus, Borland may build on the methods of operation that 
Lotus designed and may use the Lotus menu command hierarchy 
to do so. 
Keeton J's application of the idea-expression distinction was criticised in 
drawing the line between idea and expression at too high a level of 
abstraction and thereby providing too broad a scope of protection: 
We do not think that "methods of operation" are limited to 
abstractions; rather, they are the means by which a user operates 
something. If specific words are essential to operating something, 
then they are part of a "method of operation" and, as such, are 
unprotectable. 
As a matter of policy, competitors should not be foreclosed from using the 
specific command terms and hierarchical arrangement that Lotus had 
used. In drawing an analogy to the QWERTY keyboard, users who had 
learned the command structure of 1-2-3 and written their own macros 
would be locked into Lotus if Borland were prohibited from using the 
same pattern. This would provide undue market power to Lotus and fail 
to reward Borland for the value of its own innovations. 
3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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Borland is important for implicitly drawing a distinction, as argued above, 
between situations of misappropriation of another program's code and 
imitation of another program's features using freshly written code. This 
thesis argues for an interpretation of the Borland decision such that the 
Altai test applies to the former while the Borland analysis (echoing 
Synercom) applies to the latter. As the First Circuit stated:390 
While the Altai test may provide a useful framework for assessing 
the alleged nonliteral copying of computer code, we find it to be of 
little help in assessing whether the literal copying of a menu 
command hierarchy constitutes copyright infringement. 
. The implication would be that, if there has been no access to the source 
code of the plaintiff, the issue for the court is whether a particular feature 
of the program is, of itself, a protectable work for the purposes of 
copyright. The court effectively endorsed the approach that, provided a 
competitor write their own code, there should be little prohibition on 
imitation of function or interfaces: 
[T]o offer the same capabilities as Lotus 1-2-3, Borland did not have 
to copy Lotus' underlying code (and indeed it did not); to allow 
users to operate its programs in substantially the same way, 
however, Borland had to copy the Lotus menu command 
hierarchy. 
The appeal decision in Borland agrees with the policy objectives 
developed in this thesis, and also agrees with the distinction between 
approaches based on copying of code and imitation of features with fresh 
code. There are, however, some reasons to be concerned that the 
390 Emphasis added. 
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precedent set by Borland might not be a lasting or applicable to other 
countries. One issue is that the First Circuit upheld the argument as to 
"method of operation" but did not consider the question of whether it 
was also a "system, process or procedure". It is not clear that the court's 
decision will be adopted by courts outside the United States using only 
general law principles of the idea-expression distinction. Some indication 
of a willingness to do so is found in the Australian decision in 
Powerflex. 391 
The decision of the First Circuit was also at odds with an earlier decision 
of the Tenth Circuit in Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys. 
Inc.392 which rejected a similar argument based on s. 102(b ). 
More significantly, the appeal to the Supreme Court in Borland resulted 
in an equally divided (4-4) court, announced on 16th January 1996, with 
no written judgments supplied. The major issues in the appeal squarely 
addressed the concern of this thesis. For example, the opening sentence to 
Lotus' argument in its petitioner's brief to the Supreme Court stated: 
The issue in this case is whether the copyright protection Congress 
granted computer programs protects the original, creative 
expression contained in their user interfaces against wholes ale 
appropriation. 
That this proposition obtained support from four of the nine serving 
judges suggests that it is possible that in a further appeal, user interfaces 
391 Section 7.6.3. 
392 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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such as the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy may become per s e 
protectable. This would be likely to flow onto other jurisdictions such as 
Europe which, as discussed below, have indicated some willingness to 
following the lead of the United States courts. 
7.6.2 Europe 
In Europe, it should be noted that the EC Directive restated the idea 
expression dichotomy in that the principles underlying a computer 
program are not protected. Moreover the EC Directive also states that the 
principles underlying a program's interfaces are also not protected. 
Courts in EC member states will, however, be faced with the task of 
developing jurisprudence to deal with these copyright law changes over 
the coming years. This may result in some ''lurching, backtracking and 
zigzagging"393 before a general consensus is reached. Cases in the United 
Kingdom, both before and after the EC Directive have, however, indicated 
a willingness to be led by the United States courts in developing this 
jurisprudence. 
In Computer-Aided Systems (UK) Ltd v Bolwezz394 the plaintiff's ex-
employees wrote a fourth generation language program, Progress, which 
had similar functions to a vehicle leasing program in COBOL written for 
393 Karjala, D.S. (1994) "Recent United States and International Development in 
Software Protection (Part 2)" European Intellectual Property Review, p. 58 at p. 63. 
394 (Unreported, Chancery Division, 23 August 1989). 
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the plaintiff. Hoffmann J cited Whelan with approval, and held that 
program structure was a form of literary expression protected by copyright. 
The significantly different conceptual characteristics of the fourth 
generation language, however, did not suggest an objective similarity 
between the programs. 
John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders395 dealt with programs for 
labelling medicines. The defendant had been employed by the plaintiff to 
modify and improve the plaintiff's program written in BASIC, later 
rendered in machine code for the BBC microcomputer by rewriting in 
assembly language. Subsequently, the defendant developed a rival 
program which performed similar functions with more advanced 
features, although it was written in QuickBASIC for the IBM. Given no 
similarity in source code (between BBC assembler and IBM QuickBASIC) 
the court assessed similarity in non-literal elements. Of 17 similarities 3 
(the line editor, amendment routines and dose codes) were found to have 
been the result of copying the plaintiff's program and infringement 
upheld. Importantly, Ferris J cited Altai with approval, stating: 
There is thus nothing in any English decision which conflicts with 
the general approach adopted in the Computer Associates case ... it 
would be right to adopt a similar approach in England. This means 
that consideration [of copying] is not restricted to the text of the 
code. 
395 [1993] FSR 497. 
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In Ibos Compters Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd396 a 
program called ADS had been jointly developed between programmers P 
and C over a number of year after which P separately developed a 
competing program called Unicorn. An inference of copying was drawn 
from the presence of common spelling mistakes, identical comment 
headings, file records and redundant and unexplained code in the source 
code of both programs. The court found infringement on the basis that 
the defendant had taken short cuts in creating his program by starting 
with ADS and making modifications to produce Unicorn. It should also 
be noted that Jacob J raised caution about the direct applicability of United 
States cases to English law. 
7.6.3 Australia 
The situation in Australia will remain uncertain until the High Court 
rules on the pending appeal from the Full Federal Court in. Powerflex 
Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation397. The Powerfiex litigation 
paralleled the Borland litigation in the United States. The approach and 
findings of the court at first instance398 on appeal in both cases was 
remarkably similar. 
Data Access owned copyright in the program DataFlex, which provided a 
396 [1994] FSR 275. 
397 [1997] FCA 490. 
398 Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Seroices Pty Ltd (1993) AIPC 191-006 p. 39,445. 
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set of programming tools to develop database management systems. The 
program was comprised of a development component (compiler tools) 
and· a runtime system (interpreter). The Dr Bennett was a user of DataFlex 
for a number of years and desired to create an application development 
system which would be compatible with the DataFlex program in terms of 
using the same commands, file structure and functions keys. By study of 
the manuals and close observation of the operation of DataFlex, Dr 
Bennett independently wrote his own program which was initially called 
Powerflex although later changed to PFXplus, which was sold 
commercially as a competitor to DataFlex. There was no similarity in 
source code or object code of the two programs. 
Infringement was alleged on the basis that PFXplus "language" (the set of 
command words and macros used) was copied from the DataFlex 
program, along with a compression algorithm look-up table, identical 
function key assignments, and an error text table. The key issue was 
whether the command words individually or together constituted a 
computer program within the meaning of the Act. If the command 
words were protectable, then infringement would have followed as some 
192 of the 254 Dataflex words were contained in PFXplus. 
Jenkinson J at first instance held that each one of the words in the 
DataFlex language was protected by copyright as a computer program. 
Each word constituted a "set of instructions" which caused the computer 
to perform a particular function. The declarative words and phrases of 
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the PFXplus program (expressions in a fourth generation language) were 
converted to a set of procedural instructions in C (a third generation 
language) then to machine code for execution by the runtime system. 
That there was no similarity in the source code underlying the commands 
words was seen as immaterial. 
Powerflex argued that the words constituted unprotectable "ideas" within 
accepted copyright doctrine and drew upon the decision in Borland and in 
particular its statement that:399 
If specific words are essential to operating something, then they are 
part of a "method of operation" and, as such, are unprotectable. 
The principle in Borland was that words such as "Copy" and "Print", as 
used in the menu hierarchies, were uncopyrightable in contrast to the 
underlying code which was protected expression. Jenkinson J rejected 
these arguments on two bases. The first was that he distinguished 
Borland as an application of s. 102(b) of the United States' legislation and 
the phrase "method of operation" which did not exist in the Australian 
Act. The second was the application of Keeton J's approach to 
infringement in Paperback, which, as discussed above, was based on the 
Whelan principles. He held that the words in the DataFlex language were 
protected expression on the basis that there were numerous other ways of 
expressing the functions which the commands performed. Even though 
the words were mnemonic and suggested the function to be performed, 
399 49 F.3d. 807 (1st Cir. 1995) at p. 816. 
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there were other words which could have been used to execute these 
functions. On the same basis, each of the allocation of 16 words to 
function keys was a computer program and their imitation by the 
defendant an act of infringement. 
In examining the macros the court did find similarity in the source code 
underlying the macros, although the methodology employed by the court 
was questionable. The DataFlex macros were written in an intermediate 
code (analogous to assembler language) while the PFXplus macros were 
written in source code. The court made a comparison between the 
PFXplus source code and a rendering of the DataFlex intermediate code 
into source code which the court accepted as a "translation". As discussed 
in Chapter Five, there would have been little isomorphic relationship 
between source and intermediate code and the reliability of this subjective 
exercise from an evidentiary perspective is speculative. Fong400 argued 
that the only real similarity between the two sets of macros was in their 
function. 
Powerflex did not infringe, however, in the reproduction of an error text 
table, a look-up table of 100 strings of text responses when the program 
recognised an error in function. Jenkinson J accepted the argument that 
the_ number of ways in which the error table could be expressed was 
limited and that the expression merged with idea. Surprisingly, the court 
400 Fong, K. (1997) "Non-Literal Copying Infringes Copyright in Software" European 
In tellectual Property Review, p. 256 at p . 258. 
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also held that reproduction of a Huffman compression table did infringe. 
The table was based on a compression algorithm whereby characters 
normally encoded in 8 bits were encoded by using short strings of less 
than 8 bits for common characters, and for uncommon characters using 
longer strings. The result is a significant saving of storage space. The 
court appeared to base its ruling on the acceptance of evidence that the 
table might have been constructed in some alternative ways using the 
same compression algorithm. On the same basis, the use of the DataFlex 
file structure infringed, even though this was essential if files created in 
one system were to be compatible with the other. The PFXplus file 
structure instructions were treated as an adaptation of the Dataflex 
instructions, even though there was no similarity in code. 
Effectively, the decision at first instance granted an Australia-wide 
monopoly to Dataflex over use of 192 command words in computer 
programs, including such common words as "Print", "Display", "Save", 
"Find" and "Help", common words which existed in other languages 
developed before DataFlex, such as BASIC. The first instance decision was 
severely criticised as providing greater protection to American companies 
in Australian than that which they would receive in the United States, 
putting Australian companies at a distinct competitive disadvantage.401 
401 Moignard, S. (1996) "Computer Software Copyright - Protecting Ideas or 
Expressions?" Australian Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 7, p. 198. 
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On appeal, the Full Court overturned the decision and found that the 
DataFlex words were not computer programs: 
Each of the words in the so-called DataFlex language is but a cipher. 
The underlying program is the set of instructions which directs the 
computer what to do when that cipher is in fact used, for example 
by being typed on to the screen. It is not to the point that the cipher 
bears some resemblance to an ordinary English word. The cipher 
or command is not an expression of the set of · instructions, 
although it appears in that set of instructions. It is the trigger for 
the set of instructions to be given effect to by the computer. 
The Full Court identified the computer program as being expressed in the 
source code, not in the choice of command words. Unlike Jenkinson J, 
the Full Court endorsed the approach of Borland and noted that the Court 
of Appeals in Borland stated that s. 102(b) of the United States' Act added 
little to the general law principle of separation of ideas and expression. 
The Supreme Court judgment in Baker v Selden402 was seen as 
embodying this principle in common to both jurisdictions. Given the 
description of the command words as "ciphers", the court refused to 
protect the words themselves since they were ideas rather than 
expression. Extending this argument, both of the function key words and 
the macros were also unprotectable: 
In our view, a command which triggers the underlying computer 
program to perform more than one function is no more a 
computer program than is a command which triggers the program 
to perform only one function. 
The court rejected the objective similarity between the two versions of 
402 (1880) 101 us 99. 
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source code underpinning the macros as justifying a finding of an 
"adaptation" of the DataFlex macros: 
In our view, a process of devising a source code to perform the 
same function as is performed in some other source code expressed 
in original language does not involve creating a version of the 
original source code. It is an original work, albeit that the function 
to be performed is the same. 
The court agreed that the error table was not infringed, although not on 
the grounds of merger held in first instance. The table might be protected 
as a table or compilation (not a computer program), but on the evidence 
there were sufficient differences in the texts to prevent a finding of 
reproduction. The court did uphold, however, the infringement by 
reproduction of the Huffman compression table, although again as a table 
or compilation and not as a computer program. While Dr Bennett did 
not directly copy the compression table, by observation of the behaviour 
of the DataFlex program and use of test files the PFXplus compression 
table was effectively reverse engineered, although its final form was 
indistinguishable from that of DataFlex. On this basis, echoing the 
earlier High Court ruling in Autodesk v Dyason, the table had been 
indirectly . copied by this reverse engineering process and therefore 
infringed. 
The court also overturned the finding that the use of the file structure 
infringed. With no similarity in source code between the two programs 
the only identity was that of function, which was unprotectable. Again 
the court rejected the description of PFXplus as an "adaptation" of 
DataFlex in this respect. 
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The approach of the Full Federal Court, like that of the First Circuit in 
Borland, agrees with the policy prescriptions in this thesis. In particular, 
both courts appear to recognise that copyright principally protects program 
code and that protection of "non-literal" elements should not be equated 
with protection of the underlying code. Both have emphasised the 
importance of interfaces and refused to protect elements of these 
interfaces based on analogous reasoning. In Borland, the menu 
command hierarchy was an unprotectable "method of operation". In 
Powerflex, the database language was an unprotectable "cipher". The 
major difference is that Australia is likely to have a ruling shortly from its 
highest appellate court which will settle the law, whereas in the United 
States the split decision of the Supreme Court is likely to generate further 
uncertainty. 
7. 7 Political considerations 
In assessing the current state of the law internationally it is important to 
remember that legislation and case law did not arise in a political 
vacuum. While some of the policy prescriptions developed within this 
thesis may represent a normative policy objective, desirable innovation 
policy in the information economy needs to be tempered by an 
understanding of the political economy. Legislative reform may be 
impeded or circumvented by powerful interest groups actively 
participating within the policy development and legislative process. 
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Indeed, Litman403 has argued that the nature of the legislative process in 
the United States was to blame for difficulties in accommodating 
copyright law for new technologies. Olson404 believed that Congress as a 
political body was loathe to implement changes which would result in 
one-sided losses on interest groups, with the result that "good copyright 
policy" was often delayed or abandoned. MeneU405 noted that one of the 
difficulties was that policymakers did not have a sufficient understanding 
of the path of information technology and the implications for a desirable 
intellectual property regime. He suggested that the outcome of the 
CONTU process was unsurprisingly, "a rather naive set of 
recommendations, closely approximating the status quo".406 
One example of politics affecting intellectual property policy was the 
development of the EC Directive. Political considerations provide one 
explanation for the significant concessions contained in the EC Directive 
to reverse engineering and access to interfaces. From December 1989 to 
July 1990, the European Parliament considered the issue of reverse 
403 Litman, J. (1989) "Copyright Legislation and Technological Change" Oregon Law 
Review, Vol. 68, p. 275. 
404 Olson, T.P. (1989) "The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to Proposed 
Copyright Reforms Since the 1909 Act" Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA, 
Vol. 36, p. 109. 
405 Menell, P.S. (1994) "The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for 
Computer Software" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 94, p. 2644 at p. 2651. 
406 Ibidem p. 2652. 
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engineering within the EC Directive in a debate which was:407 
... often heated, sometimes illuminating, never conclusively 
persuasive one way or the other. 
A "virtual firestorm erupted"408 dividing the European computer 
industry into two opposing camps. The European Committee for 
Interoperable Systems (ECIS) was formed in September 1989 and included 
companies such as Bull, Olivetti, Fujitsu, NCR, UNISYS and Sun. ECIS 
supported an open interface approach and endorsed the freedom to 
conduct reverse engineering and extraction of interface specifications. 
Against ECIS rose the Software Action Group for Europe (SAGE) which 
included IBM, DEC, Apple, Lotus and Microsoft.409 SAGE opposed the 
draft directive arguing for broader protection of software to fight "piracy" 
and to stimulate investment. About a year later, the Computer Users of 
Europe (CUE) emerged to argue for users' concerns in support of freedom 
of competition and interoperability. Vinje410 noted that SAGE and ECIS 
argued from the perspective of their membership's situation with respect 
to de facto interfaces. IBM's Systems Network Architecture and 
407 Verstrynge, J-F. (1993) "Protecting Intellectual Property Rights within the New Pan-
European Framework: Computer Software" in Lehmann, M. and Tapper, C.F. (eds) A 
Handbook of European Software Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press) p. 2. 
408 Vinje, T. (1993) "The Legislative History of the EC Software Directive" in Lehmann, 
M. and Tapper, C.F. (eds) A Handbook of European Software Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press) p. 39 at p. 46. 
409 Kellaway, L. (1990) "Unhappy Interface for Computer Industry Rivals" Financial 
Times (15th February) p. 7. 
410 Vinje, T. (1993) "The Legislative History of the EC Software Directive" in Lehmann, 
M . and Tapper, C.F. (eds) A Handbook of European Software Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
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Microsoft's MS-DOS, for example, established dominant standards to 
which the members of ECIS felt "locked-in", as access to and use of which 
were tightly controlled by members of SAGE. At one level the situation 
in Europe reflected concerns about fostering local technological industries 
to compete internationally, particularly a growing European IBM-
compatible PC industry led by Bull and Olivetti. The key issue was the 
ability to create products compatible with the PC-BIOS. ECIS insisted that 
acceptance of counter-proposals made by SAGE would effectively insulate 
American hardware and software companies from European 
competition.411 Goldstein412 noted that a prohibition on seeking 
compatibility through legitimate research and decompilation would be: 
... at the expense of Community-based companies seeking to make 
their products compatible with products coming from the United 
States. Not only would Community consumers pay the. difference; 
a large part of the price paid would flow out of the Community. 
A major policy objective of the EC was the harmonisation of 
telecommunications and the removal of barriers to harmonisation such 
as the existence of technical requirements of local communications 
networks inconsistent with international standards. The identification of 
computer software as the key to the development of effective 
communications systems has in part led to similar policy needs for 
Press) p. 39 at p. 47. 
411 Ibidem p. 62. 
412 Goldstein, P. (1993) "The EC Software Directive: A View from the United States of 
America" in Lehmann, M. and Tapper, C.F. (eds) A Handbook of European Software 
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press) p. 203 at p. 205. 
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regulation in these sectors.413 The explicit removal of protection to 
interfaces in the EC Directive echoed the requirement in the Directive o n 
Liberalization of Terminal Equipment4l4 to disclose interface 
specifications. It is arguable that the EC's long interest in the area of 
telecommunications interfaces and its experience with IBM's refusal to 
provide European companies with access to interface specifications in the 
1980's naturally applied to the debate on software protocols. It is 
consistent with the above to note that the EC itself is a supra-national 
body principally concerned, under Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome, to 
promote development of the Community economy and has been a major 
contributor to the development of competition policy in Europe. 
Competition law serves as a policy instrument to shape and consolidate a 
Community-wide integrated internal market.415 
Australia, by contrast, represented a small country whose development of 
copyright legislation was driven principally by the concerns of 
multinational software houses and the United States government in 
applying unilateral trade pressures.416 For example, the CLRC had been 
413 Wilkinson, A. (1993) "Software Protection, Trade, and Industrial Policies in the 
European Community'' in Lehmann, M. and Tapper, C.F. (eds) A Handbook of 
European Software Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press) p. 25 at p. 31. 
414 Directive 88/301EC Articles 4 and 5. 
415 Bellis, J-F. and L'Ecluse, P. (1991) "The Meaning of Competition Law for Information 
Technology in Europe" Chapter Two in Meijboom, A.P. and Prins, C. (eds) The Law of 
Information Technology in Europe 1992: A Comparison with the USA (Kluwer: 
Deventer) p. 29. 
416 Dempsey, G.C. (1995) "Evolution of Copyright Protection for Software Programs in 
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given a reference to investigate the legal protection of computer 
programs. Fearing potential change from the status quo the United States 
acted to pre-empt the Australian government on the issue. On 30 April 
1993, shortly befor·e the draft report on the CLRC was to be finalised, the 
United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor signalled his intention 
to retain Australia417 on the "Priority Watch List", under s. 301 of the 
United States Trade and Competitiveness Act 1974, on the basis that there 
was a risk that Australia might adopt a protection regime for computer 
programs other than as a literary works under copyright. It is arguable 
that the CLRC responded to this pressure. Its draft report recommended 
not only the continuation of protection for computer programs as literary 
works, but notably recommended replacing the Australian definition of 
J/computer program" with the definition in the United States Act.418 On 
30 April 1994, Australia was transferred from the "priority watch list" to 
the "watch list". In its final report the CLRC stated:419 
The Committee would like to think that the Draft Report ... served 
to reassure the US Government any remove any misapprehension 
that it might have previously had about the Committee's 
intentions. 
More important for the future of computer software copyright are 
Australia" Law and Policy, Vol. 17, p. 283. 
417 Together with the European Community, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Hungary, Korea, 
Poland, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Turkey. 
418 Copyright Law Review Committee (1993) Draft Report on Computer Software 
Protection (AGPS: Canberra) para. 6.17. 
419 Copyright Law Review Committee (1995) Computer Software Protection (AGPS: 
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growing pressures within international institutions to harmonise 
copyright protection in a direction of strong protection favoured. 
Principal amongst these are the Berne Convention, the Final Act of the 
Uruguay Round and unilateral trade action by the United States. The 
Berne Convention consists of a series of treaties dating from 1886 which 
provides that signatory states to the Berne Union agree to accord an 
author's works, originating in any member country of the Union, the 
same protection it accords works originating in its own country. The 
Convention also dictates some minimum requirements for protection. 
The EC Directive was based on the Berne Convention and that its 
provisions dealing with computer programs as literary works are 
consistent is alleged specifically in Recitals 25 and 29 and also in Article 
1(1). A significant exception to the permitted reverse engineering is article 
6(2)(c) of the EC Directive which removes the fair use exception where the 
purpose is the development of a computer program "substantially similar 
in expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright". This may 
potentially, depending on subsequent case law, include non-literal 
infringement.420 The presence of Article 6(2)(c) was designed to ensure 
that the EC Directive is consistent with the Berne Convention.421 
Canberra) para. 3.23. 
420 Soma, J.T., Winfield, G. and Friesen, L. (1994) "Software Interoperability and Reverse 
Engineering" Rutgers Computer and Technology Law journal, Vol. 20, p. 189 at p. 241. 
421 Verstrynge, J-F. (1993) "Protecting Intellectual Property Rights within the New Pan-
European Framework: Computer Software" in Lehmann, M. and Tapper, C.F. (eds) A 
Handbook of European Software Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press) p. 1 at p. 10. 
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The development of protection legislation for computer programs other 
than as literary works within the Berne Convention appears foreclosed 
internationally422 by the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) as part of the Final Act of the Urugauy Round 1994. In 
particular, article 10(1) of the TRIPS agreement provides: 
Computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be 
protected as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971). 
Further, Article 10(2) requires in part that: 
Compilations of data or other material, whether in machine 
readable or other form, which by reason of the selection or 
arrangement of their content constitute intellectual creations shall 
be protected as such ... 
The difference between the Berne Convention and TRIPS, however, was 
that the GATT created a monitoring and enforcement mechanism 
through the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to 
implement TRIPS. The WTO Treaty included dispute resolution 
procedures and authorised cross retaliation across different trade sectors. 
TRIPS was therefore a far more powerful instrument than the 
Convention in globalising intellectual property regimes in a direction 
favouring strong protection.423 
422 c.f. Samuelson, P., Davis, R., Kapor, M.D. and Reichman, J.H. (1994) "A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
94, p. 2308 at p. 2313; and Christie, A. (1994) "Designing Appropriate Protection for 
Computer Programs" European Intellectual Property Review, p. 486, who argued that 
the issue was "far from dead". 
423 Drahos, P. (1995) "Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the 
GATI", Prometheus, Vol. 13, p. 6. 
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Ginsberg argued that following TRIPS there was no longer a realistic 
alternative to copyright protection for computer programs.424 Pressure 
was also placed on countries to confer specific additional rights such a 
rental right for literary works (including computer programs) required by 
Article 11and14(4) of the TRIPS Agreement. In Australia CLRC endorsed 
the TRIPS requirement by recommending the introduction of a rental 
right.425 Reichman and Samuelson426 have also demonstrated the 
influence of vested interests in using the TRIPS regime to strengthen 
copyright protection in recent legislative initiatives in Europe and the 
United States to provide strong monopolies over information compiled 
in databases. 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter has examined the current state of the law with respect of 
computer program copyright with particular focus on the United States, 
Europe and Australia. Of particular interest were the effectiveness of the 
idea-expression distinction and the doctrine of fair use in providing 
encouragement to the development of competing products given the 
importance of internal interfaces and user interfaces. Although Landes 
424 Ginsberg, J. C. (1994) ''Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of 
Copyright over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software" Columbia Law Review, 
Vol. 94, p. 2559 at pp. 2562-2564. 
425 Copyright Law Review Committee (1995) Computer Sof tware Protection (AGPS: 
Canberra) para. 2.12. 
426 Reichman, J.H. and Samuelson, P. (1997) "Intellectual Property Rights in Data?" 
Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 50, p. 51. 
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and Posner had hoped that:427 
... the debate will be resolved not by the semantics of the words 
"idea" and "expression" but by the economics of the problem. 
the courts have, as discussed in this chapter, generally focussed on 
drawing the line between protectable and unprotectable elements of 
computer programs through fixing idea, or expression, or both in a 
semantic fashion. Most clearly this was illustrated by the approach in 
Whelan. 
In light of conflicting decisions it is difficult to come to a definite 
conclusion as to the scope of copyright protection for non-literal aspects of 
computer programs.428 This is particularly so given the 4-4 split by 
Supreme Court in the Borland case. 
In terms of desirable copyright policy it is tempting to endorse an Altai 
approach and reject the Whelan approach. It is arguable, however, that 
Altai might better be described as a refinement of the Whelan analysis 
rather than a rejection of it.429 Both cases were dealing with alleged 
misappropriation of source code and related source materials. With this 
kept in mind Whelan used the similarity in structure, sequence and 
organisation of the two programs to provide evidentiary grounds for an 
427 Landes, W.M. & Posner, R.A. (1989), "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law" 
Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 18 p. 325 at p. 352. 
428 Grewal, M. (1996) "Copyright Protection of Computer Software" European 
Intellectual Property Review, p. 454. 
429 Bainbridge, D. (1994) Software Copyright Law (2nd Ed.) (Butterworths: London) p. 
89. 
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inference of misappropriation. Altai created a more sophisticated 
methodology for the same purpose. The major problem with the 
judgments was that both courts used the language of idea and expression 
to explain their approach. It is not surprising that in cases such as 
Paperback and Borland, where the situation was not misappropriation but 
of independent development, that the courts unconsciously elevated 
non-literal similarities from evidentiary facts to works protectable per s e 
under copyright. It is suggested that resolution of the confusion 
surrounding non-literal copying will rely on courts making a clearer 
distinction between alleged copying of source code and alleged copying of 
function. An Altai approach would suit the former while the Synercom 
approach the latter. 
The advantage of this recommenqed approach is that it provides a 
''bright-line" test for infringement in cases where there has been no access 
to the plaintiff's source code and related materials. A bright-line test is 
needed if competitors are to be aware of what is and is not legal when 
developing a competing software product. A regime which forces all 
competitors to "play it safe" will have a negative effect on innovation, 
particularly in cross fertilisation of ideas, concepts and user interfaces. 
Karjala430 argued that an idealised scheme of program copyrights would 
avoid legal standards requiring expensive and time-consuming litigation 
430 Karjala, D.S. (1994) "Recent United States and International Development in 
Software Protection (Part l}" European Intellectual Property Review, p. 13 at p. 15. 
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over difficult factual questions. It has been noted that the greatest 
attribute of the test in Altai is its flexibility and inherent discretion vested 
in the court in the filtering process.431 A major issue would be a factual 
examination of a program for comparison with efficiency consideration or 
a range of external factors including compatible hardware or software, and 
industry practices. All these issues may be the subject of dispute and 
require expert witnesses to resolve. This is clear in Lotus' petitioner's 
brief to the Supreme Court that the idea-expression compelled a "fact-
based, line-drawing exercise" in every case of computer program 
copyright. 
Simply put, an Altai approach would contribute to the uncertainty of 
litigation and place smaller companies at a disadvantage when dealing 
with multinational software houses.432 Recognition, however, that Altai 
is only appropriate in cases of misappropriation, and not where it is clear 
by other evidence that the defendant has had no access to the plaintiff's 
source code, would avoid protracted and costly litigation. Cases such as 
Borland and Powerfiex suggest that the legal issue will be limited to 
whether the non-literal element is itself a protectable work under 
copyright law. 
Australia may be fortunate in that it is likely that the High Court will 
431 Eland, S.H. (1994) "The Abstraction-Filtration Test: Determining Non-Literal 
Copyright Protection for Software" Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, p. 665 at p. 699. 
432 Bainbridge, D. (1994) Software Copyright Law (2nd Ed.) (Butterworths: London) p. 
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resolve the issue for its domestic law. The United States will remain in a 
state of uncertainty until the Supreme Court has an opportunity to rule 
on what it believes Congressional intent to have been in respect of 
computer program copyright. In the short term the clear policy 
statements in Borland may discourage similar litigation. Europe has yet 
to articulate its interpretation of the EC Directive and will, like Australia, 
most likely follow the lead of the United States. Although the decisions 
in Borland and Powerflex appear to · be moving in this direction, the 
author has some sympathy with the view that the system is "still badly 
bent, even if not completely broken".433 In the background should not be 
forgotten the increasingly critical role international institutions such as 
TRIPS will play in the future development of intellectual property beyond 
computer programs, such as databases, multimedia technologies, and 
internet regulation. 
100. 
433 Stem, R.H. (1993) "Is the Centre Beginning to Hold in US Software Copyright Law?" 
European Intellectual Property Journal, p. 39 at p. 40. 
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8.1 Review 
Chapter Eight 
Conclusions 
The major theme within this thesis was that information economics 
provided a distinct and preferable perspective to neo-classical economics 
in the analysis of technological development and therefore in the role of 
intellectual property in promoting innovation. 
The neo-classical approach, grounded in Arrow's concerns about 
appropriability, indicated that legal intervention was necessary to correct 
a particular market failure: that innovators might be under-rewarded 
since the information they produced could be easily transmitted to those 
who were not compelled to pay for its use. Within this perspective, 
examined in Chapter Two, appropriability is achieved by the imposition 
of intellectual property rights. These rights generate an incentive to 
invest based on excluding access to information. This exclusion attempts 
to force information to mimic the commodity characteristics of tangible 
goods. From this assumption, it follows that the promotion of 
innovation is found in the maximisation of potential returns to 
innovators and consequentially the perfection of appropriability through 
broadening of intellectual property protection. Regulatory failure arising 
from monopoly distortions, underutilisation, wasteful research, and anti-
competitive strategies is marginalised within this literature. 
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In contrast to the commodity view, an information economics 
perspective argued that information is preferably viewed as a resource. 
This conception of information, discussed in Chapter Three views it as 
part of shared technological capital, rather than as an industrial product. 
From this perspective, policy should seek to exploit the indivisibilities of 
information for social benefit in preference to maximising its 
appropriability. Moreover, innovation itself is not a bounded, 
independent process involving a single firm and capital investments, but 
a process which is evolutionary and interactive, involving many 
participants. Cumulative innovation through imitation and learning is 
dictated by bounded rationality in the face of limited knowledge and 
abilities of the economic actors. Limited information processing abilities 
and costs involved in learning new information means that the economy 
is likely to exhibit significant lead times such that investment in 
innovation can be rational without strong intellectual property 
protection. Informationally rich environments will also generate 
powerful network externalities, rewarding innovators with market power 
based on product leadership and bandwagon effects. 
Based on this information perspective a model of innovation was 
developed in Chapter Four which markedly differed from the "reward for 
inv.ention" model due to its contrasting underlying philosophy. Whereas 
the orthodox approach assumed that information displays "public good" 
characteristics - that others can access the information resulting in little 
reward for the innovator - the informational perspective assumed that 
page 221 
Chapter Eight - Conclusion 
information does not exist as an abstraction but was reliant upon the 
limitations of human understanding and communication which can be 
embodied in two principal ways. Knowledge can exist in both a codified 
and a tacit form. The less codified the knowledge, the less it displays 
public good characteristics. The more tacit the knowledge, the more 
difficult that knowledge is to articulate and communicate. The degree to 
which one can appropriate another's innovation is impeded both by the 
availability of the innovation in a codified form and the learning process 
involved in turning that codified knowledge into tacit knowledge. This is 
one explanation for the existence of natural lead times in innovation. 
Another way to embody information is to create technological products 
such as a physical machine or a piece of software. In the innovation 
model these products were defined as "information technology artefacts". 
The usefulness of this concept is that it permits a distinction to be drawn 
between the economic characteristics of the underlying technological 
knowledge and the characteristics of the physical artefact. The latter, 
despite the innovation embodied therein, would be an excludable 
commodity and not the subject of market failure assumed in a neo-
classical perspective. Assuming that a principal objective of intellectual 
property policy is the promotion of innovation, the IT artefact model of 
innovation can be used to explain the application the legal mechanisms 
of confidential information, patent and copyright. 
Chapter Five demonstrated that computer programs are a particular form 
of technological innovation which reflects the characteristics of the IT 
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artefact. This was based in the proposition that access to the executable 
form (machine code) of a program does not readily permit appropriation 
of the underlying knowledge. Although this proposition stands at odds 
with much of the legal literature in this area, it is justified by close 
examination of the nature of the software development process which 
shows, in particular, that when dealing with third or higher generation 
language development, there is no isomorphic relationship between the 
source code and the compiled machine code. Hence, decompilation is of 
limited utility. The result of this is that the executable form of a computer 
program corresponds to an IT artefact. The underlying source code 
represents the codified knowledge articulated by the programmers from 
their own tacit knowledge and by observation of other programs, in a 
cumulative learning process. The close analogy between the software 
development model and that of the confidential information scenario 
suggested a limited role for intellectual property protection beyond 
enforcement of trade secrets. A basic role for copyright is the prohibition 
of literal copying or "piracy" due to the costless replicability of machine 
code. 
In critically revisiting arguments for broad intellectual property protection 
for computer programs, the prescription of proprietary interfaces and 
standards in some of the policy literature described in Chapter Six is 
inappropriately based on a neo-classical perspective and inconsistent with 
the realisation of powerful network externalities within the industry. An 
information perspective instead recommended the encouragement of 
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reverse engineering and imitative competition on the basis that 
competitors implement their own source code solutions, thereby 
investing in the innovation process. Goals of efficiency and compatibility 
should not be hampered by intellectual property, so decompilation should 
be permitted to provide a limited degree of access to interfaces and 
communications protocols. Elements of a user interface should not be 
protectable per se. 
The consistency of copyright regimes in the United States, Europe and 
Australia with the policy implication of the advocated information 
perspective was examined in Chapter Seven. The legal situation will 
continue to be uncertain until key rulings of the Supreme Court and the 
Australian High Court have been handed down. While this is shortly to 
take place in Australia, the tied decision in Borland means that it may be 
some years before the Supreme Court has a further opportunity to 
consider the issue. The law may remain unsettled in Europe for longer, 
given the issuing of the EC Directive. Courts in Europe may take some 
time to reach some consensus on the domestic interpretation of the EC 
Directive and are likely to be influenced by the United States. The key 
issue of dispute is whether "non-literal" elements of computer programs, 
such as "structure, sequence and organisation", internal interfaces such as 
file structure and look-up tables, and user interfaces such as menu 
command hierarchies, are protected. The rulings of both Borland and 
Powerfiex on appeal would, on the whole, negate this proposition. This 
negation is consistent with the objectives of an information perspective. 
page 224 
Chapter Eight - Conclusion 
, 
International political pressures such as TRIPS, however, may influence 
future developments in copyright legislation over information 
technologies in the direction of stronger protection. 
8.2 Key Aspects and Recommendations 
This thesis provides five key contributions to the understanding of 
copyright and intellectual property in computer programs. First is the use 
of information economics as a lens through which to view innovation 
policy and the application of intellectual property to information 
technology. In particular, this thesis extends the literature in information 
economics, and analogous analyses of patent issues,434 into copyright. 
The value of information economics lies principally in the insight it 
provides into the role of knowledge and learning within technological 
innovation. More importantly, it represents a significant counterpoint to 
the "reward" perspective dominant in neo-classical analysis. As Boyle435 
stated: 
[Incentive] analysis largely ignores the opposite perspective, that of 
the free flow of information. If we switch the perspective, We can 
see that one important purpose of [intellectual property] law is to 
make sure that future creators have available to them an adequate 
supply of raw materials. From this perspective, too many 
"incentives" could convert the public domain into a fallow 
landscape of private plots. 
434 · e.g. Mandeville, T. D. (1996) Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological 
Change, and the Patent System (Ablex: New Jersey); and Mandeville, T.D, 
Lamberton, D.M. and Bishop, E.J. (1982) Economic Effects of the Australian Patent 
System (Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra). 
435 Boyle, J. (1996) Shamans, Software, and Spleens (Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge) p. 38. 
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Second is the development of a model of innovation which brings 
together two key information economics concepts regarding the 
embodiment of information. One is the recognition of the degrees to 
which knowledge exists in codified and tacit forms. This distinction was 
used by Mandeville436 in his analysis of the patent system. The other is 
recognition of the embodiment of technological knowledge within 
physical products, defined in this model as "IT artefacts". This 
knowledge-artefact distinction was adapted from the work of Monk437 in 
his study of technological change. By combining these distinctions, the 
model of innovation represents information embodied in three ways: as 
codified knowledge, tacit knowledge, and IT artefacts. The model explains 
the role of intellectual property laws in promoting innovation through 
the flow of tacit knowledge. 
Third is the rejection of a dominant assumption within the legal policy 
literature on computer program copyright - that possession of the 
software product (machine code) equates with access to the underlying 
knowledge (source code). This proposition is critical not only because the 
assumption of access has been the foundation for much of the legal 
literature favouring broader protection of programs, but it also facilitates 
436 Mandeville, T. D. (1996) Understanding Novelty: Information, Technological Change, 
and the Patent System (Ablex: New Jersey). 
437 Monk, P. (1992) ''Innovation in the Information Economy" in Antonelli, C. (ed.) The 
Economics of Information Networks (Elsevier Science Publishers: New York); and 
Monk, P. (1989) Technological Change in the Information Economy (Pinter 
Publishers). 
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the application of the innovation model to software development. 
Fourth is application of the innovation model to develop policy 
implications for intellectual property in the context of computer 
programs. It was argued that the law should reflect a model of 
confidential information, where imitative competition and reverse 
engineering promote technological innovation. The role of copyright law 
was in providing a basic level of protection to prevent literal replication 
of programs in their machine code form - "piracy". The proposition that 
copyright should provide broader protection over "non-literal" elements 
such as user interfaces was rejected. 
Fifth is the reconciliation of the case law regarding computer program 
copyright with these policy objectives. The courts have failed explicitly to 
recognise that alleged copyright infringement has been in two forms. One 
is by misappropriation of source code, for which non-literal similarities 
provide circumstantial evidence of actual copying. The approach in Altai 
would be suited to this kind of complex factual investigation. The other 
is by competitors imitating successful features or interfaces by engaging in 
their own development process and writing fresh source code. The 
approach in Synercom, and the appeal decisions in Borland, and 
Powerflex would be more appropriate in providing a "bright-line" 
infringement test, whereby the court's task is a question, not of "non-
literal" copying, but of whether the alleged feature or interface is itself 
protectable under copyright. It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
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law develops a jurisprudence consistent with this suggested methodology. 
It is hoped that the infusion of an information economics approach might 
trigger the switch in perspective needed in the coming policy debates to 
ensure the integrity of the future intellectual commons. 
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Appendix One 
The Compilation Process 
The public domain project SillyBalls is used to illustrate the steps 
involved in the compilation process. This program was written in 1988 
and intended as an instruction tool for programmers learning the 
graphical user interface of the Apple Macintosh. The program does not 
illustrate the full features expected in a sophisticated program, but is used 
to illustrate the relationships discussed above between source, object and 
executable code. The program does nothing more than use the Macintosh 
Quickdraw tool to draw a series of randomly coloured and placed balls on 
the screen until the user dicks the mouse to end the program. The 
development environment used for illustration is Metrowerks 
Codewarrior Integrated Development Environment version 1.7.4. 
The starting point is the source code files together with the project file. 
These are illustrated in iconographic form in Figure Al-1. 
D 
Silly Balls.µ 
~ 
El 
SillyBalls.h 
~ 
tEJ 
Silly Balls .c 
Figure Al-1 - Project Files 
Silly lnit.c 
Silly Balls.µ .rsrc 
The project file SillyBalls.µ keeps track of the other source materials for 
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the program. By convention, project files are identified by adding the 
extension ".µ" to the name of the file. The text based source code is 
located in SillyBalls.c and Sillyinit.c. This '1.c" extension to the names of 
these files indicate that the source code is written in the C language.438 
An extract of each of these C based files (without comment lines) are 
presented in Figure Al-2 And Figure Al-3. 
#include "SillyBalls.h" 
extern Rect windRect; 
void Initialize(void) 
{ 
Figure Al-2 - Sillylnit.c 
WindowPtr mainPtr; 
OSErr error; 
SysEnvRec theWorld; 
error= SysEnvirons(l, &theWorld); 
if (theWorld.hasColorQD == false) { 
Sys Beep ( 5 0) ; 
ExitToShell (); 
InitGraf(&qd.thePort); 
InitFonts(); 
InitWindows (); 
InitMenus(); 
TEinit (); 
InitDialogs(nil); 
InitCursor(); 
GetDateTime((unsigned long*} &qd.randSeed); 
mainPtr = GetNeWCWindow(rWindow, nil, (WindowPtr) -1); 
windRect = mainPtr->portRect; 
SetPort(mainPtr); 
TextSize(BobSize); 
438 By convention, ".cp" and ".p" indicate C++ and Pascal respectively. 
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Figure Al-3 - SillyBalls.c 
#include "SillyBalls.h" 
Rect windRect; 
extern void Initialize (void); 
void NewBall(void); 
void MyPaint(Rect *); 
void main(void) 
{ 
Initialize(); 
do { 
NewBall(); 
} while (!Button()); 
void NewBall(void) 
{ 
RGBColor 
Rect 
long int 
ballColor; 
ballRect; 
newLeft,newTop; 
ballColor.red =Random() ; 
ballColor.green =Random(); 
ballColor.blue =Random(); 
RGBForeColor (&ballColor); 
newrop = Random(); 
newLeft = Random(); 
newTop = ((newTop+32767) * windRect.bottom) /65536; 
newLeft = ((newLeft+32767) * windRect. right )/65536; 
SetRect (&ballRect,newLeft,newTop,newLeft+Ba llWidth, 
newTop+BallHeight); 
MoveTo(newLeft, newTop); 
MyPaint(&ballRect); 
MoveTo(ballRect. left + BallWidth/2 - BobSize, 
ballRect.top + BallHeight/2 + BobSize/2 -1); 
InvertColor(&ballColor); 
RGBForeColor(&ballColor); 
Drawstring (" \pBob"); 
void MyPaint(Rect *rnyRect) 
{ 
RGBColor rnyColor; 
GetForeColor(&rnyColor); 
InvertColor(&rnyColor); 
RGBForeColor(&rnyColor); 
PaintRect(myRect ); 
InvertColor(&rnyColor); 
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RGBForeColor(&rnyColor); 
PaintOVal(rnyRect); 
The source code also includes a header file, SillyBalls.h. The ".h" 
extension indicates that the file contains definitions of data and 
prototypes of functions used by the program. An extract appears in Figure 
Al-4. 
SillyBalls.h 
/* Constants */ 
#define BallWidth 
#define BallHeight 
#define BobSize 
#define rwindow 
Figure Al-4 - SillyBalls.h 
20 
20 
8 
128 
The resources for the project are contained in the file SillyBalls.µ.rsrc. For 
this example, the resources are in a ResEdit file. ResEdit is an application 
in common use as a resource builder and editor. For this simple project, 
the only resource is the definition of the window to be used by the 
application. On the Macintosh, this is contained in a "WIND" resource 
within the SillyBalls.µ.rsrc file. This is illustrated in Figure Al-5. 
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Figure Al-5- ResEdit Resources 
~[] SillyBalls.JI.rsrc 0§ 
[bl {} -
WIND 
-. 
'° -~
When CodeWarrior is used to open the project file, it displays a list of the 
source material to be drawn upon in the construction of the program. 
This is presented in Figure 5-10. Note that the project window does not 
contain the header file. The reason is that each of the other source files 
cross-reference the header file in the compiler instruction "#include 
SillyBalls.h", which can be found in Figures Al-2 and Al-3. This instructs 
the compiler, before translating source code files into binary form, to copy 
the header file into each of the source code files. While included in the 
project window, the MacOS.lib was not among the source materials 
presented above. This library representing basic functions is used by 
Macintosh systems software, and is not specific to any particular project, 
but instead is used by a range of projects. This library is precompiled and 
in a binary format, so it will not require translation, but relevant extracts 
are used to supplement the object code created through the other source 
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files. 
Figure Al-6 - Project File 
v rf/ Sources 0 j 0 1 
rf/ Silly Balls .c 01 0 l I!) 
rf! smy lnit.c ~ o ~ o l LEI 
.,.n•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••U•••o•u•••••••-C.••••••••uooooouo0-••••••••••••••••·•-0-••••••••••••••••• 
"'1ii1' rf/ Librariy ~ 01 01 El 
'ti/ HacOS. lib i 0 l 0 ~ Ill 
...................................................................... 'C)··················<O-·················· .................. . 
"'ii" rf/ Resources 1 0 1 0 1 r.3 
rf/ Sill Balls. .rsrc l n/a 1 n/a [ .~. {} 
4·,fjle(s) 1• , ·· . . £. o .. o .~.· · . · ,; rai 
Once the source materials have been assembled, a compiler is used to 
create the object code (binaries) for each of the components of the project. 
The text based source code files will are sent to a C/C++ compiler for 
processing. The relevant elements of MacOS.lib are loaded into the 
project; the resource file is already in a binary form ready for linking. The 
compiler steps through the text based source files and creates 
corresponding binary object files, which are added to the project. 
Following compilation, the project window in Figure Al-7 shows that the 
binary from compilation of SillyBalls.c and Sillylnit.c are 330 and 134 bytes 
respectively, while 30,728 bytes of MacOS.lib has been loaded and stands 
ready to be linked. 
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Figure Al-7 - Project File After Compilation 
. _ _ _ _ S~ll B~lls.µ._ - .- . . .. .... 
v Sources 464 i 1 21 I:) 0 
Si11y8a11s.c 330 i 12 j CD 
Silly lnit .c i 1 34 i 0 ) I!) 
······································································~·················•-0-··· · ··············9················· 
VJ'· Library ~ 30K ~ 0 ~ El 
MacOS. lib ~ 30728 l 0 ~ CD 
··~: ......... R.eso·li·r-·c;·e-s·· ....................... r ............. ,n .............. •ir··· .. ·····a·· 
Sill Balls .. rsrc ! n/a ~ n/a i 
4 . {i~(s) ', · ~~JC .12 · lr.Jii 
The final step is the building of the software product, in this case an 
application or executable program. This requires a linker, which takes all 
the pieces of object code and arranges them in a manner compatible with 
the configuration of the central processing unit (CPU) of the machine on 
which the program is intended to run. Sophisticated linkers recognise 
redundant object code which is removed from the final program; such 
linkers may also optimise the executable code for speed in reference to a 
particular CPU architecture. Some other languages run an optimiser 
separate to the linker after the code has been run through the linker. 
Once this final step is complete, the output is a ready to use software 
product. The relevant icon for the executable application is presented in 
Figure Al-8. 
Figure Al-8 - Application 
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. Appendix Two 
Commented Source Code 
An example of commented source code (public domain) is presented 
below in Figure A2-l. 
Figure A2-1- Commented Source Code 
ll---------~----------------------------------------------------------
11 types 
11-------------~---------------------~------------------------------
typedef RectPtr *RectHandle; 
I* 
This is a document layout that contains the window record and references 
to the associating data. The window record MUST be the first field. This 
is because I use the window pointer returned by the Toolbox to be a 
pointer to my document. To confirm that the window pointer is a document 
pointer, I store an application reference in the window record's refCon. 
Then, I use a routine to test for the presence of this reference to insure 
I'm looking at one of my document's windows. 
*I 
struct SndDocurnent ( 
WindowRecord 
short 
short 
window; II must be first field 
II document's resource f ile 
II document's list of sounds 
long 
ListHandle 
Boolean 
resFile; 
vRefNurn; 
dirID; 
list; 
sndinUse; I I document is using a 'snd ' resource 
} ; 
typedef struct SndDocument SndDocument; 
typedef SndD:>eument *SndDocPeek; II to peek at the document record 
II This is the status window layout . The concept here is similar t o the 
11 document type mentioned above. The message is a string handle used to 
II store the current message. 
struct 
} ; 
StatusWindow ( 
WindowRecord 
StringHandle 
long 
window; 
message; 
showrime; 
II current text of status message 
I I time window was shown 
typedef struct StatusWindow StatusWindow; 
typedef StatusWindow *StatWindowPeek; 
I I This is the about window layout. The concept here is s imilar to the 
II document type mentioned above . The comment is a string handle used to 
II store the current message. 
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struct AboutWindow { 
WindowRecord 
Handle 
Handle 
) ; 
window; 
appPict; 
comment; 
II handle to picture of app's name 
11 handle to string of about comments 
typedef struct AboutWindow AboutWindow; 
typedef AboutWindow *AboutWPeek; 
11 This is the template to the WIND resource. I used it to load in the WIND 
II resource and then adjust the ooundsRect . I also look at the procID to 
11 determine if it has a title bar or drag region. 
struct WindowTemplate { 
} ; 
Rect boundsRect; 
short procID; 
Boolean visible; 
Boolean fillerl; 
Boolean goAwayFlag; 
Boolean filler2; 
long ref Con; 
Str255 title; 
II template to a WIND resource 
typedef struct WindowTernplate WindowTernplate; 
typedef WindowTernplate *WindowTPtr, * *WindoWI'Hndl; 
page 237 
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Decompilation 
Using the SillyBalls example, the decompiled version of the object code 
generated by Sillylnit.c is set out below in figure A3-l. Note that there is 
little resemblance to the source code extracted in Appendix One, and even 
less resemblance to the full version of the source code (not reproduced) 
which contains extensive comments through the code, similar to 
Appendix Two. 
Figure A3-1- Sillylnit.c (Decompiled) 
02412730: mflr rO 
02412734: stw r31,-4(sp) 
02412738: stw r30,-8(sp) 
0241273C: stw r29,-12(sp) 
02412740: stw r0,8(sp) 
02412744: stwu sp,-96(sp) 
02412748: addi r31,rtoc,152 
0241274C: bl *+1380 ; Ox02412cb0 
02412750: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
02412754: sth r3,64(sp) 
02412758: bl *+1368 ; Ox02412cb0 
024127SC: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
02412760: sth r3,66(sp) 
02412764: bl *+1356 ; Ox02412cb0 
02412768: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
0241276C: sth r3,68(sp) 
02412770: addi r3,sp,64 
02412774: bl *+1364 ; Ox02412cc8 
02412778: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
0241277C: bl *+1332 ; Ox02412cb0 
02412780: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
02412784: ext sh r29,r3 
02412788: bl *+1320 ; Ox02412cb0 
0241278C: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
02412790: lha rO, 4 (r31) 
02412794: addi r4,r29,32767 
02412798: ext sh r30,r3 
0241279C: mullw r0,r4,r0 
024127AO: srawi r29,r0,16 
024127A4: addze r29,r29 
024127A8: lha r0,6(r31) 
024127AC: addi r3,r30,32767 
024127BO: mullw r0,r3,r0 
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02412784: srawi r30,r0,16 
024127B8: addze r30,r30 
024127BC: rnr. r4,r30 
024127CO: rnr. r5,r29 
024127C4: addi r3,sp,56 
024127C8: addi r6,r30,20 
024127CC: addi r7, r29, 20 
024127DO: bl *+1296 ; Ox02412ce0 
024127D4: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
024127D8: rnr. r3,r30 
0241270C: rnr. r4,r29 
024127EO: bl *+1304 ; Ox02412cf8 
024127E4: lwz rtoc, 20 (sp) 
024127E8: addi r3,sp,56 
024127EC: bl *+124 ; Ox02412868 
024127FO: nap 
024127F4: lha r3,58(sp) 
024127F8: lha r4,56(sp) 
024127FC: addi r3,r3,2 
02412800: addi r4,r4,13 
02412804: bl *+1268 ; Ox02412cf8 
02412808: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
0241280C: addi r3,sp,64 
02412810: bl *+1304 ; Ox02412d28 
02412814: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
02412818: addi r3,sp,64 
0241281C: bl *+1196 ; Ox02412cc8 
02412820: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
02412824: addi r3,rtoc,136 
02412828: bl *+1352 ; Ox02412d70 
0241282C: lwz rtoc,20(sp) 
02412830: lwz r0,104(sp) 
02412834: addi sp, sp, 96 
02412838: mtlr rO 
0241283C: lwz r31,-4(sp) 
02412840: lwz r30,-8(sp) 
02412844: lwz r29,-12(sp) 
02412848: blr 
0241284C: dc.l OxOOOOOOOO ; Invalid opcode I I .... 
02412850: dc.l Ox00002041 ; Invalid opcode I ... A' 
02412854: lwz r0,0(r3) 
02412858: dc.l OxOOOOOllc i Invalid opcode I I .... 
0241285C: dc.l Ox00082e4e ; Invalid opcode ' ... N' 
02412860: or is r23,rll,Ox4261 
02412864: xoris rl2,r3,0x0 
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Two examples of applications frameworks within the MacOS 
environment are EasyApp (written in C) and PowerPlant (written in 
C++ ). EasyApp is a simple yet powerful application framework written by 
Jim Trudeau in 1995 as a teaching device for programmers unfamiliar 
with the Macintosh.439 It provides a stand-alone shell where the basic 
principle is that a substantial percentage of any program behaviour can be 
described by some simple default functions. The source files used in 
EasyApp are presented in Figure A4-l. 
439 Trudeau, J. (1995) Programming Start Kit for Macintosh (Hayden Books). 
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Figure A4-1 - Easy App 
Easy App 0 ~ l:l 
AppleEvents.c n/a l III 
dialog.c n/a l III 
drag.c n/aj III 
errors.c n/a n/aj [El 
events.c n/a n/a 1 Ill 
file.c n/a n/a l ID 
init.c n/a n/a ~ [il 
main .c n/a n/a ~ {il 
memory.c n/a n/al IB 
menus.c n/a j n/a l ID 
utilities.c n/a l n/a l IB 
vindovProc.c n/a ~ n/a i {il 
vindovs .c n/a ~ n/a ~ (£} 
zoom.c n/a! n/a1 IB 
Easy App.p.rsrc . n/a j n/a ~ (il 
··~········ ·i::i"b"r:ar::i·;·s-················· · ···········r·············ar············i;-r····· ···1:r 
Draglib ~ n/a 1 n/ a~ [il 
lnterfacel ib ~ n la 1 n I a l ID 
M'W'CRuntime.lib 1 nhd n/a ~ Ill 
··~······· ·· ·vour:···App·········· · ····················1············· · ·ar· ······· · ····c;T·········i?r 
hooks.c ~ n/.a j n/a ~ IB 
Your A .rsrc f n/a 1 n/a ~ 
The EasyApp section of the source materials contains the "shell" of the 
application and provides a range of default services to the application and 
its interface components. These services include: memory management 
(memory.c); retrieving and parsing events such as keyboard strokes and 
mouse actions (events.c); creation and disposal of windows (windows.c); 
and management of menus and menu selections (menu.c). The libraries 
represent the required libraries for software to run on PowerMacs 
(DragLib, lnterfaceLib, and MWCRuntime.Lib). The programmer 
augments or replaces the default interface behaviour by modifying the 
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"hooks" to the default routines contained in the source file hooks.c, and 
creates customised resources by replacing the YourApp.rsrc file with 
appropriate new resources. 
An example of a sophisticated object oriented application framework is 
PowerPlanl, commercially available from Metrowerks and written in 
C++. It provides a main event loop and supporting classes which 
implement features such as menus, windows and printing. The source 
code for PowerPlant is presented in Figure A4-2. 
A4-2 - PowerPlant 
~Ni: :----:~---- -~...,... - Basic ·Powe rPla n t 6.8K. u ~.:::=:··-=--·-:_ _______ ===~il§.fill~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . ' . 
t~L{filf'H~;T.'·:; ·. . % J . ·~ · ,. ., ·· , : · ,.. ' ::··. ;:w·:'"'e~~~).,.,J~ata ~ .~ .. , · · 
"V (I/ Application 0 j 0 • EJ (i• 
if( M1J F'P...D>?brJ9Ho?.aders.pch++ nh j n/ .a • [} --~ 
((I PP Basic Stat·tet· .cp 01 0 • ID 
t(I/ PP Basic Resouf'ce .f's re n ia ; rr /.a ID 
~ PP Basic Resource .ppob n / a j n / .a , [l 
>¥ PP Action Strings.rsrc n/a ~ n/a ! [El 
¥(! PP DebugAlerts .rsrc . n /a ~ n/a : IB 
... t> .. ~···c·o~1n·~~·d·~·~·5 .............. ....................................................... r····· .. ··· ·a·t· .............. i:· .. ~ ... 1:r 
· ... t> .. ·~····F·~·a-tures .......................................................................  r·············or ............ oT ·~ .... Ef lt [~i~f i~~t~:: : ·_.·_ -::· .. ·. : : · T : !f ·:: :if T -~ 
·.·:.~:._._.~-_-.-.-~t~~~t~·~·~"""·.-.·.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.·.·.·.-.-.-.·:.-.-.·.·:.-.·.-.· ... -.-.·.-.-.·:.-.-.-.·.·:.-.-.-.-.-.·.-.·.-.-.-.·.·.-.·.-.·.-.-.·:.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.·.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.·.-.-.·+"""·.-.-.-.-.-.·.-.-.·.·g.f ."""·-·:.-.-.-.-.-.-.g.f ""·:.-.·::.~-.--
... lfr ... ~-·-tffhHie:s····-··· · ·· .......................... ···· .... ··· ·· ··· .............................. r··-····-·····•f · · ··· ·· ···· .... cf: ... -~·· ··a·· 
, "",, '" ,, ,. , • •••• •, •"' "' ," • • "' • ' '" • ••• ••••••n••U••••••••••••••••o• ••••• ••n•••••n ••'" • •" • • "' • "•' " " • • ••• • " . C•" • • ,., • • "' "' • .. (..u•••••••• ••o•• ••('o••.,•• •••o•••u• 
"?' ~ libraries 1 0 j 0 j a 
!fl HacOS.lib : o: o: [I, 
If(! CPlusPlus. lib 0 : 0 ~ 1B ·--· 
If(! AEOb jectSUDDOrtl ib .0 0 : 0 ~ [il -= .·' 
72 filJL>(s) 0 0 2i 
The PowerPlant environment provides a range of base classes which the 
programmer can draw upon to develop sophisticated applications. For 
example, the Pane classes handle visual elements such as windows and 
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pictures as well as editable text. Commander classes handle actions which 
involve interpreting keyboard and mouse commands (selecting Close in 
the File menu), broadcasting these to other objects (the relevant window) 
and receiving these messages and taking appropriate action (closing the 
window). The programmer modifies the basic framework by creating 
special instances (objects) of the relevant class which inherit their class's 
function and to which further functions can be attached. For example, to 
create the basic application shell, the source code will use a header file as 
presented in Figure A4-3. 
A4-3 - PowerPlant Header 
#include <Lapplication.h> 
class CPPMyApp : public Lapplication 
public: 
CPPMyApp ( ) ; 
virtual -CPPMyApp(); 
virtual BooleanObeyCornmand (COmmandT inCornmand, void* 
ioParam) 
protected: 
} ; 
virtual void FindCornmandStatus( 
CornmandT inCorrmand, 
Boolean &outEnabled, 
Boolean &outUsesMark, 
Charl6 &outMark, Str255 outName); 
virtual void Startup(); 
This piece of code takes the basic application class (LApplication) and 
creates a specific instance or object of that class (CPPMyApp) which, along 
with the inherited functions outlined in the definition of the object, will 
form the basis for the new software development. Similar modifications 
can be made to program objects such as windows (from LWindow) and 
pulldown menus (from Lmenu). 
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